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ABSTRACT
In its broadest aspect, this thesis constitutes a demonstration of the substantive utility 
of a political sociology that pays serious regard to the issues surrounding the notion of 
subjectivity. More specifically, it takes the form of a sustained argument concerning 
the relationship between political mobilisation and the various structures and dynamics 
associated with subjectivity. In the first part of the thesis, a theory of consciousness, 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity is developed. It is argued that as a result of a number 
of existential facts about consciousness, individuals manifest and are subject to various 
socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity. The most important of these are: (a) the 
necessity experienced by individuals to reaffirm their senses of self; (b) their desire for 
the symbolic mastery of the “external-world”; and (c) the compulsion experienced to 
negate symbolically the foreignness of the other. The second part of the thesis is 
devoted to exploring some of the political consequences and implications of the 
existence of these dynamics. By means of a number of case studies - specifically, 
analyses of political conflict, political ritual and populism - it is demonstrated that in 
order to understand various kinds of political mobilisation, it is necessary to 
understand the sense in which political action and discourse dovetail with the 
structures and dynamics of subjectivity. It is concluded that to the extent that this is the 
case, a political sociology which neglects issues of subjectivity is necessarily partial.
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INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, political analysis, certainly in the European tradition, has couched its 
theories and explanations at the macro-structural level.1 In this respect, two general 
concerns have been central: (i) a concern with power relations at the level of society 
and social structure; and (ii) an interest in the character and functioning of the state, 
and its relationship to civil-society. Indeed, for many theorists, it is a concern with 
macro-structural questions of power and the state that defines the proper realm of 
enquiry for political analysis 2 For example, Tom Bottomore argues that “the principal 
object of political sociology has been, and should be, the phenomenon of power at the 
level of an inclusive society (whether that society be a tribe, a nation state, an empire, 
or some other type); the relations between such societies; and the social movements, 
organizations and institutions which are directly involved in the determination of such 
power [Bottomore, 1979: 7].”
In part, the dominance of the macro-structural approach is a function of the history of 
development of political analysis.3 According to W. G. Runciman, a new science of 
politics emerged with the awareness that the state could be distinguished from society 
as a whole, an idea that opened the way for the analysis of the relations between the 
two.4 Moreover, he argues that any attempt to develop a general theory of society - one 
that would by implication tend to conflate these realms - is doomed to be a waste o f  
effort [Runciman, 1969: 1-4].
This general concern with power and the state is underpinned by an interest in 
emancipatory politics. In this respect, Anthony Giddens notes that radicalism, 
liberalism and conservatism - the three major approaches within modem politics - are
1 I am thinking here o f writers such as Karl Marx; Max Weber; Robert Michels; Alexis de 
Tocqueville; Gaetano Mosca; and so on. See, for example, Tom Bottomore's discussion in 
Political Sociology, (Hutchinson, London: 1979), 7-12.
2 For example: Crick, B., In Defence o f  Politics, (Penguin, Harmondsworth: 1964); Bendix, R., 
(Ed.), State and Society: A Reader in Comparative Political Sociology, (Little Brown, 
Boston: 1968); and Bottomore, T., (Hutchinson, London: 1979).
3 I am using the term "political analysis" to refer to various related disciplines: specifically 
political theory; political science; and political sociology.
4 Runciman, W. G., Social Science and Political Theory, 2nd Edition, (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge: 1969), chapter 2.
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all dominated, though in differing ways, by ideas of emancipation:5 radicals and liber­
als, avowing justice, equality and participation, seek to free individuals from 
exploitation, inequality and oppression [Giddens, 1991: 211-212]; conservatives, in 
contrast, define their intervention in terms of a rejection of the emancipatory agenda 
and develop instead a critique of modernisation [Giddens, 1991: 210], Clearly, issues 
of power and the state are central to issues of emancipation: firstly, in that these issues 
are integral to the conceptualisation of notions such as exploitation and oppression; 
and secondly, in that an understanding of them is central to the development of 
strategies of political intervention.
Of course, this is not to claim that one can only talk about power and the state from a 
macro-structural perspective. In this respect, Michel Foucault’s conception of power as 
a positive force is particularly significant. He rejects the idea that power is necessarily 
repressive, arguing instead that “...What makes power hold good, what makes it 
accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but 
that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces 
discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the 
whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is 
repression.”6 In particular, power acts on the body, which is, therefore, “directly 
involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they 
invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, 
to emit signs [Foucault, 1977: 25].”
Of course, such a conception results in an analysis which is radically different from 
those offered by traditional political theorists [i.e., Marx, Weber, Michels, etc.]. 
According to Foucault, power is not something to be possessed and utilised by an 
agent, whether that agent be a sovereign, a state or a social class.7 Rather, power is the
5 Giddens, A., Modernity and Self-Identity, (Polity Press, Cambridge: 1991), 210-214.
6 Foucault, M., "Truth and Power", in Foucault, M., Power/Knowledge, (Edited: Gordon, C.), 
(Harvester Wheatsheaf, London: 1980), 119.
7 For example, Foucault claims that power relations "are not univocal; they define innumerable 
points o f confrontation, focuses o f instability, each o f which has its own risks o f conflict, of 
struggles, and of an at least temporary inversion of the power relations [Foucault, 1977: 27]."
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agent itself: the agent of discourse, truth and knowledge.8 Therefore, there can be no 
question of emancipation from the effects of power, since power is constitutive of 
social life itself
Of course, despite Foucault’s rejection of the macro-structural approach, he is a long 
way from applying anything resembling an action framework to questions of power 
and politics. Indeed, one of the major criticisms levelled at him is that he pays 
insufficient regard to the role played by knowledgeable social actors in the constitution 
of social life.9 Of course, it is not the case that Foucault’s neglect of agency is theoreti­
cally naive, since it is clearly a function of the “decentring of the subject” that is 
characteristic of French “post-structuralist” thought.10 Nevertheless, analyses which do 
not take agency (or more precisely, subjectivity) seriously are, significantly flawed. 
Specifically:
1. Such analyses inaccurately specify the nature of the social world; not 
recognising that social actors are always and everywhere knowledgeable and 
purposive agents and that the continuity of social practices is ensured by means 
of the reflexive monitoring of social action.11
2. Where such analyses reduce subjectivity to the social world, the complexity of 
the constitution of subjectivity is oversimplified; specifically, these analyses 
fail to recognise that subjectivity is constituted at the intersection of three 
dynamics; namely, social, existential and unconscious dynamics.
3. Such analyses fail to consider subjectivity as a significant explanatory variable 
in the course of social action; to this extent, the accounts they offer of 
phenomena that are conceived in macro-structural terms are necessarily partial.
8 For brief critiques o f this position, see Giddens, A., A Contemporary Critique o f Historical 
Materialism, (MacMillan, London and Basingstoke: 1981), 171-172; and Giddens, A., 
Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory, (MacMillan, London and Basingstoke: 1982), 
221 - 222 .
9 See, for example, Giddens, A., (MacMillan, London and Basingstoke: 1982), 222.
10 Thus, Foucault characterises the "genealogical" method as "a form of history which can 
account for the constitution o f knowledges, discourses, domains o f objects etc., without 
having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of 
events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course o f history [Foucault, 1980: 117]."
11 See, for example, Schutz, A., The Phenomenology o f the Social World, (Northwestern 
University Press, Evanston: 1967b); and Giddens, A., The Constitution o f Society, (Polity 
Press, Cambridge: 1984).
9
The important point is that these criticisms apply not just to post-structuralist theories, 
but to any social theory or analysis which fails to recognise the significance of 
subjectivity. Accordingly, it is my claim that the macro-structural orientation of much 
political analysis acts as a significant barrier to the understanding of political 
phenomena and processes.
Of course, it must not be claimed that political analysis never concerns itself with 
social actors. However, what is significant is that where it does so - as, for example, in 
the American behaviouralist tradition - it tends to treat issues of subjectivity in a one­
dimensional fashion; that is, it tends to reduce subjectivity to the social world. To 
demonstrate this, I will consider briefly: (i) a number of the areas of study identified as 
significant in the behaviouralist tradition; and (ii) the notion of the authoritarian 
personality.
The Behavioural Approach
Political behaviouralism emerged in the United States as a reaction against the 
dominance of historical, philosophical and descriptive-institutional approaches in 
political science. According to Jaros and Grant, it is “an approach which emphasizes 
and makes explicit the fact that all political phenomena depend on human acts [Jaros 
and Grant, 1974: 7].” Its primary aim is to bring some of the rigour of the natural 
sciences to the analysis of political forms and processes. To this end, behavioural 
approaches tend to employ quantitative and statistical techniques in order to derive 
verifiable propositions about observable political behaviour. The emphasis on 
observable behaviour - in part, a function of the debt that behaviouralism owes to 
positivism - has inclined behavioural analysis towards a concern with individuals. 
However, as I indicated above, this concern is not, for the most part, translated into an 
interest in subjectivity. To illustrate this, I will consider briefly how behavioural 
approaches treat: (i) political socialisation and personality; (ii) political participation; 
and (iii) public attitudes.
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(i) Political socialisation and personality
The study of political socialisation is concerned with the effect that socialisation has 
on the manner in which individuals structure their political worlds, both cognitively 
and affectively [Dowse and Hughes, 1986: 190-191]; or, to put this another way, it is 
concerned with examining how the beliefs, values and emotions that comprise 
political culture are transmitted from generation to generation [Rose, 1980]. In 
concrete terms, analyses of political socialisation tend to focus on the differential 
impact of the agencies and processes of socialisation - assessed in terms of political 
participation, political attitudes, voting behaviour and so on - across a number of 
dimensions, including: social class, family background, gender, race and educational 
attainment.
Despite an ostensible interest in the attitudes and behaviour of individuals, subjectivity 
remains a marginal concern to such analyses. Typically, political socialisation is 
treated as something that happens to individuals; their behaviour and attitudes are 
conceived to be the product of external influences.12 Specifically, individuals are 
portrayed as the passive imbibers of institutionally grounded beliefs and attitudes;13 or 
as the subjects of the process of socialisation, where the agents of socialisation model 
particular behaviours and attitudes.14 In these schemes, the differences between the 
behaviours and attitudes exhibited by particular individuals are reduced to the different 
structural locations that these individuals occupy, and/or to them being subject to 
different processes of socialisation. Issues of subjectivity - that is, issues to do with 
individual motivation, need and meaning - are largely ignored; or, to borrow an 
analogy, they are consigned to a black box.15
12 Perhaps the major exceptions to this general tendency are the various authoritarian 
personality studies.
13 Thus, for example, Rose argues that "...Because o f the continuity o f English social 
institutions, many values thus transmitted antedate the birth o f the individual [Rose, 1980: 
142]."
14 See, for example, Wasbum, P. C., Political Sociology: approaches, concepts, hypotheses, 
(Prentice-Hall, New Jersey: 1982), 157-160; and 185-187.
15 For a systematic working o f these arguments, see Rosenberg, S. W., “Sociology, Psychology, 
and the Study o f Political Behavior: The Case o f the Research on Political Socialization”, 
Journal o f Politics, (1985), 47, 2, 715-731.
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The relative neglect of the more complex issues of subjectivity has a number of 
problematic consequences. Firstly, the relationship between beliefs/attitudes and 
behaviour is inadequately theorised, as is the relationship between beliefs/attitudes, 
behaviour and personality.16 Secondly, as Shawn Rosenberg indicates, there can be no 
analysis of the subjective, private meaning or significance of political attitudes and 
behaviour. Political socialisation studies almost inevitably focus upon publicly 
expressed and culturally defined attitudes and behaviour [Rosenberg, 1985: 719]. And 
thirdly, the relationship between subjectivity (or personality) and political forms and 
processes can be neither adequately explored nor specified. It is significant that 
commentators have noted a decline in interest, in recent years, in processes of political 
socialisation [e.g., Dowse and Hughes, 1986: 216-218], It is quite possible that this 
decline is directly related to the kinds of problems detailed here [Rosenberg, 1985: 
722-728].
(ii) Political participation
Political participation has been defined variously as: (a) “those voluntary activities by 
which members of a society share in the selection of rulers, and directly or indirectly, 
in the formation of public policy”;17 (b) “the involvement of the individual at various 
levels in the political system [Rush and AlthofF, 1971: 14]”; (c) “those activities by 
private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of 
governmental personnel and/or actions they take [Verba and Nie, 1972: 2]”; (d) “those 
activities by private citizens by which they seek to influence or to support government 
and politics [Milbrath and Goel, 1977: 2]”; and (e) “taking part in the processes of 
formulation, passage and implementation of public policies [Parry, Moyser and Day, 
1992: 16]”.
None o f these relationships are straightforward. See, for example: LaPiere, R., “Attitudes 
versus actions”, Social Forces, (1934), 13; Wicker, A. W., “Attitudes versus actions: The 
relationship o f verbal and overt behavioural responses to attitude objects”, Journal o f  Social 
Issues, (1969), 25, 4, 41-78; and Aronson, E., The Social Animal, (W. H. Freeman and 
Company, New York: 1992), 150-156.
17 Dowse, R. and Hughes, J. A., Political Sociology, 2nd Edition, (John Wiley & Sons, 
Chichester: 1986), 266 [following McClosky, H., “Political Participation”, International 
Encyclopedia o f Social Sciences (Collier-Macmillan, New York: 1968), 252-265].
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The importance of political participation is related to its significance for notions of 
democracy. In traditional terms, high levels of participation are a sine qua non of 
democracy. For example, Aristotle equates good democratic citizenship with civic 
responsibility and political participation [Aristotle, 1981]; Rousseau’s ideal State is 
small enough so that all its citizens may actively participate in the decision-making 
process [Rousseau, 1973]; and Verba and Nie argue that, in some fundamental sense, 
“the more participation there is in decisions, the more democracy there is [Verba and 
Nie, 1972: 1].” However, the reality of the rates of political participation in Western 
democracies is in stark contrast to these kinds of ideals.
According to Lester Milbrath, about one-third of the American adult population are 
politically “apathetic”; “they are unaware, literally, of the political part of the world 
around them [Milbrath, 1965: 21].” About sixty percent are “spectators”; “they watch, 
they cheer, they vote, but they do not do battle [Milbrath, 1965: 21].” Only two percent 
are “gladiatorial”, participating in a full range of political actions. Similarly, the 
authors of a much more recent study claim that “outside the realm of voting, the 
British citizenry are not highly active within the political system. They may be aware 
of politics and even have an interest in it, but they tend not to speak out all that much 
beyond the confines of a voting booth [Parry, Moyser and Day, 1992: 47].”
The fact that citizens do not participate en masse in political activity is clearly 
significant for democratic theory; for example, it has led Robert Dahl to reject theories 
of participatory democracy, and to advance, instead, a notion of polyarchy,18 It also 
begs the question: why do some citizens participate when others do not? According to 
Dowse and Hughes, there is little systematic theory to answer this latter question. 
Instead, one finds much ad hoc analysis of a range of correlational data [Dowse and 
Hughes, 1986: 288-289]. For example, it has been found that political participation 
varies with education; social integration; gender; the urban/rural divide; life-cycle; and 
socio-economic status.19
18 Dahl, R., A Preface to Democratic Theory, (University o f Chicago Press, Chicago: 1956).
19 The major studies o f political participation include: Lane, R., Political Life, (Free Press, New 
York: 1959); Lipset, S. M., The Political Man, (Doubleday, Garden City: 1960); Milbrath, 
L., Political Participation (Rand McNally & Company, Chicago: 1965); Verba, S. and 
Nie, N., Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality, (Harper and
13
The predominance of this kind of correlational analysis is indicative of a lack of 
sophistication in the treatment of political participation. In part, this lack of 
sophistication is a function of the neglect of the relationship between participation and 
subjectivity. Where aspects of subjectivity are considered in analyses of political 
participation, they tend to be treated in simple correlational terms,20 and are rarely 
integrated into wider theoretical schemata. Interestingly, the one rigorous theory of 
political participation identified by Dowse and Hughes - namely, that advanced by 
Anthony Downs [1957] - is undermined precisely by an inadequate specification of 
subjectivity. Specifically, to the extent that Downs’ theory focuses on the rational- 
calculative dimensions of action, it is unable to explain why individuals are willing to 
engage in political activities which involve them in costs, even where they are unlikely 
to gain much back in terms of rewards (for example, voting in a General Election, 
where a single vote will not affect the overall outcome).
In fact, this rational-calculative emphasis is common to much of the analysis of 
political participation, insofar as participation is normally conceived in voluntarist 
terms (i.e., in terms of choice). However, such an emphasis is artificially restrictive, in 
that it fails to recognise the non-conscious dimensions of participation. In this respect, 
one might consider, for example, Roland Barthes’ and Louis Althusser’s utilisation of 
the notion of interpellation [Althusser, 1971; Barthes, 1973], In terms of this idea, an 
individual’s participation in politics begins not with his conscious decision to act, but 
rather with his interpellation by political myths or ideologies.
Row, New York: 1972); Campbell, A., Converse, P., Miller, W. and Stokes, D., The 
American Voter, (University o f Chicago Press, Chicago: 1976); Milbrath, L. and Goel, M., 
Political Participation, (Rand McNally College Publishing Company, Chicago: 1977); 
Parry, G., Moyser, G. and Day, N., Political Participation and democracy in Britain, 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1992).
20 For example, Dahl, R., Who Governs?, (Yale University Press, New Haven and London: 
1961); Almond G. A. and Verba, S., The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy 
in the Five Nations (Princeton University Press, New Jersey: 1963); Milbrath, L., Political 
Participation, (Rand McNally & Company, Chicago: 1965); Campbell, A., Converse, P., 
Miller, W. and Stokes, D., (University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1976); Verba, S. and 
Nie, N., Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality, (Harper and 
Row, New York: 1972); and Milbrath, L. and Goel, M., (Rand McNally College Publishing 
Company, Chicago: 1977).
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(iii) Public attitudes
The analysis of survey data concerning political attitudes is also fraught with 
difficulties if  there is no proper consideration of issues of subjectivity. The first point 
to note about attitudes of any sort is that they are notoriously difficult to measure 
accurately.21 Of course, this has not prevented political analysts from making 
widespread use of the notion of “political attitudes”. In this respect, perhaps most 
familiar are the various surveys of public opinion, which purport to represent the 
political attitudes of whole nations. It is perhaps not surprising that these have 
assumed a central place in the political process of many liberal-democratic societies. It 
is, after all, part of the democratic myth that a political party must represent the in­
terests and desires of its population to win and retain power; and that voters are well- 
informed, casting their votes at a general election for the party which most clearly 
represents their attitudes on the important issues.22 From this perspective, attitude 
surveys perform an important function, keeping political parties (and others) informed 
about the state of public opinion. However, when one examines “public opinion” more 
closely, it becomes clear that the reality of “political attitudes” is very different from 
the image created by this myth.
According to Philip Converse, the political attitudes of mass publics are largely 
inconsistent and contradictory.23 It is only 10-15% of a population that demonstrate a 
meaningful structure for their beliefs. Outside this group, the lack of a “trickle down” 
of political information means that individuals do not think about politics in terms of 
underlying “ideological” principles. Consequently, their beliefs are organised into 
relatively discrete clusters that demonstrate little unity or “constraint”.24 Moreover, the 
nature of the objects of belief change as one moves from the well-informed elite to the 
mass of the public. These “shift from the remote, generic, and abstract to the
21 See, for example, Oskamp, S., Attitudes and Opinions, (Prentice-Hall, New Jersey: 1977), 
37-41.
22 See, for example, Himmelweit, H. T., Humphreys, P. and Jaeger, M., How Voters Decide 
(Open University Press, Milton Keynes: 1985).
23 Converse, P., “The nature o f belief systems in mass publics”, in Apter, D., (Ed.), Ideology 
and Discontent, (The Free Press, Glencoe: 1964).
24 "Constraint" refers to the functional interdependence o f attitudes. See Converse, P., (The 
Free Press, Glencoe: 1964), 207-208. For a discussion of the lack of constraint between the 
attitudes held by the mass o f the public, see 212-214; and 227-234.
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increasingly simple, concrete, or “close to home”...”; progressing from “abstract 
“ideological” principles to the more obviously recognisable social groupings or 
charismatic leaders and finally to such objects of immediate experience as family, job, 
and immediate associates [Converse, 1964: 213].”
Obviously, if one accepts these arguments, and concedes that it is only a small elite 
that hold internally consistent, “ideologically” grounded sets of beliefs, there are 
considerable implications for analyses of voting behaviour.26 In particular, it is not 
possible to claim that a vote for a political party necessarily indicates support for that 
party, quite simply because the internal inconsistency of voters’ attitudes precludes any 
simple correspondence between attitudes and voting behaviour.27 Of course, the 
corollary of this general point is that it is similarly not the case that a vote against a 
political party (i.e., for a different party) necessarily indicates antipathy towards that 
party and its policies.
The significant point here is that these contentions are only surprising if  issues of 
subjectivity are neglected. For example, as I suggested above, it has long been 
understood by social psychologists that there is no simple correspondence between
25 In fact, Converse identified five "levels of conceptualisation", each denoting a particular 
mode o f evaluating political issues (his analysis was based upon a range o f studies o f U.S. 
national elections that were conducted by the Survey Research Center, University of 
Michigan; these studies utilised samples o f 1000 to 1800 individuals). These levels ranged 
from tiie highest where individuals used abstract, conceptual dimensions to assess political 
objects (2.5% of total sample), to the lowest, where they made no reference to policies or 
issues at all, mentioning instead: (i) loyalty to a particular party; (ii) personal qualities of 
candidates; or (iii) no interest in politics (22.5% of sample). See Converse, P., “The nature of  
belief systems in mass publics”, in Apter, D., (Ed.), Ideology and Discontent, (The Free 
Press, Glencoe: 1964), 215-219.
26 For evidence supporting Converse’s claims, see, for example: McClosky, H., “Consensus and 
ideology in American politics”, American Political Science Review, (1964), 58, 361-382; 
Mann, M., “The social cohesion o f liberal democracy”, American Sociological Review, 
(1970), 35, 3, 423-439; Bogart, L., Silent Politics: Polls and the Awareness o f Public 
Opinion, (Wiley-Interscience, New York: 1972); Parkin, F., Class Inequality and Political 
Order, (Paladin, St. Albans: 1972); Butler, D. and Stokes, D., Political Change in Britain: 
the Evolution o f Electoral Choice, 2nd Edition, (MacMillan, London: 1974); 
Abercrombie, N., Hill, S. and Turner, B., The Dominant Ideology Thesis, (George Allen & 
Unwin, London: 1980); and Abramson, P. R., Political Attitudes in America, (Freeman, San 
Francisco: 1983). Of course, there has also been research that questions the relevance of 
Converse's work for understanding political attitudes: see, for example, Nie, N. H., Verba, S. 
and Petrocik, J. R., The Changing American Voter, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass.: 1976).
27 Converse produces correlational data to demonstrate that there is little internal consistency - 
firstly, between the attitudes that members o f the public hold towards political issues; and 
secondly, between the attitudes held and party preference expressed. See Converse, P., (The 
Free Press, Glencoe: 1964), 228-229.
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attitudes and behaviour. Also, consider, for example, the idea that voting behaviour is 
determined by a rational calculation based on perceived policy preferences. Not only 
does this make certain assumptions about rationality,28 but it also leaves no room for a 
consideration of the affective bases of behaviour. In fact, it is by no means clear that 
voting behaviour is a rational activity. For example, Sears et al, in a study of American 
voting patterns, found that individuals did not vote according to perceived self-interest, 
but rather, they relied on affective cues for their voting decisions.29 In general terms, 
George Marcus has noted, in a review of the work on emotions and politics, that whilst 
a good proportion of the literature of political theory has concerned itself with the 
proper development of reason, insufficient attention has been paid to the essential 
strategic function ofpassion,30
The Authoritarian Personality
One area of research which has been concerned with the deeper aspects of subjectivity 
is that which has developed around the idea of “the authoritarian personality”. 
According to Adorno et al, there exists an authoritarian personality type, which is 
characterised by conventionalism; suspicion; a submissive attitude towards the leaders 
of the in-group; condemnation of those people who deviate from “normal” values; a 
preoccupation with power and “toughness”; and an intolerance of weakness [Adorno, 
Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson and Sanford, 1950],
In order to measure this personality type, Adorno et al developed the “F-scale”, which 
comprised a synthesis of three previously developed scales (namely, the A-S scale 
[anti-Semitism]; the E scale [ethnocentrism]; and the PEC scale [political and 
economic conservatism]). On the basis of results from over 2000 questionnaires,
28 This idea seems require a Benthamite view that human action proceeds on the basis of a 
felicific calculus. However, even where action is based upon cognitive calculation, it is by no 
means clear that such calculation is "rational". See, for example, Nisbet, R. and Ross, L., 
Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings o f  Social Judgement, (Prentice-Hall, New 
Jersey: 1980); and Fiske, S. T. and Taylor, S. E., Social Cognition, 2nd Edition, (McGraw, 
New York: 1991).
29 Sears, D., Lau, R., Tyler, T. and Allen, H., “Self-interest vs. symbolic politics in policy 
attitudes and presidential voting”, American Political Science Review, (1980), 74, 3, 
670-684.
30  • • •Marcus, G. E., “Emotions and politics: hot cognitions and the rediscovery of passion”, Social 
Science Information, (1991), 30, 2, 224.
17
Adomo et al claimed that the F-scale responses supported the contention that there 
existed an authoritarian personality type. Therefore, it seems that they were correct to 
claim, in the preface to “The Authoritarian Personality”, that “an adult’s outlook or 
ideology (i.e., ethnocentrism) is an aspect of her or his personality.”
Adomo et al turn to psychodynamic theory in order to explain the occurrence of the 
authoritarian personality. They argue that authoritarianism is related to early childhood 
experiences in families characterised by parental strictness and a general sense of 
coldness. In this situation, the child is forced to repress his Oedipal desires for his 
mother and, consequently, he feels hatred and hostility towards his father. However, 
this hatred cannot be allowed conscious expression, therefore, it is transformed, by 
means of a reaction formation, into feelings of love. Of course, there remains, 
nevertheless, a residue of repressed, unconscious hostility towards the father. It is this 
that resurfaces later, in the authoritarian personality, as displaced aggression against
<3 i
powerless individuals and out-groups.
Clearly, the notion of an authoritarian personality type is veiy significant. Particularly, 
it suggests how hostility and prejudice might be rooted in the structures of personality. 
Moreover, by identifying “implicit prefascist tendencies”, it shows how individuals 
might be susceptible to the discourses of fascism (and other similar discourses). The 
huge volume of work that the authoritarian personality study has spawned is testament
31 See David Held's discussion, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkeimer to Habermas, 
(Hutchinson, London: 1980), 144-146.
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to its importance.32 Of course, this is not to argue that it is without its fair share of 
problems.33
It is quite clear that in the authoritarian personality analysis, subjectivity is more than a 
simple reflection of social forces. Nevertheless, Adomo et al are committed to an 
artificially restrictive view of the foundations of authoritarianism. In this respect, it is 
particularly significant that the psychodynamic approach directs attention away from 
other possible avenues of enquiry. These include: a “social-learning” approach, which 
would stress “the learned (i.e., cognitive) conceptions of reality which are prevalent in 
certain cultures or subcultures, rather than [on] the labyrinthine process of reaction 
formation described in the ego-defensive typology”;34 and a social-psychological 
approach, as, for example, might be suggested by Tajfel’s idea that individuals seek to 
subordinate the members of out-groups in order to achieve a positive social-identity 
[Tajfel, 1981: 1982].
As far as the relationship between political analysis and subjectivity is concerned, 
perhaps the major problem of the authoritarian personality study is that it does little to 
bridge the macro/micro divide; that is, the relationship between personality and wider 
political forms and processes remains unclear. Indeed, Smelser goes so far as to argue
32 See, for example: Christie, R. and Jahoda, A., (Eds.), Studies in the Scope and Method o f the 
Authoritarian Personality, (Free Press, Glencoe: 1954); Eysenck, H., The Psychology o f  
Politics, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London: 1954); Rockeach, M., The Open and Closed 
Mind (Basic Books, New York: 1960); Brown, R., Social Psychology, (Free Press, New 
York: 1965); Kirscht, J. P. and Dillehay, R. C., Dimensions o f Authoritarianism: A Review 
o f the Research and Theory, (University of Kentucky Press, Lexington: 1967); Lee, R. E., m  
and Warr, P. B., “The development and standardization of a balanced F-scale”, Journal o f  
General Psychology, (1969), 81, 109-129; Ray, J. J., “Do authoritarians hold authoritarian 
attitudes”, Human Relations, (1976), 29, 307-325; and Altemeyer, R. A., Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism, (University o f Manitoba Press, Winnipeg: 1981). John Ray identifies 37 
alternatives to the F-scale developed to measure authoritarianism [“Alternatives to the F scale 
in the measurement of authoritarianism: a catalog”, The Journal o f Social Psychology, 
(1984), 122, 105-119].
331 am not concerned here to specify systematically these problems, suffice it to say that the 
major difficulties are: (i) methodological - see, for example, Christie, R., Havel, J. and 
Seidenberg, B., “Is the F scale reversible?”, Journal o f Abnormal and Social Psychology, 
(1956), 56, 141-158; Altemeyer, R. A., (University of Manitoba Press, Winnipeg: 1981); and 
Ray, J., The Journal o f  Social Psychology, (1984), 122; and (ii) concern the specificity of 
"right-wing" authoritarianism - see, for example: Eysenck, H. J., (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London: 1954); and Rockeach, M., (Basic Books, New York: 1960). For a sympathetic, but 
critical, general analysis o f the idea o f an authoritarian personality type, see Brown, R., (Free 
Press, New York: 1965).
34 F. Greenstein, cited in Dowse R. and Hughes, J., Political Sociology, 2nd Edition, (John 
Wiley & Sons, Chichester: 1986), 207.
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that “...We do not at present have the methodological capacity to argue causally from a 
mixture of aggregated states of individual members of a system to a global 
characteristic of a system.”35
In fact, in empirical terms, it is doubtful that we ever will have this capacity; mainly 
because, as I have already noted, there is no straightforward relationship between 
aspects of personality (i.e., the deeper levels of subjectivity) and the specific 
cognitions and behaviours that individuals adopt.36 Nevertheless, it is precisely the 
relationship between subjectivity and wider political forms and processes which is, in 
large part, the subject-matter of this thesis.
Statement of Intent
In the broadest of terms, the concern of this thesis is to demonstrate: (i) the 
inadequacies of political analyses that do not pay sufficient regard to issues of 
subjectivity; and (ii) the substantive utility of a political sociology which does take
37these issues seriously.
In order to achieve these aims, I will employ the following broad strategy. In Chapter 1 
- a brief, preparatory chapter - 1 will establish, by means of an explication of a number 
of central concepts, the beginnings of a theoretical framework, which I will utilise in 
the analyses of subsequent chapters. In Chapter 2 , 1 will be concerned to analyse the 
structures and dynamics of subjectivity; specifically, I will consider how Man has a 
dual nature - both “social” and “solitary” - and I will analyse some of the implications 
of this fact. In Chapter 3, I will continue with the general themes of the previous 
chapter; expressly, I will explore, with reference to the “normative sphere”, some of 
the mechanisms whereby individuals attain the symbolic mastery of the “extemal-
35 N. Smelser, cited in Dowse R. and Hughes, J., Political Sociology, 2nd Edition, (John Wiley 
& Sons, Chichester: 1986), 206.
36 Of course, the ability to argue from statements about aggregates o f individuals to system 
characteristics also depends on whether social-collectivities can be said to have emergent 
properties.
37 Since much o f this thesis is devoted to exploring the nature o f “subjectivity”, a definition o f  
the term is inappropriate. However, it should be noted that the term will be used in a way that 
implies more than the simple awareness o f the conscious subject o f his conscious existence 
(i.e., non-conscious dynamics and motivations will be taken to be aspects o f subjectivity).
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world”. In Chapter 4 ,1 will critically examine a number of the ideas associated with 
Marxist political theory - an undertaking both informing and informed by an analysis 
of social groups and subjectivity. In Chapter 5, utilising many of the arguments 
developed in the previous chapters of the thesis, I will analyse the political efficacy of 
ritualistic celebration. And in Chapter 6 , 1 will attempt, by means of an analysis of 
populism, to draw the various arguments of the thesis together.
Within the framework of this strategy, a number of arguments will be advanced which, 
whilst important for understanding the relationship between subjectivity and political 
forms and processes, are also significant in their own right. It is worth briefly identify­
ing these arguments because they will often be only implicit in the analyses to follow.
Firstly, and most significantly, an argument about the nature of consciousness, 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity will be advanced. I will not rehearse this argument 
here, suffice it to say that it draws heavily upon the phenomenological and existential 
philosophical traditions. However, it is worth noting that there will be virtually no 
reference to psychodynamic theories and concepts in this argument. This is not meant 
to imply a rejection of the ideas of psychoanalysis, but is rather a function of the 
internal logic of the argument to be advanced; in other words, it is not that psychoana­
lytic concepts cannot usefully be employed to analyse the relationship between 
subjectivity and politics; it is rather that the conceptualisation of subjectivity, as it is 
developed in this analysis, does not straightforwardly suggest a psychoanalytic 
approach.
Significantly, this point is indicative of the general theoretical status of the thesis to 
follow. Quite consciously, the thesis is an exercise in theoretical, political sociology. It 
is the deductive relationships between concepts which govern the forms and directions 
taken by arguments. Strictly speaking, the analysis to follow constitutes the reality that 
it theorises; its theoretical concepts have no objective correlates in the “real” world. 
The arguments and conclusions to follow, therefore, are best regarded as heuristic
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tools. In this respect, they will be either more or less useful in analysing political forms
38and processes, the reality of which they bracket.
Secondly, there are also present, in the text to follow, arguments about the extent of 
the political As I indicated at the beginning of this introduction, the political, for 
many theorists, is defined in terms of its opposition to the non-political [e.g., 
Runciman, 1969]. At many points in this thesis, I will appear implicitly to concur with 
this view. Particularly, I will often be concerned to demonstrate not that subjectivity is 
itself an aspect of the political, but rather that it is significant for understanding 
political forms and processes. However, it should be noted, that I am utilising this 
“exclusive” conception of “the political” for purposes of analytical clarity only.
Indeed, I will also be concerned, at times, to break down the distinction between the 
political and the non-political. In this respect, one might note Bottomore’s claim that 
political sociology, in its broadest sense, concerns power in a social context [Botto­
more, 1979: 7]. If such power is, as Bottomore maintains, “an element in most, if not 
all, social relationships...[Bottomore, 1979: 7]”, then the absolute separation of the 
political and the non-political is dissolved. In fact, in this sense, it is only problematic 
to conflate these realms if the political is defined in terms of its separation from the 
non-political. Thus, for example, Runciman is apparently required to rule out, as a 
matter of definition, the claim that all social relationships have a political dimension. 
However, this kind of definitional restriction can only be justified by an appeal to 
tradition; that is, it might be argued that because the science of politics has 
traditionally concerned the institutions of government, it is an unwarranted extension 
of the field of enquiry to include within its scope a multitude of other social relations
38 These ideas share some affinity with the "conventionalist" approach in the philosophy of 
science. According to Kolakowski, "the fundamental idea o f conventionalism may be stated 
as follows: certain scientific propositions taken for descriptions o f the world based on the 
recording and generalization o f experiments, are in fact artificial creations, and we regard 
them as true not because we are compelled to do so for empirical reasons, but because they 
are convenient, useful, or even because they have aesthetic appeal [Kolakowski, L., cited in 
Keat and Urry, 1982: 60]." As Keat and Urry point out, this position can develop into "the 
more radical claim that, in some sense, the physical world of the scientist is created or 
constructed by scientific theories, and not described by them [Keat and Urry, 1982: 60.]." In 
tins respect, they note Kuhn's remarks about Lavoisier: "Lavoisier, we said, saw oxygen 
where Priestley had seen dephlogisticated air and where others had seen nothing at all....At 
the very least, as a result o f discovering oxygen, Lavoisier saw nature differently. And in the 
absence o f some recourse to that hypothetical fixed nature that he "saw differently", the 
principle o f economy will urge us to say that after discovering oxygen Lavoisier worked in a 
different world [Kuhn, T., cited in Keat and Urry, 1982: 61]."
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and processes. However, this is not, in fact, a justification, but rather an argumentum 
ad antiquitam. Moreover, it allows no theoretical space for a broader analysis of power 
and conflict as they are manifest in the wider realms of the social sphere.
Arguably, it is feminist theorists who have provided the most significant challenge to 
this kind of macro-institutional orthodoxy. According to Ann Oakley:
Whatever else feminist politics have done in the last decade, they have 
broadened the concept of the political. In saying “our politics begin 
with our feelings” - rather than with our exercise of the franchise - 
feminists are drawing attention to the fact that the field of what is 
usually considered political is a created one. Politics, in any and every 
sense, is about power, and it is as much about the power that men, 
wittingly or unwittingly, exercise over women as it is about the power
' J Q
that presidents and prime ministers wield over nations.
According to Anthony Giddens, it is high modernity that has brought to the fore the 
wider kinds of political issues that concern feminists.40 He has developed the notion of 
“life politics”; a politics of choice - where power is generative rather than hierarchical 
- which is founded on the emancipatory effect of modem institutions. Life politics 
focuses on the question: how should we live our lives in emancipated social 
circumstances [Giddens, 1991: 224]? It is the politics of reflexively organised self- 
identity; a politics based on the opening up of lifestyle options. Thus, he notes that: 
“...Feminism, at least in its contemporary form, has been more or less obliged to give 
priority to the question of self-identity [Giddens, 1991: 216].” The moment that 
women “step outside” the home, the important question becomes: “who do I want to 
be”?41 This question is a political question, to the extent that it involves a debate about
39 Oakley, A., Subject Women, 2nd Impression, (Fontana Press, London: 1985), 310.
40 Giddens, A., Modernity and Self-Identity, (Polity Press, Cambridge: 1991), 214-217.
41 Friedan, B., cited in Giddens, A., (Polity Press, Cambridge: 1991), 216.
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rights and obligations; and suggests a mode of decision-making which has implications 
for conflicts of interest and values [Giddens, 1991: 226-228].42
Clearly, the kinds of politics that Giddens is talking about are very different from the 
kinds referred to by traditional political theorists. The important point is that his 
approach does not equate politics with issues of the state, government and its 
associated institutions. To this extent, if it does not break down the separation between 
the political and the non-political, it at the very least blurs it. In the thesis to follow, it 
is not my intention to develop systematically what might be termed a “micro-politics” 
of the social world. However, I will be concerned to demonstrate that power and 
conflict are aspects of all social relationships; and that there are significant 
correspondences between “micro-political” and “macro-political” forms and 
processes.
In fact, this point leads on to the third of the arguments which run through this thesis. 
This concerns the relationship between the micro-sociological (particularly, issues of 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity) and the macro-sociological (particularly, the idea of 
social structure). In this respect, there are two significant points. Firstly, social 
structure is to be defined as social action which has been identified as regular and non- 
random. Therefore, social structure is denied an ontological status in the world,; that is, 
it exists only as an abstract concept. Secondly, in analytical terms, it is not the aim to 
reduce the apparently macro-sociological to statements about social actors, 
subjectivity, personality dispositions and so on. Rather, it is to establish 
correspondences, functional and efficacious relations, symmetries, transformations and 
tendencies between the micro and macro-levels, so that explanatory frameworks might 
be developed that operate simultaneously at both levels.
To conclude this introduction, it is proper to say something about the substantive focus 
of this thesis. The first point to make is that it is not my intention to construct 
definitive analyses of any of the specific political phenomena that I consider here. 
Rather, as I have indicated, these will be analysed in order to demonstrate the utility of 
a political sociology that pays serious regard to issues of consciousness, subjectivity
42 For a detailed discussion o f life politics, see Giddens, A., Modernity and Self-Identity, 
(Polity Press, Cambridge: 1991), chapter 7.
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and intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, it is my intention to make a substantive contribu­
tion towards the understanding of certain kinds of political phenomena. Specifically, I 
hope to shed some light on the mechanisms and politics of social group formation, 
social integration and, most significantly, political mobilisation.43 The rationale for 
focusing on these kinds of phenomena is that they require, on the part of social actors, 
some degree of cognitive and affective commitment to the social group, and therefore, 
lend themselves particularly well to analysis in terms of a framework which 
foregrounds issues of subjectivity. Thus, it is my hope that by demonstrating that these 
phenomena are a prime concern for political sociology and that to understand them it 
is necessary to consider issues of subjectivity, I can show that political sociology must 
extend its scope beyond the boundaries set by the macro-institutional orthodoxy.
I take “political mobilisation” to refer both to political movements (i.e., a political 
mobilisation) and to the process whereby individuals are incorporated within the bounds o f a 
political intervention. In this thesis, this concept enjoys a pre-eminence over the related 
concepts of social group formation and social integration, since issues of group formation 
and social integration, when considered from the standpoint o f political analysis, tend to 
become fused with issues of political mobilisation.
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CHAPTER ONE : THEORETICAL CONCEPTS
It is necessary to begin this thesis by briefly analysing some of the theoretical ideas 
which run through this work. Specifically, I wish to explicate some of the concepts 
which are otherwise only implicit or used routinely in the analyses to follow. To do 
this, I will adopt the following strategy: (i) I will briefly outline some of the major 
ideas to be found in the work of Alfred Schutz, particularly, as they pertain to the 
relationship between individuals and the social world; (ii) I will consider how these 
ideas can be used to construct a theory of social structure; and (iii) I will look at the 
related question of the character of common identity.
Alfred Schutz
I should make it immediately clear that it is not my intention to subject the whole 
compass of Schutz’s work to a rigorous critical examination. Indeed, in the analysis to 
follow, I will almost completely ignore his analyses of the social sciences; his concern 
with the nature of social action; and his more strictly philosophical interests. I am 
concerned, rather, as I have already indicated, to analyse his arguments regarding the 
relationship between social actors and the social world.
According to Richard Zaner, Schutz’s project is an “effort to make explicit precisely 
what is implicit and taken for granted by the very nature of common-sense life - to 
make its foundational presuppositions explicit for the sake of disclosing its structures, 
analysing its strata, revealing its interconnected textures, and thereby to make it 
possible to understand what makes the social world tick, that is, what makes the social 
world at once “social” and “world”.”1 For Schutz, the starting point of this project is 
an analysis of the most simple and concrete of all social relations, the face-to-face or 
“we relation”, which is characterised by an “actual simultaneity” of “two separate 
streams of consciousness [Schutz, 1967: 163]”. The we-relation refers specifically to 
the direct social encounter of two individuals, who for its duration share a mutual
1 From the introduction to Schutz, A., Reflections on the Problem o f Relevance, (Edited: Zaner, 
R.), (Yale University Press, New Haven: 1970b), xii.
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orientation, “lifeworld” and temporal reality. It is in the we-relation that one individual 
grasps another as a “spontaneous and freely acting being [Schutz, 1967: 220.]”.
Although the most simple of all social relations, the we-relation, according to Schutz, 
serves as the foundation of the intersubjectivity of the social world. Specifically, it is 
in the we-relation that important core assumptions about the existence of fellow-men 
and the reality of the material world are confirmed. In the words of Schutz:
The community of environment and the sharing of experiences in the 
We-relation bestows upon the world within the reach of our experience 
its intersubjective, social character. It is not my environment nor your 
environment nor even the two added; it is an intersubjective world 
within reach of our common experience. In this common experience the 
intersubjective character of the world in general both originates and is 
continuously confirmed.
The we-relation, in its pure form, referring to the mutual orientation of two 
individuals, is essentially prepredicative.3 However, individuals bring to actual, 
concrete we-relations, “stocks” o f previously constituted knowledge. Therefore, the 
social actor’s experience of his fellow-man in the we-relation “stands in a multiple 
context of meaning: it is experience of a human being, it is experience of a typical 
actor on the social scene, it is experience of this particular fellow-man, and it is 
experience of this particular fellow-man in this particular situation, Here and Now 
[Schutz, 1964: 30].”
The stocks of knowledge which individuals bring to we-relations comprise 
frameworks of typifications by means of which they can interpret their own lived 
experiences. They consist of material which has been synthesised in consciousness and 
organised under categories, and which is present at hand in the form of “what one
2 Schutz, A., Collected Papers: Volume II, (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1964), 31.
3 See Schutz, A., (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1964), 23-27.
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knows” or “what one already knew”.4 “To these schemes the lived experiences are 
referred for interpretation as they occur [Schutz, 1967b: 84].”
The typifications which comprise stocks of knowledge vary enormously in specificity 
and concreteness, ranging from the most basic structures inscribed in every experience 
of the social world, to the specific, variable and actual experiences themselves, which 
are characteristic of every individual biography.5 Included amongst these typifications 
are the skills, useful knowledge and recipes which make up routine knowledge. These 
serve as tools at hand for defining and mastering the situations which confront the 
social actor in the social world. In this respect, Schutz distinguishes between routine 
and problem atic situations. The former are testament to the apparently structured 
nature of the social world and can be determined unproblematically with the aid of 
routine (or habitual) knowledge; they are only limitedly in need o f  explication, as a 
consequence of the existence of a plan determined interest - which limits the 
determination of the situation to that which is “practically necessary” - to which action 
is oriented.6 In contrast, the latter, problematic situations, contain elements which are 
not immediately discernible. Therefore, these require deliberation on the part of the 
social actor, before they can be rendered sufficiently explicit to be mastered in terms 
of a plan determined interest.
Although no two social actors share the same stocks of knowledge, much knowledge 
is, nevertheless, socially derived. As Schutz and Luckmann put it:
the specific elements of knowledge, the typical “contents” of the 
subjective stock of knowledge, are not for the most part acquired 
through processes of explication, but rather are derived socially. In 
other words, they are taken from the “social stock of knowledge”; that
4 I am paraphrasing from Schutz, A., The Phenomenology o f the Social World, (Northwestern 
University Press, Evanston: 1967b), 84.
5 See Schutz, A. and Luckmann, T., The Structures o f  the Lifeworld, (Northwestern University 
Press, Evanston: 1973), 99-105, for a discussion of the fundamental elements of the stock of 
knowledge (including the corporeal, spatial and temporal limits inscribed in every situation).
6 A plan determined interest is the specific motivational factor which determines the guidelines 
for conduct in a given situation. It is based upon a hierarchy o f plans o f conduct which 
individuals carry with them at all times.
7 See Schutz, A., Collected Papers: Volume II, (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1964), 91-105.
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is, from the socially objectivated results of Others’ experiences and 
explications. The larger part of the stock of knowledge of the normal 
adult is not immediately acquired, but rather ‘Teamed”.8
In this process of learning, the usual agencies of socialisation are crucial. Particularly, 
individuals acquire the social stock of knowledge through the kinship system. But 
educational, religious and political institutions are also important.
Social Structure
It is now possible to consider how these ideas can be used to construct a theory of 
social structure. However, it is first necessary to make explicit a key meta-theoretical 
assumption of this thesis. It is my claim, as I intimated in the Introduction, that 
knowledge constitutes its own reality; and more specifically, that sociological concepts 
constitute the reality which they analyse. It is not possible, in this thesis, to offer a 
proper philosophical justification for this view, suffice it to say that this kind of 
idealism is the inevitable consequence of ascribing, as is demanded by 
phenomenology, epistemological privilege to the sphere of consciousness. Of course, 
to maintain, as I do, that abstract entities have no objective correlates in the “external” 
world is to be distanced from the views of Alfred Schutz.9 Nevertheless, it is still 
possible to use his ideas to construct a theory o f social structure, so long as it is 
recognised that concepts, in his terms, potentially denote a “material reality”, whereas, 
in my terms, they can denote only other concepts.
The first step in constructing a theory of social structure is to establish a working 
definition of the term. As I indicated in the Introduction, I am going to use this term to 
refer simply to social action which has been identified as regular and non-random. 
Clearly, in this respect, it will be possible to identify social structures of varying 
degrees of specificity, ranging from those which are defined by a single common 
element to those which manifest an institutional character. According to this view, a
8 Schutz, A. and Luckmann, T., The Structures o f  the Lifeworld, (Northwestern University 
Press, Evanston: 1973), 244.
9 Although, I would argue, o f course, that Schutz does not pursue the logic o f his own 
phenomenological stance to its proper conclusion.
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social actor can be said to be located within a social structure when he10 shares in 
common with those other social actors who are similarly located, at least one of the 
characteristics which define that structure.11
However, it is important to recognise that the social actors who comprise social 
structures have a special character. Specifically, they are - because social structure is 
an abstraction - entirely anonymous; that is, they are defined wholly by the average
courses o f  action which they pursue and which constitute the social structure, and
12thereby, they are deprived of the fullness of their biographies. It is, therefore, 
possible to specify social structure in terms o f  the typifications {or typificatory fram e­
works) associated with the average courses of action pursued by anonymous social 
actors.
To illustrate this, let us consider, for a moment, how one might specify the role played 
by women in the Parsonian nuclear-family.13 According to Parsons, “families are 
‘factories’ which produce human personalities”;14 chiefly, by means o f two 
mechanisms: (i) the socialisation of children; and (ii) the stabilisation of adult 
personalities. In this process, the role o f women is primarily “expressive”; specifically, 
they are responsible for child-rearing and for the emotional stability of the family.15 It 
is possible to express their role in terms of a series of normative expectations: for 
example, a mother will: take primary responsibility for the immediate satisfaction of
10 Throughout this thesis, I will use the impersonal masculine pronoun, rather than any o f the 
alternatives (she or he; s/he; etc.). This is for stylistic reasons only.
11 For example, Weber argued that the term "class" should be used "when a large number of 
men have in common a specific causal factor influencing their chances in life, insofar as [(ii)] 
this factor has to do only with the possession o f economic goods and the interests involved in 
earning a living [Weber, 1947: 91-92]."
12 There are three points to note here: (i) the experience that an individual has o f the world is 
uniquely his because he enjoys a unique biography (see, for example, Schutz, A., Collected 
Papers: Volume 1, 2nd Edition, (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1967a), 9-10); (ii) I am using the term 
anonymous to describe the social actors who comprise social structures because these social 
actors have no individual characteristics; and (iii) courses of action are not average in any 
empirical sense, but rather, as abstractions, they are denied variability and flux; that is, they 
have been "frozen".
131 should point out that I am making no claims at all about the validity of Parsons' analysis.
14 Parson, T., "The American Family", Parsons, T. and Bales, R. F., Family: Socialization and 
Interaction Process, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London: 1956), 16.
151 am aware that even if  one accepts die existence of a traditional division o f labour, it is by 
no means clear that the role played predominandy by women can be labelled "expressive". 
See, for example, Oakley, A., Housewife, (Penguin, Harmondsworth: 1974), 183.
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her child’s physical needs; provide for her child’s emotional well-being; ensure her 
child’s safety; and begin the process of socialising and educating her child. Clearly, a 
social actor will only be able to fulfil these expectations if she is in possession of 
stocks o f knowledge which are commensurate with her role. Specifically, a “mother” 
will need to possess frameworks of typifications which: (i) establish either the le­
gitimacy or the inevitability of her role; (ii) specify the expectations which are 
associated with this role; (iii) provide a whole gamut of skills and recipes which will 
enable her to fulfil these expectations; and (iv) command her - day in, day out - to 
accomplish “motherhood”.
The important point is that having imaginatively constituted the regularity of social 
action to be analysed in terms of the notion of “motherhood”, it is possible to specify 
the average courses of action pursued by anonymous “mothers” entirely at the level of 
these kinds of typificatory frameworks. Or, to put this another way, it is possible to 
specify the social structure which constitutes “motherhood”, in terms of the 
typifications associated with the average courses of action pursued by anonymous 
“mothers”.
The rationale for using this technique for specifying social structure is as follows: (i) it 
satisfies the demand of radical idealism that social structure should have no material 
existence; social structure is conceived simply to be a conceptual device which 
facilitates the analysis of social action that has been identified as regular and non- 
random; (ii) it preserves within its conceptual framework, formally at least, the 
“reflexivity” o f the social actor; but it recognises, at the same time, that anonymous 
social actors have no “freedom”, since the social structures which they comprise have 
no open future}6 and (iii) it is, methodologically, a powerful and flexible tool, since it |
makes no claims about the “existence” or “non-existence” o f the social structures that „
it specifies.
Of course, the kinship system, and specifically, the “mother-role”, certainly in the 
above example, are relatively well-defined social structures, and therefore, they are 
particularly well-suited to this kind of conceptual technique. Nevertheless, in
16 See Schutz's discussion of the world ofpredecessors and the problem o f history, Schutz, A., 
Collected Papers: Volume II, (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1964), 56-63.
31
principle, any social structure, however diffuse its action complex, can be specified in 
this manner. Consider, for example, the Weberian notion of social class: one might be 
said to have identified, in Weberian fashion, a social class, when one has determined a 
regularity of social action, within which an indeterminate number of social actors who
ITshare a common economic-factor, share also similar life-chances. Clearly, in 
principle - if not in practice - it is quite possible for such a regularity of social action to 
be specified in terms of the typifications associated with the average courses o f action 
pursued by anonymous social actors. For instance, to give two very limited examples, 
one might identify patterns o f educational achievement, and analyse these in terms of 
the frameworks of typifications employed by anonymous pupils and staff; or one might 
examine patterns of job recruitment in terms of the typifications employed by 
anonymous school-leavers. In general, it is possible to specify social structures in 
terms of their associated typificatory frameworks because: they are abstractions; the 
regularity of action which defines them has no open future; and they comprise
1 ftanonymous social actors who pursue average courses of action.
Common Identity
In the last part of this chapter, I wish to explore a related issue; namely, the manner in 
which individuals, in the course of their everyday-lives, come to develop a common 
identity. Or, to put this another way, I wish to analyse the way in which individuals, as 
they live through routine situations, come to identify with their contemporaries and
17 See footnote 11.
18 An important side-issue is suggested by this analysis, to do with the possibility and nature of 
the experience that social actors have o f social structure. In this respect, the first point to 
make is the obvious one that social actors cannot experience the constituted regularity of 
social action which comprises a social structure; that is, they cannot experience what is, after 
all, an abstraction. Nevertheless, social actors do experience the social world as though it 
were structured and ordered; specifically, they experience it as comprising a series of more or 
less routine situations - to be mastered by means o f habitual knowledge - which they take as 
evidence of its structured reality (the work of the ethnomethodologists is significant here; see, 
for example, Garfinkel, H., Studies in Ethnomethodology, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford: 1984). 
This fact has important analytical consequences: most significantly, it means that one can talk 
about anonymous social actors as though they actually experience the social structures within 
which they are located. To understand this, it is necessary only to recognise that the routine 
situations experienced by these actors are precisely what constitute social structure; this is the 
case because the constituted regularity o f social action which defines social structure can be 
specified as a succession of absolutely determined routine situations. The importance of these 
points is that when I talk, during this thesis, about social actors experiencing social structure, 
it will be in the sense of anonymous social actors experiencing social structure.
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predecessors as members of particular social groups. Thus, it is my general aim to 
specify the mechanisms which lie behind the emergence of common identity. In terms 
of this thesis, the importance of this task lies in the fact that I wish to make, in 
subsequent chapters, a number of arguments about the political significance of group 
membership. Clearly, in this respect, the issue of common identity is crucial. Thus, to 
anticipate, I will argue that common identity emerges: (i) as a result of the systematic 
application of typifying labels; and (ii) directly from the realm of social-experience, as 
a consequence of the repetition of we-relations between social actors who share 
similar biographies.
According to Emile Durkheim, societies can be characterised according to their moral 
density; that is, according to the degree to which individuals are sufficiently in contact 
to be able to interact with one another (Durkheim, 1947: 257). It is my argument that 
the greater the levels of moral density, when this is understood to refer to the regular 
and repeated we-relations between social actors who share similar biographies, the 
greater the potential for the emergence of a common identity. To give a simple 
example, one would expect social actors who are involved in industrial action, to 
develop high levels of common identity, as a result of the fact that they share, through 
repeated we-relations, a whole realm of direct social experience.
However, the process whereby a common identity emerges from the realm of direct 
social experience is complicated by the fact that individuals, in the course of we- 
relations, tend to make typifying assumptions about one another; that is, it is 
complicated by the fact that individuals tend to use the typifications which comprise 
stocks of knowledge in order to address one another as the relatively anonymous 
bearers of typical characteristics. These typifying operations become significant in a 
we-relation either when they are made explicit or when they carry with them the 
expectation of certain behaviour. The important point is that the typifications attached 
to individuals, and the complex of expectations which are associated with these 
typifications, affect not only the course of we-relations, but also, over time, the way in 
which individuals define themselves. Quite simply, to systematically and repeatedly 
identify an individual as the bearer of a set of typical characteristics is to confer upon 
him a social identity to which he has access.
However, the mere fact that an individual has a social identity is not, in itself, 
sufficient to guarantee the emergence of an awareness of common identity. In formal 
terms, a common identity only emerges with the recognition that there are other 
individuals who share this social identity. But, of course, in practice, this recognition is 
achieved as a matter of routine; individuals will have been taught, through the social 
stock of knowledge,19 that the social world is made up of recognisable and discrete 
social groups, and they will simply assume that to possess a social identity is to share it 
with other like social actors; social identities are, by definition, “social”.
Thus, it is clear that a common identity can emerge as a result of the systematic 
application of typifying labels. However, as I have already indicated, it can also 
emerge directly from the realm of social experience. The limiting condition on this 
possibility is that a “group” of social actors should share at least one characteristic in 
common.20 In practice, it is also required that this characteristic be a significant 
element in the course of their shared we-relations. Language is perhaps the single most 
significant example of the ability of a single shared characteristic to bind social actors 
together. It is only by means of language that we inhabit a shared reality at all. As 
Berger and Luckmann put it: “...Everyday life is, above all, life with and by means of 
the language I share with my fellowmen”. The political significance of language, in 
this respect, has long been appreciated, as is demonstrated by the centrality accorded 
to the preservation of languages by political groups who wish to promote and protect 
traditional identities.
However, there is clearly only a limited potential for the emergence of a common 
identity on the basis of a single shared characteristic. In general, as one might expect, 
the more that social actors share in common, the more likely it is that such an identity 
will emerge. Therefore, as I have already stated, it is the regular and repeated we- 
relations between social actors who share similar biographies which is most likely to 
generate common identity. It is in terms of this kind of mechanism that social cohesion
19 The social stock o f knowledge is knowledge which is "handed down to me by my friends, my 
parents, my teachers and the teachers o f my teachers [Schutz, 1967a: 13]”; that is, it is 
knowledge which is not immediately derived from within an individual's personal experience.
20 A "group" o f social actors, as in "a number" of social actors.
21 Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., The Social Construction o f  Reality, (Faber and Faber, London: 
1966), 51.
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is most usually conceived. In this respect, one might note, for example, both 
Durkheim’s conception of mechanical solidarity and the Marxist idea that class- 
consciousness will emerge where “...The various interests and conditions of life within 
the ranks of the proletariat are more and more equalised...”.22
So why is it that a series of we-relations between social actors who share similar 
biographies is likely to engender a common identity? It is simply that in the face-to- 
face situation, the reality of this similitude is constantly reaffirmed. Social actors who 
share similar biographies bring to we-relations similar frames of reference, in terms of 
which the associated situations can be defined and mastered. Because the participants 
in the we-relations define the social world in the same way, their affinity with one 
another is confirmed. In concrete terms, they have access to a whole range of verbal 
and non-verbal clues which will establish their likeness; similar behaviours, attitudes, 
emotions, hopes, fears, likes and dislikes, all function to solidify their common 
identity.
Finally, one might also note that the context and intensity of shared we-relations is 
important. Where individuals, over a period of time, share repeated we-relations with 
the same other individuals, so long as their biographies are similar, a common identity 
will almost inevitably emerge. This situation is found most clearly within the bounds 
of a variety of institutional settings, of which the kinship system represents perhaps the 
best example. The likelihood that a common awareness will emerge is still further 
increased, where these we-relations are also of high levels of intimacy and/or 
intensity.23
To sum up, therefore, it is my argument that common identity emerges as a conse­
quence of: (i) the systematic utilisation, in the context of we-relations, of typifying 
labels; and (ii) the fact that the realm of direct social experience is occupied by 
individuals who share similar biographies; something which becomes apparent in face- 
to-face relations.
22 Marx, K., and Engels, F., Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, (Edited: Feuer, L.), 
(Fontana/Collins, Glasgow: 1981), 57.
231 will discuss this in more detail when I deal with political ritual (see below, Chapter 5).
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Conclusion
To summarise, I have been concerned in this first chapter to explicate and analyse a 
number of important theoretical ideas and issues. Specifically, I have examined those 
ideas and issues which, whilst significant, are otherwise only implicit or used without 
explication (i.e., routinely) in the analyses of subsequent chapters. In this respect, it is 
necessary to emphasise the general point that whilst I will rarely refer again to the 
arguments of this chapter, the ideas and concepts explored here are integral to the 
analyses that follow. For example, I will make continual use of the concepts of Alfred 
Schutz to specify the relationship between individuals and the social world; and, as I 
have already indicated, I will be concerned, throughout this work, to examine the 
significance of the existence of a common identity amongst social actors. In general, 
therefore, this chapter has been an exercise in concept preparation, with the aim being 
to establish the beginnings of a conceptual framework which will be used for the more 
substantive analyses which are to be developed in this thesis.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE SELF AND SOCIETY
The fundamental premise of the work to follow is that Man has a dual nature - that he 
is at once both social and solitary. It is my claim that this dual nature is a prime 
sociological concern, since it forms the foundations upon which subjectivity is built 
and is, therefore, a significant variable in the unfolding of social action. In this chapter, 
I intend to specify Man’s dual nature, and to consider its significance for sociological 
analysis. Specifically, I will: (i) describe the contrasting natures of “the social self’ and 
the “solitary self’; and (ii) consider how Man is compelled to seek constantly a 
“reaffirmation of the self’.
The Social Self
In many ways, the idea of the social self - that is, the idea that, in some sense, society 
defines the individual - is the pivotal sociological concept, since it contains within it 
the conditions of possibility for sociological enquiry itself. To understand this, it is 
necessary only to consider the relationship that this concept enjoys with the idea of 
social cohesion. In this respect, for example, Dennis Wrong points out that many 
social theorists, using ideas such as the “internalisation of social norms”, rely 
implicitly on the notion of the social self to answer the Hobbesian question, “How is 
the social order possible?”1 Of course, the consequence of the centrality of this notion 
to sociological enquiry is that the social self enjoys many different guises. For 
example, Emile Durkheim conceives of social rules that “enter directly into the 
constitution of actors’ ends themselves”2; Alfred Schutz argues that individuals accept 
as unquestionable “the ready-made standardized scheme of the cultural 
pattern...[Schutz, 1965: 95]”; and Talcott Parsons talks about the “internalisation of 
value-standards”, so that to act in conformity with these becomes a “need-disposition”
1 See Wrong, D., “The oversocialized conception o f man in modem sociology”, in Bocock, R., 
Hamilton, P., Thompson, K. and Waton, A., An Introduction to Sociology (Fontana, 
Glasgow: 1980), 23-51.
2 See Parsons, T., The Structure o f Social Action, (McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York: 
1937), 382.
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in a social actor’s personality structure.3 In the analysis to follow, I will examine one 
particular treatment of the social self, namely George H. Mead’s classic social 
behaviourist theory, in order to demonstrate not only the significance of the societal 
relation in the constitution of subjectivity, but also the inadequacies of accounts that 
seek to reduce subjectivity to the social world.
Despite a fragmentary and unsystematic academic output,4 Mead’s work concerning 
the emergence of the self is considered perhaps the classic sociological treatment of 
this area. In accepting the explanatory significance of self-consciousness, there is an 
implicit recognition of the Cartesian dictum that there is a difference between the 
psychical and the physical. Mead argues that this difference consists in the ability of 
consciousness to appear as an object to itself. Thus, the self “is essentially different 
from other objects, and in the past it has been distinguished as conscious, a term which 
indicates an experience with, an experience of one’s self [Mead, 1934: 200]”.5 
However, whilst Mead accepts that the existence of self-consciousness must be 
admitted, he sees his task as that of articulating a behaviourist explanation of this fact.
Mead claims that the emergence of the self is based on the prior existence of a form of 
sociality. He argues “that mind can never find expression, and could never have come 
into existence at all, except in terms of a social environment; that an organised set or 
pattern of social relations and interactions...is necessarily presupposed by it and 
involved in its nature [Mead, 1934: 244].” In locating his modus operandi squarely in 
the external world of social processes and acts, Mead is able to avoid the difficulties - 
particularly, “the spectre of solipsism” - which he sees as inherent to approaches that 
move from psychical states outwards.
For Mead, consciousness emerges from a dynamic involving an organism oriented 
towards its encountered environment according to pre-programmed biological drives.
3 See Parsons, T., The Social System, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London: 1951), 36-45.
4 In Maurice Natanson’s words, "...Mead’s work may be characterized as a continual and 
persistent return to the phenomena o f social reality in an effort to comprehend these 
phenomena and to describe them truly. In this sense, his work, fragmentary, incomplete, 
unsystematic, and repetitious as it is, represents an attempt by a great and utterly honest mind 
to deal with problems o f crucial importance to philosophy and the social sciences [Natanson, 
1973: 4]."
5 He contrasts the self with the body, pointing out that the body is unable to grasp itself whole.
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Other selves necessarily exist within this environment, since it is in interaction and, 
particularly, as a corollary of significant communication that self consciousness 
arises.6 Mead’s contention is that the seeds of this emergence are sown with the 
internalisation of the objective meaning structures that exist between two organisms 
participating in a conversation of gestures. To illustrate this process, Mead turns to the 
events of a dog fight. The situation where two angry dogs face each other is an 
example of non-significant communication. A gesture of Dog A functions as a 
stimulus to Dog B, whose response similarly becomes a stimulus to Dog A and so on. 
Thus, “...We have this interplay going on with the gestures serving their functions, 
calling out the responses of the others, these responses becoming themselves stimuli 
for readjustment, until the final social act itself can be carried out [Mead, 1934: 44].” 
This process, though non-significant in the sense that the various gestures have no 
meaning for the participants involved, is the precursor of significant communication.
A gesture becomes significant when the response aroused in the individual to whom 
the gesture is addressed is also aroused in the individual who makes the original 
gesture. This occurs when an organism develops the ability to take the attitude o f the 
other. In the words of Mead:
When, in any given social act or situation, one individual indicates by a 
gesture to another individual what this other individual is to do, the first 
individual is conscious of the meaning of his own gesture...in so far as 
he takes the attitude of the second individual toward that gesture, and 
tends to respond to it implicitly in the same way that the second 
individual responds to it explicitly. Gestures become significant 
symbols when they implicitly arouse in an individual making them the
6 In the essay “What objects must psychology presuppose?” [in Mead, G. H., Selected 
Writings, (Edited: Reck, A.), (University o f Chicago Press, Chicago: 1964), 105-113], Mead 
argues, "...Other selves in a social environment logically antedate the consciousness o f self 
which introspection analyzes [111]." However, if  this is the case, it is hard to see how the 
first self-consciousness could have emerged.
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same responses which they explicitly arouse, or are supposed to arouse,
n
in other individuals, the individuals to whom they are addressed.
The importance of the development of the ability to use significant gestures is 
threefold. Firstly, as a result of this ability, organisms are able to address symbols with 
communicative intent; specifically, at the point at which an organism becomes aware 
of how a symbol is likely to be interpreted, that awareness itself is incorporated into 
the communicative exchange, and symbols can be employed in the expectation that 
they will, or will not, arouse a certain response. Secondly, the ability to think, as inner 
conversation, is similarly based on the emergence of significant symbols. According to 
Mead, “only in terms of gestures as significant symbols is the existence of mind or 
intelligence possible; for only in terms of gestures which are significant symbols can 
thinking take place [Mead, 1934: 44].” And thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the 
emergence of the self is founded on the ability to use significant gestures, since it is 
only by taking the attitude of the other, something which is synonymous with this 
ability, that the organism can come to perceive itself as an object (i.e., as a self).
Clearly, to the extent that the ability to take the attitude of the other is fundamental to 
the emergence of significant gestures, Mead’s analysis rests on the plausibility of his 
contention that an organism without self-consciousness can come to view itself as an 
object. How then does he account for this ability?
According to Jurgen Habermas, one can detect in Mead two distinct modes of
Q _
explanation. The first relies on the notion of delayed reaction, whereby a break 
between a stimulus and its associated response allows the organism to step back and 
interpret what it is doing in terms of the response that is elicited. However, as 
Habermas points out, this conception appears to presuppose that type of reflection 
which Mead is in fact seeking to explain. Therefore, the second, Darwin inspired, line 
of argument is perhaps more convincing. Vocal gestures, it is argued, are ideally suited 
to enable an organism to take the attitude of the other, since these are audible not only 
to the organism to whom the address is directed but also to the speaker of the address
7 Mead, G. H., Mind, Self and Society, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1934), 47.
g
See Habermas, J., Theory o f  Communicative Action: Volume 2, (Polity Press, Cambridge: 
1984), 1-42.
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and, therefore, likely to elicit the same potential response in the addresser as the 
addressee.9 Furthermore, Mead sees this ability to take the attitude of the other as 
evolutionarily inevitable because of the advantages in a competitive environment 
accruing to an organism who is able to interpret the meaning of its own gestures.
Up to this point, I have attempted to demonstrate how, for Mead, the self is emergent 
from the social process. Particularly, it is the ability to take the attitude of the other 
concomitant with the development of significant communication which allows the 
individual to view itself as an object. Thus, Mead’s analysis allows no sharp separation 
between mind and social process; self-consciousness, whilst differing from the purely 
physical, is very much a social product, based on and emergent from a prior sociality.
Before I move on to consider how Mead conceives the development of the fully 
socialised self, it seems sensible at this juncture to point to some of the implications 
and possible difficulties of his position as outlined to date.
As I have already stated, Mead argues that social psychology should accept that 
consciousness is explanatorily significant. However, it appears that it does not follow 
that the introspective field is likewise significant, because Mead argues we can foresee 
the day when exact social sciences will:
define persons precisely and determine the laws of social change with 
mathematical exactness...Eugenics, education, even political and 
economic sciences, pass beyond the phase of description and look 
toward the formation of the social object. We recognize that we control 
the conditions which determine the individual.10
In this respect, Van Meter Ames claims that “the epochal achievement of Mead 
himself was to pull consciousness out into the open by stating it in understandable and 
observable terms of behaviour [Ames, 1956: 323].” However, the consequence of this 
achievement is that consciousness as consciousness is no longer the central concern. If
9 See, for example, Mead, G. H., Selected Writings, (Edited: Reck, A.), (University o f Chicago 
Press, Chicago: 1964), 136-137.
10 Mead, G. H., (University o f Chicago Press, Chicago: 1964), 107-108.
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this is the case, then Mead does not, as he claims, deal with the many difficulties of a 
subjectivist approach, but rather, in locating his mode of explanation clearly in the 
world of social process, he simply ignores such difficulties. This neglect is particularly 
evident when one considers Mead’s summary dismissal of the problem of solipsism. In 
a manner reminiscent of Samuel Johnson,11 Mead is able to avoid the problems of * 
subjective idealism by simply reasserting the primacy of the physical world. However, I 
the criticisms of the radical sceptic remain in place. The extended world does not 
become real simply because it is asserted to be so.12
Nevertheless, one must admit the seeming explanatory power of an account which 
locates the genesis of self-consciousness in the social world. The idea that other selves 
logically antedate the consciousness which introspection analyses is a powerful one.
As we have seen, this argument is based on the idea that significant communication 
and, therefore, self-reflection, arises with the ability of the organism to take the 
attitude of the other. However, there are a number of questions that remain 
unanswered as far as this is concerned. Particularly, it is necessary to examine the 
precise cognitive processes involved in the ability to take the attitude of the other, 
otherwise we are left not with an explanation of how an organism comes to be an 
object to itself, but merely a description of what it means to be an object to oneself. In 
this respect, one might consider, for example, the role played by the vocal gesture in 
this process. According to Mead, the vocal gesture is particularly suited to the 
emergence of the self, since being audible to the addresser as well as to the addressee, 
it is likely to arouse the same response in the former as in the latter. However, if this is 
the case, then it is not clear why the organism who utters the vocal gesture should have 
to take the attitude of the other in order to become aware of the gesture uttered. All 
that appears to be required is that the appropriate response has been previously 
learned.
Habermas points to a further difficulty concerning Mead’s notion of the significant 
gesture. He claims that it is not clear from Mead’s account how gestures with identical
11 Johnson refuted the idealist implications o f Berkeley’s philosophy by kicking a stone.
12 For a discussion o f the problem of other selves in relation to Mead's body-self dichotomy, 
see Natanson, M., The Social Dynamics o f  G. H. Mead, (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1973), 58-59.
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meaning for the participants of an interaction situation will arise. Specifically, “if the 
same gesture arouses in both a disposition to like (sufficiently similar) behaviour, an 
observer can notice a concurrence in the way they interpret the stimulus, but this does 
not yet imply the formation of a meaning that is the same for the participants 
themselves [Habermas, 1981: 12].” For Habermas, the solution to this problem lies in 
the fact that an individual initiating a communicative act does so with the expectation 
that it will be interpreted in a certain manner. However, this is an expectation that can 
be disappointed and it is through the mutual expression of this disappointment that 
rules for the use of symbols develop.
In adopting toward themselves the critical attitude of others when the 
interpretation of communicative acts goes wrong, they develop rules for 
the use o f symbols. They can now consider in advance whether in a 
given situation they are using a significant gesture in a way as to give 
the other no grounds for a critical response. In this manner, meaning 
conventions and symbols that can be employed with the same meaning 
take shape.13
To this point, I have been dealing with Mead’s contention that the development of the 
self depends upon the ability to take the attitude of the other. It is now necessary to 
turn to the more focused question of how the human child progresses to become a fully 
socialised human adult. Mead argues that there are two intermediary stages in this 
process, the play stage and the game stage. The play stage is characterised by the child 
playing at being someone. “A child plays at being a mother, at being a teacher, at 
being a policeman; that is, it is taking different roles, as we say [Mead, 1934: 150].” 
The role taking process serves to organise the child’s self, particularly in that the 
responses he makes to the role being played become increasingly systematised. “He 
plays that he is, for instance, offering himself something, and he buys it; he gives a 
letter to himself and takes it away; he addresses himself as a parent, as a teacher; he 
arrests himself as a policeman [Mead, 1934: 150-151].”
13 Habermas, J., Theory o f Communicative Action: Volume 2, (Polity Press, Cambridge: 1984), 
15. Habermas goes on to use Wittgenstein's idea o f a rule, in order to chart the emergence o f  
the fully socialised individual.
The game stage is differentiated from the play stage by the increased rigidity of its 
structure. Whereas in the play stage the child passes from one role to another in 
arbitrary fashion, in the game stage the child “must be ready to take the attitude of 
everyone else involved in that game, and these different roles must have a definite 
relationship to each other [Mead, 1934: 151].” The game stage is normally 
characterised by formal systems of rules and it “represents the passage in the life of the 
child from taking the role of others in play to the organized part that is essential to 
self-consciousness in the full sense of the term [Mead, 1934: 152].”
The final crucial stage in the full development of the self comes when the individual is 
able to take the attitude of the generalised other towards himself; that is, when he is 
able to take the attitude of the whole social group towards himself. Mead is referring 
here to the ability of the individual to deduce from the attitudes of the constituent 
members of a social group, the generalised attitude of the group as a whole. It is the 
ability of the individual to take the attitude of the generalised other to the various 
projects being undertaken within the context of the group that guarantees the presence 
of a fully developed self. Moreover, it is through the functioning of the generalised 
other that the individual is subject to the control of the society of which he is a 
member. Most significantly, the generalised other constitutes the ground upon which 
thought can occur, since thought consists in the individual taking the attitude of the 
generalised other towards himself and responding accordingly. The grounding of the 
thought process in the generalised other guarantees that the social group will be 
present in consciousness as a constraining force. As Mead puts it, “...We assume the 
generalized attitude of the group, in the censor that stands at the door of our imagery 
and inner conversations, and in the affirmation of the laws and axioms of the universe 
of discourse [Mead, 1964: 288].” As a result, individuals will tend to act in fashions 
that are determined by their social groups.
However, Mead rejects the idea that the self and its actions are entirely the product of 
society. In this respect, he distinguishes between the “I” and “me” aspects of the self, 
where the “I” is the self in its unique individuality and the “me” in its social form. The 
“me” is the self from the standpoint of the generalised other and, therefore, functions 
as society’s representative in consciousness. It is the self as “me” which allows the
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individual to pass as a member of the wider community. In contrast, the “I” is that 
aspect of the self which calls out and responds to the “me” as it appears in conscious­
ness. The important point is that this response is never fully determined (by the “me”) 
and, therefore, there is a novel and emergent quality to every act. It is this that ensures 
the uniqueness and creativity of each individual self.14
However, the extent to which the logic of Mead’s enquiry actually allows one to 
conceive of a spontaneous, creative individual must be questioned. The “I” is an aspect 
of the self; the self has the social milieu immanent in its nature; it is hard, therefore, to 
see how the “I” can be posited as a transcendent entity.15 Indeed, this point would 
seem to be borne out by experience, where that which is typically thought of as the “I” 
is simply the totality of an individual’s past actions and experience.16 If this is the case, 
then even if one, in line with philosophical tradition, endows the individual with 
creative potential, it is hard to see how this can be anything other than fundamentally 
mediated by the totality of experience. However, it is not the task here to explore the 
various issues surrounding notions of determinism, suffice it to say that Mead foresaw 
the day when social sciences would “define persons precisely and determine the laws 
of social change with mathematical exactness...”.17
In terms of the interests of this chapter, it is, perhaps, the concept of the generalised 
other which is the most significant in Mead’s account. It is the ability of the individual 
to adopt this attitude towards himself that defines him as a fully social self. The “me”, 
a specifically social identity, forms the bedrock of social action in the social group, 
and is the primary source of social order. Of course, Mead’s account is but one 
example of a theory of the social self, and this latter argument, that the social self is 
integral to social order, is a theme common to other similar conceptions. As I noted
14 For fuller discussions of the various issues surrounding the "I" and the "me", see Mead, G. 
H., Selected Writings, (Edited: Reck, A.), (University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1964), 
142-149; and Mead, G. H., Mind, Self and Society, (University o f Chicago Press, Chicago: 
1934), 174-199.
15 See Mead, G. H., (University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1964), 140-141.
16 Natanson points out that this is indeed one aspect of Mead's "I" [Natanson, M., The Social 
Dynamics o f G. H. Mead, (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1973), 16-17].
17 Mead, G. H., Selected Writings, (Edited: Reck, A.), (University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 
1964), 107-108.
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earlier, perhaps the most frequent response to the Hobbesian question, “How is the 
social order possible?”, is to claim that it is possible because society constitutes 
individuals; that is, it is to claim, in effect, that a regularity of action is guaranteed by 
the presence of society in the subjectivities of social actors.18
In broad terms, then, Mead’s analysis, and accounts of the social self generally, 
accomplish two major things: (i) they demonstrate the sense in which subjectivity is 
fundamentally structured by the societal relation; and (ii) they conceptually link the 
levels of the social and the individual, therefore, providing the grounds for an analysis 
of the reproduction of social action which is perceived to be regular and non-random. 
However, such accounts also beg a number of important questions. Perhaps most 
significantly, they raise the issue as to whether the character of the self is exhausted in 
it social aspect; or, to put this another way, whether it is possible to reduce subjectivity 
to the “external-world”?19
As a starting point for exploring this issue, I wish to return to Mead’s analysis of the 
self, and to note a certain ambiguity in his account. Specifically, I wish to consider 
whether having been constituted as self-reflective, consciousness requires the 
continued presence of others for its maintenance. The logic of Mead’s account would 
seem to suggest that it does since it is only through the functioning of a generalised 
other that the fully developed self can exist. However, equally, it is not expected that a 
self able to perceive itself as an object could then lose this ability. Therefore, it seems 
quite plausible to Mead that the person in solitary confinement should still be capable 
of self-reflection and inner-conversation.20 Whatever the solution to this ambiguity, the 
case of the individual in solitary confinement poses interesting questions for the social 
behaviourist explanation of consciousness. Particularly, it is difficult to see how an 
analysis concerned to pull consciousness out into the open is applicable to a situation
18 Thus, R. S. Perinbanayagam argues that ’’...The individual is unknown to social 
science...because he is defined, created, and sustained by an interaction with the other - 
known to some sociologists as the primacy of the group, to some others as the importance of 
institutions and communities, and to some sociologists and anthropologists as the 
paramountcy o f social structure. It is not that the individual has no creativity or voluntariness, 
but that even such creativity and voluntariness are social and interpersonal activities, and so, 
are minimally or maximally constrained [Perinbanayagam, 1975: 501]."
19 When I use the term "external-world", it will always be in the sense o f perceived external- 
world.
20  »See Pivcevic, E., Husserl and Phenomenology, (Hutchinson, London: 1970), 46.
where there is a bare minimum of interaction. It is, therefore, perhaps the case that the
account which seeks to avoid the spectre of solipsism is inadequate in describing the
21state of consciousness which most concretely mirrors this condition.
In fact, as I intimated above, Mead’s account displays a general explanatory weakness 
when dealing with self-consciousness as self-consciousness. Although one cannot 
doubt the efficacy of the concept of the generalised other, particularly, in that it 
specifies how a social control function might enter the consciousness of an individual 
subject, there are aspects of reflection and awareness that cannot easily be understood 
by means of this conceptual framework. Particularly, there is the question of the 
awareness of the conscious subject of his conscious existence. I am talking here about 
Man’s awareness that he is an unified existent entity, standing apart from the others 
encountered in social interaction. Self-consciousness inevitably means isolation and a 
separation from the world of others. It confirms not only Man’s ability “to call upon 
himself and find himself at home”22, but also that when he gets there he will have no 
house guests.
Interestingly, Mead provides us with the conceptual apparatus necessary to understand 
how an individual might come to perceive himself as ultimately separated from those
21 It is worth noting that the various issues surrounding the notion of solipsism are inextricably 
linked to more general epistemological concerns. Although it is not possible to discuss these 
at any length, it is worth briefly considering whether Mead's account is as epistemologically 
unproblematic as he seems to think. Is he able, by focusing upon the realm of observable 
social processes, to specify the indubitable basis for the human sciences? At present, this 
question must be answered in the negative, since there are a number o f philosophical 
difficulties that have not yet been adequately resolved. For example, one might consider that 
the natural sciences as Mead conceives diem (including his own enquiry) are situated 
squarely in the realm of the pre-philosophic natural attitude. They are, in Husserlian 
terminology, “lost in the world [Husserl, 1970: 157]” and they have not been subjected to a 
"radical investigation o f sense" [for an outline o f the demands of the phenomenological 
approach, see Hindess, B„ Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Sciences, (The 
Harvester Press, Sussex: 1977), 56-59]. As a consequence, upon reflection, "we fall into 
errors and confusions. We become entangled in patent difficulties and even 
self-contradictions [Husserl, 1964: 17]." Mead's analysis, therefore, remains helplessly 
attached to a common sense view of the sciences and thereby open to the charge of 
relativism. Ironically, Husserl shows us that one o f the very consequences of the lack of a 
radical investigation o f sense is the solipsism which Mead argues cannot exist [Husserl, 
1964: 16]. Broadly speaking, therefore, epistemological difficulties are not avoided simply 
by reasserting the primacy of the material world. Mead does not silence the claims of the 
radical sceptic by dismissing the metaphysical question o f solipsism as unworthy o f analysis. 
This is not necessarily to accept the arguments o f the sceptics. But it is to maintain that they 
must be dealt with.
22 Mead, G. H., cited in Ames, V. M., “Mead and Husserl on the self’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, (1955), IV, 3, 325.
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he encounters in social interaction. This is a consequence of the fact that the self is 
able to appear as an object to itself. The very fact that the individual is able to grasp 
himself in this manner, an object among other objects, implies an awareness of his 
separation from those others he encounters. It is fair to say, that without this awareness 
there would be no basis for meaningful interaction. However, in that Mead wishes to 
avoid recourse to the introspective sphere, he is unable to explore the consequences of 
this awareness, instead being content merely to articulate the various mechanisms 
involved its emergence.
Indeed, it is difficult to see how an analysis of consciousness that is concerned to 
objectify the introspective sphere can further the understanding of the plight of the 
conscious subject aware of its consciousness. In part, this is due to the fact that 
consciousness, for the conscious subject, is not reducible to the external-world. This 
can be illustrated by considering the notion of Cartesian doubt. Descartes argued that 
whilst one can doubt the existence of everything material one cannot doubt the fact of 
one’s doubting and, therefore, one’s existence. In his words “...While I wanted to think 
everything false, it must necessarily be that I who thought was something...”. The 
fact that the individual can conceive of consciousness in isolation, demonstrates its 
irreducibility, for him, to the external-world. Thus, whilst an analysis concerned to 
objectify consciousness is quite adequate in describing its emergence, it is wholly 
inadequate in teaching us what it means to be a conscious subject aware of its own 
consciousness.
The Solitary Self
It is this aspect of subjectivity that I wish to explore in the second half of this chapter. 
To anticipate, I wish to argue that as a result of the isolation, estrangement and lack of 
definiteness which is characteristic of the self in the solitary relation, individuals expe­
rience a necessity to seek continual reaffirmation of their senses of self. In other 
words, it is my claim that the solitary self is in perpetual flight from its isolation, 
estrangement and absurdity. This is the pursuit of self-reification, the attempt to
23 Cited in Russell, B., A History o f Western Philosophy, (Unwin, London: 1946), 547.
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transcend the inexplicability of the cogito. However, as the individuals engaged in this 
project are socially defined, that is, they think and act in terms of the norms and values 
of their social groups, this search for reaffirmation is fundamentally mediated by the 
societal relation. Of particular significance is the fact that individuals will look to 
society to satisfy this need, which will be achieved to the extent that they are able to 
embrace their various social identities. The social and political significance of these 
issues is wide-ranging and constitutes, in large part, the wider concern of this work. In 
my analysis of these issues, I wish to turn first to Jean-Paul Sartre and his description 
of nothingness, to analyse what is arguably as extreme an account of the isolation of 
consciousness as is possible.
For Sartre, the starting point of the philosophical enquiry is the Cartesian cogito. 
Accordingly, “...There can be no other truth to take off from than this: I think, 
therefore, I exist. There we have the absolute truth of consciousness becoming aware 
of itself [Sartre, 1957: 36].” Sartre terms consciousness, “Being for-itself’, and it is to 
a description of this and its relation to “Being in-itself’ (i.e., the world of things) that 
his major “existential” work Being and Nothingness is devoted.24
The For-itself is essentially defined by its emptiness, by the lack of that which is 
necessary for its completion. In Sartre’s words, “...Consciousness is a being, the nature 
of which is to be conscious of the nothingness of its being [Sartre, 1969: 47].” There 
are a number of different senses in which this can be understood. Sartre maintains that 
the inevitable corollary of the intentionality of consciousness is the existence of a gap 
between thought and its objects.25 It is not only the case that “...All consciousness, as 
Husserl has shown, is consciousness of something [Sartre, 1969: xxvii]”, it is also true 
that consciousness is, at all times, aware of the fact that it is so conscious. The gap 
between thought and its objects is derived from this awareness; that is, the awareness 
of consciousness that it is not the object to which it is directed. Further, it is in this gap 
that the freedom of the For-itself is manifest. It is the fact that consciousness is able to
24 Sartre, J-P., Being and Nothingness, (Routledge, London and New York: 1969). For the 
analysis o f nothingness, see particularly, 3-45.
25 The term "intentional" has a technical usage in the phenomenological literature. It refers to 
the "directedness" o f mental acts; that is, to the fact that all mental acts are directed towards 
an object. It was first employed in this sense by Brentano and Husserl.
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adopt any number of attitudes towards the objects to which it is directed, particularly 
the attitude of denial, which confirms this freedom. This general point is worth 
emphasising: it is because the For-itself is separated from the given order of things that 
it is free; freedom is detachment, the permanent possibility that things might be other 
than they are. Thus, according to Wamock, “at the very centre of the For-itself, right at 
the beginning we discover both freedom and an emptiness [Wamock, 1965: 43].”
As a consequence, the being For-itself lacks the necessary concreteness to render itself 
a being In-itself.26 Particularly, the conscious being lacks the coincidence o f  him self 
with him self required for this transformation. This is so, inevitably, because of the fact 
that the For-itself lacks an essence, and it lies at the heart of Sartre’s famous dictum 
that the For-itself is not what it is and is what it is not. Thus, on the one hand, Man is 
confronted by a past that he no longer is, and on the other, by the totality of his 
unrealised possibilities that may or may not come to pass. Therefore, “...Human-reality 
is free because it is not enough. It is free because it is perpetually wrenched away from 
itself and because it has been separated by a nothingness from what it is and from what 
it will be [Sartre, 1969: 440].”
The fact that nothingness lies coiled at the heart o f  being is further confirmed by an 
analysis of negation. This concerns, most simply, the capacity of consciousness to 
conceive of that which is not the case and can be inferred from Man’s ability to ask 
questions. For example, to ask whether the Duke of Wellington is in a particular cafe 
is to recognise the possibility of a negative reply. Similarly, to receive a reply to the 
affirmative rules out other answers and thus carries with it its own negations (yes, the 
Duke o f  Wellington is in the cafe, he cannot, therefore, be at home, on the bus, etc.). 
However, more interesting than these, which are simple acts of judgement/thought, are 
those instances where negation enters directly into the experience of a For-itself. Sartre 
deals with this most famously in a passage concerning the non-appearance of a friend 
at the cafe where he is expected:
96  _ ■The In-itself refers most simply to the things o f the material world. These, in contrast to the 
For-itself, have fixed essences that define them in their entirety. Thus, the In-itself has no 
unfulfilled possibilities; "It is itself indefinitely and it exhausts itself in being [Sartre, 1969: 
xlii]."
27 See, for example, Sartre, J-P., Being and Nothingness, (Routledge, London and New York: 
1969), 88.
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But now Pierre is not here. This does not mean that I discover his 
absence in some precise spot in the establishment. In fact Pierre is 
absent from the whole cafe; his absence fixes the cafe in its 
evanescence; the cafe remains ground,; it persists in offering itself as an 
undifferentiated totality to my only marginal attention; it slips into the 
background; it pursues its nihilation. Only it makes itself ground for a 
determined figure; it carries the figure everywhere in front of it, 
presents the figure everywhere to me. This figure which slips constantly 
between my look and the solid, real objects of the cafe is precisely a 
perpetual disappearance; it is Pierre raising himself as nothingness on 
the ground of the nihilation of the cafe.28
Although Pierre’s absence is based on an original relation of expectation - that is, he is 
only absent by virtue of someone expecting him to be there, it is still a very real event 
concerning the cafe, which he now haunts by his non-appearance. More generally, it is 
Sartre’s contention that non-being enters the world as a consequence of the assump­
tions and expectations used by Man and that once it is present it is apprehended as 
clearly as is being. Thus, Sartre states that “Man is the being through whom 
nothingness comes into the world [Sartre, 1969: 24].”
This leads us to a final question: what kind of being must Man be that through him 
nothingness can enter into the world? The answer that Sartre gives is that nothingness 
can only be produced by nothingness, since “...It would be inconceivable that a Being 
which is full positivity should maintain and create outside itself a Nothingness...for 
there would be nothing in Being by which Being could surpass itself toward Non- 
Being...The being by which Nothingness comes into the world must be its own 
Nothingness [Sartre, 1969: 23].” We are returned, therefore, to a conception of 
consciousness as freedom and emptiness, something that is confirmed by the ability of 
the For-itself to introduce negatites into the world. Furthermore, consciousness carries 
within itself a permanent negation; that is, it constantly identifies itself by reference to 
those multitude of objects which are not it. These, then, are the senses in which
28 Sartre, J-P., Being and Nothingness, (Routledge, London and New York: 1969), 10.
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“consciousness is a being, the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingness of 
its being [Sartre, 1969: 47].”
It can be seen that Sartre has produced an account of consciousness which apparently 
stresses its isolation and estrangement. The For-itself is always separated from the 
objects to which it is directed; in its emptiness and freedom it constantly escapes itself 
as a lack of completed possibilities. However, it must be noted that Sartre himself 
would deny that consciousness is isolated in this way. Firstly, because the For-itself is 
absolutely dependent for its existence upon the objects to which it is directed; and 
secondly, because Man recognises that others are the condition of his own existence30 
- Man “can not be anything... unless others recognize it as such. In order to get any 
truth about myself, I must have contact with another person [Sartre, 1957: 37-38].” 
Nevertheless, one must, in fact, doubt whether these qualifications are sufficient to lift 
consciousness out of its isolation. It is still the case that the For-itself is conscious of 
both its nothingness and its freedom; it is difficult to see how something that can only 
exist For-itself, by virtue of its not being those objects towards which it is directed, can 
be anything other than fundamentally estranged. Indeed, it would appear to be the case 
that the For-itself is absolutely dependent upon its solitariness for its existence.
At this point, it seems sensible to make a number of general points concerning Sartre’s 
approach and its significance for sociological enquiry. Firstly, there are a whole series 
of difficulties concerning his insistence upon the inalienable freedom of the For-itself. 
Most importantly, it is the status that Sartre ascribes to the cogito that must be 
questioned. Whilst it is true that Mead did not pay sufficient respect to the problem of 
solipsism, it is also the case that his treatment of the emergence the self has far more 
explanatory merit than the transcendentalism of the phenomenologists. If one accepts 
the social behaviourist argument, then one is led to question Sartre’s insistence that 
consciousness is condemned to be free. It is quite possible to concede that the For- 
itself is in a sense detached from the things of the world and, therefore, required to 
choose, at all times, between alternative courses of action, but at the same time to 
maintain that this does not entail its freedom since it is itself the resultant of the social
29 Sartre, J-P., Being and Nothingness, (Routledge, London and New York: 1969), 89.
30 Sartre, J-P., (Routledge, London and New York: 1969), 221-302.
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milieu; that is, to maintain that the subject of the subject-object relation is socially 
defined (i.e., a social self).31
However, whilst we might be forced to reject Sartre’s insistence on Man’s ineluctable
32freedom there is much in his account that remains of value. Firstly, in stressing that 
consciousness is always consciousness o f  something and that this something is never 
identical with consciousness itself, he has perhaps identified that structure of 
experience which functions most fundamentally to establish and maintain the identity 
of the self. In this respect, for example, D. W. Winnicott notes that the new-born infant 
displays no sense of self and argues that this is due to the lack of an external object in 
terms of which the self can be defined.33 Of course, the consequence of the opposition 
of consciousness and its objects is the fundamental isolation that characterises the 
solitary self. Secondly, in locating Man’s freedom at the centre of his philosophy, 
Sartre pays due regard to what is an universal aspect of experience. Whether or not 
Man is in fact freely acting, it has long been recognised that he experiences himself as 
such.34 The importance of this is: (i) that the perception of freedom remains a 
significant aspect of an individual’s subjectivity; and (ii) that to be apparently freely 
acting is, as Sartre recognises, to be detached from the order o f things. Finally, it must 
be admitted that Sartre’s description of the For-itself as nothingness is a striking one. 
Although we are ultimately led to reject this in favour of the explanatory superiority of 
a social behaviourist approach, in many ways Sartre’s account serves us better than
31 Sartre's insistence on the absolute freedom o f the For-itself is generally felt to be one of the 
most problematic areas of his philosophy. See, for example, Wamock, M., The Philosophy 
o f Sartre, (Hutchinson, London: 1965), 110-112; Chiari, J., Twentieth Century French 
Thought: from Bergson to Levi-Strauss, (Paul Elek, London: 1975), 101-104; and Ayer, 
A. J., Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, (Unwin Paperbacks, London: 1982), 231.
32 Of course, there are other reasons, apart from the inadequacies o f the Sartrean account vis-a- 
vis the emergence o f the self, for rejecting the notion that the self is absolutely free. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to examine these here, suffice it to say that I accept Timothy 
Sprigge's assessment that Sartre's theory is "insufficiently zoological” [see Sprigge, T. L. S., 
Theories o f Existence, (Penguin, Harmondsworth: 1984), 146-147].
33 See Winnicott, D. W., The Family and Individual Development, (Tavistock, London: 1965), 
18. Of course, Sartre would be forced to deny that the infant could be, at one and the same 
time, conscious and yet unaware that there existed objects outside consciousness. This serves 
merely to illustrate die superiority o f those theories which see the cogito as in some sense 
constructed.
34 The crucial issue is whether or not we are mistaken in this belief. "Libertarians” argue that 
determinists cannot explain why Man experiences himself as freely acting; but this could, 
perhaps, be achieved by combining Sartre's analysis o f the structure of consciousness with a 
Median social behaviourism.
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social behaviourism when it comes to understanding what it means to be a conscious 
subject aware of its own consciousness. Of particular significance is the fact that it 
enables us to appreciate the fragility and vulnerability of such a state. The Sartrean 
individual is unable to make himself real, he at all times escapes himself and he is 
fundamentally estranged from both himself and others. It is my contention that 
although the For-itself is neither empty nor free, Sartre nevertheless provides an 
accurate description of what it means to be a conscious being. The fact that the 
individual is the product of an apparently structured social reality does not enable him 
to transcend the confines of the cogito. The experience of consciousness as 
consciousness is best understood, therefore, in terms of relations of isolation and 
estrangement.
It is my claim, as I have already noted, that as a result of this isolation and 
estrangement individuals seek constantly to reaffirm their senses of self; and that they 
achieve this to the extent that they are able to embrace their various social identities. 
In order to explore this claim, I wish now to analyse critically Sartre’s notions of 
anguish and badfaith.
Bad faith refers to those strategies employed by an individual in his attempt to deny 
the freedom that is indubitably his. Such strategies are made necessary by the anguish 
that is experienced with the reflective awareness of this freedom. In other words, the 
individual will adopt “patterns of bad faith”, in order to deny the reflective awareness 
that he has continually to choose himself but that having done so he can rely on neither 
the permanence nor the validity of these choices. In order to clarify the notion of 
anguish, it is worth considering one of the examples that Sartre himself uses; namely, 
the experience of “vertigo”.
Sartre states that “...Vertigo is anguish to the extent that I am afraid not of falling over 
the precipice, but of throwing myself over [Sartre, 1969: 29].” On a narrow path, 
confronted by a sheer drop, an individual will feel fear. He does so in that he 
apprehends himself as an object, who being subject to the universal determinism of the 
physical world, carries the possibility of a fall to death. In response, he will, after 
reflection, take the steps necessary to minimise the potential risk - for example, by
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walking as far away from the drop as possible - and escapes his fear to the extent that 
he replaces mere objective probability with his own possibilities', that is, to the extent 
that he is actively engaged in making his own future.35 However, it will be 
remembered that the individual is separated by a nothingness from both his past and 
his future. Therefore, the fact that he has at one moment taken the decision to pursue 
the course of action necessary to avoid falling over the edge, in no way guarantees that 
he will not, at the next, decide instead to throw himself over. Thus:
I am in anguish precisely because any conduct on my part is only 
possible, and this means that while constituting a totality of motives fo r  
pushing away that situation, I at the same moment apprehend these 
motives as not sufficiently effective. At the very moment when I 
apprehend my being as horror of the precipice, I am conscious of that 
horror as not determinant in relation to my possible conduct.
Anguish, in this sense, is simply the recognition by an individual that he and his future 
are always in doubt. Therefore, in general terms, it can be characterised as a kind of 
monumental and perpetual uncertainty, a lack of definiteness, consequent of the 
emptiness that lies at the heart of being. Bad faith is the most typical response of the 
For-itself to this state and constitutes a striving for fullness o f  being. This is attained to 
the extent that the For-itself is able to represent himself to himself as thing-like; that is, 
to the extent that he is able to take on the definiteness of character of an In-itself, 
therefore, fixing his possibilities and releasing him from the uncertainty of freedom. 
The sociological significance of this quest for identity is obvious; the social world is 
the arena within which this takes place and the identity sought by an individual is more 
often than not a social identity.37 That Sartre recognises this is confirmed by his 
discussion of what it means to be a waiter.
35 See Sartre, J-P., Being and Nothingness, (Routledge, London and New York: 1969), 30.
36 Sartre, J-P., (Routledge, London and New York: 1969), 31.
37 Of the four forms o f bad faith identified by Gila Hayim, only one is not immediately 
explicable in sociological terms. This she terms the Stoical solution and it refers to that 
situation where the individual represents himself as pure consciousness, separated from his 
body which becomes purely a thing. See Hayim, G., The Existential Sociology o f  Jean-Paul
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Sartre argues that the most successful waiter is the one who most completely identifies 
with his role. In other words, he is the waiter who takes on waiterhood as his essence; 
who becomes a waiter like an inkwell is an inkwell or a glass a glass; who turns 
himself into a thing whose being is exhausted in its social role. However, to the extent 
that he achieves this, he is in bad faith because, as we have seen, the For-itself can 
never actually coincide with the In-itself He is always separated by a nothingness 
from that which he is and, therefore, can only be a waiter in the mode of being what he 
is n o t3S According to Gila Hayim, this type of bad faith is an ontological solution to 
the problem of freedom. She is referring here to those instances where an individual 
“becomes nothing else but what he is expected to be, unwaveringly loyal to fixed 
modes of conduct and judgement imposed from above and without. The expectations 
of others actually become his desires, and almost come to constitute his own nature 
[Hayim, 1980: 25].” There are parallels here with both Mead and Schutz: the 
individual constitutes himself by means of a generalised other, this in turn provides 
him with the ideal course of action types (to borrow Schutzian terminology) that make 
up particular social identities; and, to the extent that he embraces these, he is spared 
the uncertainty that haunts his being.
Of course, the attempted identification with a particular social role is by no means the 
only strategy available to the individual in his flight from uncertainty. He might also 
strive to become quite literally a thing-, that is, to become an object whose possibilities 
are realised at the instance of its creation. He is able to do this to the extent that he can 
represent himself as controlled by forces that exist objectively and externally to 
himself. Such forces would include all those that Durkheim terms social facts', “types 
of conduct or thought [that] are not only external to the individual but are, moreover, 
endowed with an imperative and coercive power, by virtue of which they impose 
themselves upon him, independent of his individual will [Durkheim, 1972: 64], ”39 
Numbered amongst these are the “established beliefs and practices” that go to make up
Sartre, (University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst: 1980), 23-26; and Sartre, J-P.,
Being and Nothingness, (Routledge, London and New York: 1969), 55-56.
38 See Sartre, J-P., (Routledge, London and New York: 1969), 60.
39 Hayim obviously has Durkheim in mind when she terms this type o f bad faith, "positivistic". 
Needless to say, as far as Sartre is concerned, social facts cannot exert a determining 
influence on individuals.
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the nonnative sphere.40 To the extent that these are accepted and adhered to without 
question, they exercise a coercive force over individuals. Unquestioning acceptance is, 
for Sartre, an instance of that special kind of bad faith he terms the spirit o f  
seriousness.
This refers most generally to that human attitude that subordinates Man to a 
transcendent and immutable natural order o f  things. Sartre states that “...The serious 
attitude involves starting from the world and attributing more reality to the world than 
to oneself ...the serious man confers reality on him self to the degree to which he 
belongs to the world  [Sartre, 1969: 580, my italics].” Particularly, he assigns a 
transcendent and objective reality to those beliefs and values that govern his 
behaviour; he is enshrined in a network of the rights and duties that give to him his 
significance. This is strikingly illustrated in Sartre’s treatment of the Burgher’s of 
Bouville:41
Jean Pacome, the son of the Pacome of the Government of National 
Defense...had always done his duty, all his duty, his duty as a son, a 
husband, a father, a leader. He had also unhesitatingly demanded his 
rights: as a child, the right to be well brought up, in a united family, the 
right to inherit a spotless name, a prosperous business; as a husband, the 
right to be cared for, to be surrounded with tender affection; as a father, 
the right to be venerated; as a leader, the right to be obeyed without 
demur. For a right is never anything but the other aspect of duty.42
The Burghers, therefore, find their reality outside themselves; in their positions as 
heads of household; in their business accomplishments; in their good deeds; in their 
morality; and in their knowledge that the world is perfectly explicable. It is to society 
they look in their attempt to escape the freedom that is inevitably theirs. They seek the
40 See Lukes, S., Emile Durkheim, (Penguin, Harmondsworth: 1973), 9-10.
41 See Sartre, J-P., Nausea, (Penguin, Harmondsworth: 1963).
42 Sartre, J-P., (Penguin, Harmondsworth: 1963), 124.
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ontological security*3of an in-group and its established folkways in their flight from 
uncertainty; and they move to isolate and denigrate the out-group44 in an attempt to 
hold onto this security 45 The serious man, generally, desires the certainty that a social 
identity affords; he obscures the demands of freedom by binding himself to a 
particular framework of typifications, which consequently functions to define him. 
However, this hope that the freedom that is inevitably Man’s can be transcended in the 
societal relation is, for Sartre, a vain one, destined to be swallowed up by the 
emptiness that lies at the heart of consciousness.
In this discussion, I have attempted to demonstrate: (i) that, for Sartre, as a 
consequence of the nothingness and freedom characteristic of the For-itself, there 
exists a particular state of being he terms anguish, which can be understood as the 
perpetual uncertainty that an individual experiences as a result of his recognition that 
both he and his future are always in doubt; (ii) that an individual seeks to avoid such 
anguish by adopting strategies of bad faith, whereby he is able to operate in the guise 
o f  a pow erless In-itself6 and, therefore, escape the uncertainty of freedom; in this 
respect, strategies of bad faith can be understood as mechanisms by which an 
individual seeks to reaffirm his sense of self; that is, they are mechanisms for the 
attainment of a certain solidity o f  being, and (iii) that an individual becomes a 
powerless In-itself to the extent that he is able to define himself in terms of his various 
social identities.
It is now necessary to point to a number of the difficulties with the Sartrean account, 
so that I might demonstrate the wider significance of these kinds of arguments. As I
43 An individual might be said to be "ontologically secure" to the extent that he has achieved: (i) 
a continuity o f self-identity; and (ii) on-going confidence in reality and malleability o f  the 
external-world.
44 According to Schutz, the distinction between in-group and out-group serves primarily to 
distinguish between the way that a particular social group is experienced by its own 
members, in contrast to the way that it is apprehended by the members o f other distinct 
groups. See Schutz, A., Collected Papers: Volume II, (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1964), 227; and 
250.
45 See Schutz, A., (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1964), 128-129. William Sumner notes that "...Each 
group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if  it observes that other groups have 
other folkways, this excites its scorn. Opprobrious epithets are derived from these 
differences. "Pig-eater," "cow-eater," "uncircumcised," "jabberers," are epithets o f contempt 
and abomination [Sumner, W., cited in Schutz, (1964): 244]."
46 Hayim's definition, see Hayim, G., The Existential Sociology o f  Jean-Paul Sartre, 
(University o f Massachusetts Press, Amherst: 1980), 15.
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have stated, it is Sartre’s contention that the For-itself can never attain the solidity of 
being that it is seeking. In the final analysis, this is a consequence of the separation of 
consciousness and its objects, which itself is the condition of its emptiness and 
freedom. However, it will be remembered that I have rejected this conception of the 
For-itself in favour of the explanatory superiority of a social behaviourist account. 
Thus, the question that I wish to address here is whether the notion of bad faith retains 
its usefulness, given the rejection of the premises upon which it is built. The answer, I 
think, is yes, if  bad faith is understood not as a flight from freedom, but rather as an 
attempt to transcend the isolation and estrangement that the self experiences in its 
solitary aspect. In order to justify this assertion, I wish to turn first to consider whether 
bad faith is a convincing notion, when it is defined purely as the attempt to escape an 
inevitable freedom.
One must accept, I think, that Sartre has identified a recognisable aspect of experience 
in his description of anguish. Thus, for example, we can understand the uncertainty 
which individuals experience with the realisation, when confronted by a sheer drop, 
that they can at anytime choose to jump. Similarly, we are all familiar with the 
difficulty of accepting absolute responsibility for all our actions.47 However, the 
familiarity of these experiences does not constitute a sufficient reason for tying bad 
faith so closely to the experience of freedom. Indeed, there are a number of good 
reasons why one cannot do so.
It will be remembered that Sartre maintains that the For-itself can never be what it is. 
Thus, for example, “...If I make myself sad, it is because I am not sad - the being of 
sadness escapes me by and in the very act by which I affect myself with it...the original 
structure of “not being what one is” renders impossible in advance all movement 
toward being in itself or “being what one is” [Sartre, 1969: 61-62].” What is more, the 
inescapable freedom of the For-itself means that it must choose every emotion that it 
experiences. In this respect, for example, whilst I might appear to be pathologically 
and unavoidably sad, “...Let a stranger suddenly appear and I will lift up my head, I 
will assume a lively cheerfulness. What will remain of my sadness except that I
47 This is an aspect of anguish that I have not discussed. See, for example, Sartre, J-P., 
Existentialism and Human Emotions, (Philosophical Library, New York: 1957), 18-29.
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obligingly promise it an appointment for later after the departure of the 
visitor...[Sartre, 1969: 61].” Presumably, then, this also applies to anguish; that is, the 
For-itself, becoming reflectively aware of its freedom, is in anguish to the extent that it 
chooses to be so. However, a very condition of this freedom is the ineffectiveness of 
the motives that apparently lead to particular choices; a reflective apprehension that 
one is condemned to be free, therefore, cannot lead inevitably to an experience of 
anguish.48 According to the terms of Sartre’s analysis, freedom can be tied neither 
logically nor causally to anguish; it is a purely contingent relation.49 A similar 
argument can be levelled at his contention that the For-itself seeks to avoid anguish by 
adopting patterns of bad faith. Anguish cannot be a causal factor in the individual’s 
decision to adopt such patterns; having chosen to experience anguish the individual 
chooses bad faith as the strategy to avoid that which he has chosen to experience. This 
absurd conclusion is the inevitable consequence of an insistence upon the absolute 
freedom of the For-itself. It is impossible to tie freedom, anguish and bad faith 
together in an explanatory whole, since they are at all times separated from each other, 
both logically and causally, by the nothingness that is the For-itself.
In fact, it is very difficult to see why a For-itself that has no essence should have any 
difficulty at all with the apprehension of its freedom. For example, consider the notion 
of responsibility. Sartre argues that to be aware of one’s absolute responsibility for 
one’s own actions is to be in anguish. He illustrates this point by examining the case 
where a military officer has to choose whether to order an attack, where he knows that 
if he does so he will certainly send a number of men to their deaths.50 This officer is in 
anguish to the extent that he is aware that he is absolutely free to choose either to 
attack or not to attack. However, whilst freedom (or a perceived freedom) might be a 
necessary condition of such anguish, it is certainly not a sufficient one. The burden of 
responsibility, in this instance, is tied up with a whole range of socially derived beliefs
48 It is because there is a gap between the For-itself and both its motives and its acts that these 
motives are ineffective in determining particular actions [see Sartre, J-P., Being and 
Nothingness, (Routledge, London and New York: 1969), 33-35].
49 A possible line o f response might be that anguish is not an attitude taken towards freedom, 
but purely and simply a reflective apprehension of freedom. However, there are two 
objections here: (i) it is difficult to see why a simple recognition o f freedom should engender 
patterns o f bad faith’, and (ii) the very term anguish implies an emotional attitude.
50 See Sartre, J-P., Existentialism and Human Emotions, (Philosophical Library, New York: 
1957), 20-21.
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and attitudes, particularly those surrounding the notion of the sanctity of life. It is very 
unlikely that the officer would experience such anguish were it the fate of a battalion 
of ants that lay in his hands. However, it is difficult to see how Sartre’s account allows 
for the influence of such social factors, since these cannot be causally related to any 
attitude (e.g., anguish) adopted subsequent to their being posited as significant. 
Crudely, whether or not an individual accepts a particular moral code can have no 
bearing on his experience of anguish. If we allow that it can, we reach the absurd 
situation where the individual is in anguish to the extent that he accepts as binding a 
socially derived morality; that is, to the extent that he adopts a spirit o f seriousness and 
is in bad faith.51
It is interesting that one can construct a more successful sociological explanation of 
this notion of anguish through responsibility. The military officer is the product of a 
specific and apparently structured social reality. He will, therefore, cany with him a 
set of beliefs and attitudes which reflect the norms and values of the social groups to 
which he belongs. To the extent that these have been internalised they form a very real 
aspect of his personality. However, at the same time, his ability to appear as an object 
to himself, confirms to him his status as a sovereign individual; in Sartrean terms, his 
being is not exhausted in its social aspect. Further, he will experience himself as an 
individual who is able to choose between alternative courses action; that is, as 
relatively freely acting. Thus, in a situation such as the one Sartre details, he can suffer 
very real anguish in his responsibility. On the one hand, his decision appears to him as 
a free one; on the other, he has internalised a set of conflicting norms and values (that 
is, the sanctity of life vs. duty to nation). It is at the intersection of these conflicting 
demands that one finds his anguish.
In this brief critical diversion, I have sought to demonstrate: (i) that the logic of 
Sartre’s enquiry does not allow him to posit bad faith as a response to freedom; and 
(ii) that it is problematic to suppose that freedom should pose so many difficulties for 
a For-itself that has no essence. However, although, as a consequence, one is forced to 
reject the premises upon which Sartre builds his analysis, one must recognise that in
51 It is difficult to see why a For-itself should ever accept a set o f attitudes and beliefs that 
might result in anguish through responsibility, since it is at all times free to reject these (even 
if  only to accept them again later).
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his descriptions of bad faith - that is, in his description of the various strategies that 
individuals employ in order to achieve a certain solidity of being - he has identified an !
analysis so that the pervasiveness of bad faith might be explained.
The first step in such an undertaking is to sort out the logical difficulties which I have 
identified. In fact, this is fairly easily achieved, in a manner already alluded to in my 
treatment of the question of responsibility. To recap, these difficulties emerge as a 
result of the gap that separates the For-itself from those experiences and emotions it 
posits as being its own. Specifically, according to the terms of Sartre’s analysis, any 
emotion (e.g., anguish) experienced by the For-itself is both freely chosen and 
ineffective as a motive for any act or state that is subsequently adopted (e.g., any 
pattern of bad faith). It follows that it is impossible to tie freedom, anguish and bad 
faith together in mutual interdependence. The solution to this difficulty is to re- 
conceptualise the For-itself in terms of the societal relation; or, in other words, it is to 
specify the For-itself as the product of an established and apparently structured soc
reality. Significantly, consciousness, understood in this manner, possesses an essence 
and thus is characterised by a certain solidity of being. To this extent, it is no longer 
absolutely separated from its experiences and emotions, since these are necessarily 
mediated by whatever lies coiled at its heart. As a result, they become sufficiently 
effective to function as motives for any future conduct; the individual is bound up and 
defined by his experiences which, therefore, in a very real way, motivate him.
In this sense, it is perfectly acceptable to maintain that an individual is motivated to 
adopt strategies of bad faith by the anguish which he experiences; that is, it is perfectly 
acceptable to maintain that anguish and bad faith are causally related. However, in that 
I have rejected the argument that the For-itself is condemned to be free, it is obviously 
necessary to look again at what constitutes anguish. Firstly, it is worth noting that one 
can hold onto the idea of anguish as the reflective awareness of freedom, to the extent 
that the For-itself perceives itself to be free. This was the case, above, in my 
reconstruction of the anguish that comes with the responsibility of having apparently 
to choose between two or more courses of action, where this choice will inevitably 
involve undesirable consequences. In this instance, a strategy of bad faith would be
easily discernible aspect of social reality. The task, therefore, is to reconstitute his
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that which enabled the individual to represent his decision as constrained by forces 
external to himself. However, the crucial point, of course, is that we are no longer 
bound to define either anguish or bad faith in this manner.52 Therefore, I wish to 
consider briefly a question similar to one that Sartre himself poses; namely, what is it 
about the structure of subjectivity that necessitates the recourse to strategies of bad 
faith.53
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to consider again the structures upon 
which subjectivity is built. In the societal relation, the individual is the product of a 
social environment; he exists by virtue of his location within an interaction nexus. It is 
worth emphasising precisely what is being claimed here: namely, that the Ego, Mead’s 
“I”, is a social product. It is for this reason that I have rejected Sartre’s contention that 
the individual is condemned to be free and maintain instead that the For-itself retains a 
certain solidity of being. There is a second dimension to this societal relation which is 
derived from the ability of the individual to take the attitude of the generalised other. 
In this aspect, the individual looks back at himself as someone who has a social 
identity; or, in Sartre’s words, he “confers reality on himself to the degree to which he 
belongs to the world [Sartre, 1969: 580].” Crucially, it is as a consequence of the 
interaction of these two aspects of subjectivity that the solitary self exists. In the 
reflective attitude, the individual, as I have said, apprehends himself as a socially 
defined object, as a father, a brother, a waiter, and so on. However, at one and the 
same time, he is aware that his being is not exhausted in these identities, indeed that 
these are identities for an intentional Subject (Mead’s “I”). In this attitude, therefore, 
the individual not only develops an awareness of himself as a discrete and unique 
being, but also becomes aware that his being surpasses that of his social identity. 
However, it is fated that this aspect will escape him; as both Mead and Sartre 
understand, the individual can never apprehend himself, in the living present, as an
52 For the simple reason that the individual’s perception o f an apparent freedom is not 
necessarily anymore significant than any other belief he might hold about himself (since it is 
no longer based upon an inalienable aspect of consciousness). Further, as Danto points out, 
an individual might well adopt a strategy o f bad faith, without being aware that this is what 
he is doing; that is, although in Sartrean terms he is deceived about his nature (as freely 
acting), he is not self deceived because unless he has read the philosophy o f Sartre he will not 
necessarily recognise that he is free. However, if  this possibility is accepted, it is hard to see 
why a strategy of bad faith should necessarily be related to the desire to avoid an 
apprehension o f freedom. See Danto, A. C., Sartre, (Fontana/Collins, Glasgow: 1975), 80.
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“I”; he is condemned to lack a coincidence o f himself with himself54 Thus, it is the 
sting in the tail of consciousness that the individual is denied the definiteness 
guaranteed to him by the societal relation.
Therefore, the solitary relation brings not only the isolation and estrangement 
guaranteed by the intentionality of consciousness, but also a lack of definiteness. 
According to this conception, it is the uncertainty that comes with these states which 
constitutes “anguish” and which leads individuals to adopt the modes of thinking and 
patterns of behaviour which Sartre terms bad faith. Of course, in this conception, the 
term “bad faith” is inappropriate, since these modes of thinking and patterns of 
behaviour no longer represent a simultaneous awareness and denial of freedom, but 
rather they constitute an attempt by individuals to reaffirm their senses of self and to 
attain a certain solidity of being. The importance of Sartre’s analysis is that it so 
accurately describes what it means for a conscious subject to be aware of its 
consciousness. It does not matter that the individual, as a product of society, is in a 
very real sense what he is, when the intentionality of consciousness is a constant 
reminder to him that he is also what he is not. Subjectivity is built on both societal and 
solitary relations, and it is the latter which demands that individuals look to society in 
order to make themselves real.
53 See Sartre, J-P., Being and Nothingness, (Routledge, London and New York: 1969), 45.
54 See Mead, G. H., Selected Writings, (Edited: Reck, A.), (University o f Chicago Press, 
Chicago: 1964), 142; and Sartre, J-P., (Routledge, London and New York: 1969), 79-95.
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CHAPTER THREE: SUBJECTIVITY AND THE SYMBOLIC 
MASTERY OF THE EXTERNAL-WORLD
To restate the argument with which I concluded the previous chapter, it is my claim 
that there exists an aspect of experience, termed the solitary relation, comprising 
isolation, estrangement and lack of definiteness, which compels the individual to seek, 
in society, a reaffirmation of his sense of self In this chapter, I will continue to explore 
the general idea that the nature of Man’s relation to the external-world has significant 
consequences for social action. Specifically, I wish to explore some of the mechanisms 
whereby individuals achieve a symbolic mastery over the external-world. To 
anticipate, I will argue that this is normally achieved by means of the various kinds of 
judgements which make up the “normative sphere”; and I will demonstrate that this 
has significant consequences for understanding: (i) the functioning of political dis­
courses; and (ii) the nature and mechanisms of intersubjective conflict.
The Normative Sphere
The first stage in examining the normative sphere is to establish a working definition 
of the term. This can be understood to refer to the sum total of the normative and 
value-orientations held by a particular social actor or by the social actors of any 
specific social group. The term, normative orientation, denotes an attitude to the social 
world, whereby the action of an individual is significantly mediated by the system of 
mutual expectations which prescribes the behaviour appropriate to particular 
situations. The term, value-orientation, refers, firstly, to attitudes of judgement or 
evaluation, on the basis of which, according to perceived standards of desirability, 
acceptability, preference, etc., an individual is able to select between alternative 
courses of action, to judge the actions of other individuals, and also to evaluate his 
own actions once completed;1 and secondly, to any belief or idea about the social 
world which is held unreflectively, and which does not depend upon logical coherence
1 See Parsons' discussion: Parsons, T., The Social System, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London: 
1951, 12-15. For a brief analysis o f the relations between norms and values, see Cohen, P., 
Modem Social Theory, (Heinemann, London: 1968), 77-78.
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or empirical verification for its efficacy. Thus, broadly speaking, there are two aspects 
to the normative sphere: on the one hand, the rules and norms of social behaviour, and 
on the other, the beliefs, values and ideals which individuals hold and express in their 
actions. I dealt with the former aspect, in Chapter 1, when I discussed the relationship 
between typificatory frameworks and the reproduction of average courses o f action. 
Therefore, in this chapter, I wish to focus on the sphere of beliefs, values and ideals; 
that is, I wish to focus on the realm of value-orientations. As a starting point for the 
analysis of this realm, I wish to examine first, for reasons that will become clear later 
on, the Schutzian notion of multiple realities.4
Multiple Realities
7
The theory of multiple realities is built on the central premise that it is possible to 
identify, at least in principle, an infinite number of orders of reality, each defined by 
its own peculiar cognitive style. Or, to put this another way, that there exist numerous 
modes of experiencing the world, each constituting, to the extent that it transforms the 
world according to its own image, a “sub-world” or a “sub-universe”.5 Schutz terms 
such worlds, finite provinces o f meaning,6 and mentions, as examples, the realms of 
science, dream, theatre and religion [Schutz, 1967a: 231]. These can be specified 
along a number of common axes, which include: tension of consciousness; form of
n
spontaneity; mode of experiencing oneself; form of sociality; and time-perspective.
To clarify these terms, and to shed further light on the nature of multiple realities, let
2 I feel justified in including such beliefs under the label "value-orientation" because these are 
held by individuals in a similar fashion as ''values”, "morals", etc.. I should also point out that 
when I refer to the realm of value-orientations o f a particular social group, I am referring to 
the sum total o f particular value-orientations o f the members o f that group.
3 See Chapter 1, 30-31.
4 See Schutz, A., Collected Papers: Volume 1, 2nd Edition, (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1967a), 207- 
259.
5 This is William James' term, see James, W., The Principles o f Psychology: Volume II, 
(MacMillan & Company, London: 1901), 283-324.
6 Schutz terms each particular order of reality a finite province o f meaning, in order to 
emphasise that it is experience, rather than the ontological status o f specific objects, which 
constitutes reality. See Schutz, A., (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1967a), 229-230.
7 See Schutz, A., (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1967a), 232; and 341.1 am about to detail these aspects 
with respect to one particular order o f reality, i.e., the paramount reality.
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us consider, for a moment, their embodiment in one particular finite province of
meaning, namely, the world of working or paramount reality.
The world of working, according to Schutz, is the world of our everyday-lives, and:
as a whole stands out as paramount over against the many other sub­
universes of reality. It is the world of physical things, including my 
body; it is the realm of my locomotions and bodily operations; it offers 
resistances that require effort to overcome; it places tasks before me, 
permits me to carry through my plans, and enables me to succeed or to 
fail in my attempt to attain my purposes. By my working acts I gear into 
the outer world, I change it...I share this world and its objects with 
Others; with Others, I have ends and means in common; I work with 
them in manifold social acts and relationships, checking the Others and
o
checked by them.
It has a cognitive style of the following basic characteristics:9
1. a specific tension of consciousness, namely, wideawakeness;10
2. a specific epoche, namely, that of the natural attitude;11
3. a prevalent form of spontaneity, namely, working;12
1 34. a specific form of experiencing one’s self (the working-self as the total self);
8 Schutz, A., Collected Papers: Volume 1, 2nd Edition, (Nijhoff The Hague: 1967a), 226-227.
9 After Schutz, A., (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1967a), 230-231.
10 "By the term "wide-awakeness” we want to denote a plane of consciousness o f highest 
tension originating in an attitude of full attention to life and its requirements [Schutz, 1967a: 
213].”
11 The natural attitude is the mental stance that people take in their everyday-life. In the natural 
attitude, the lifeworld is taken-for-granted. The epoche of the natural attitude refers to a 
suspension o f any doubt that the world might be other than it appears.
12 ’’Working...is action in the outer world, based upon a project and characterised by the 
intention to bring about the projected state o f affairs by bodily movements [Schutz, 1967a: 
212].” According to Schutz, a pragmatic motive governs action in the sphere of everyday life 
(the world o f working). This claim dovetails with his contention that ”wide-awakeness" is the 
characteristic tension o f consciousness of this realm. See Schutz, A., (Nijhoff The Hague: 
1967a), 208-214.
13 ’’Living in the vivid present in its ongoing working acts, directed toward the objects and 
objectives to be brought about, the working self experiences itself as the originator o f the
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5. a specific form of sociality (the intersubjective world of social action and 
communication);14
6. a specific time perspective (standard time originating in the intersection of the 
inner-duree and objective/cosmic time).15
According to Schutz, we confer the accent of reality upon the world of working for as 
long as our experiences partake of its particular cognitive style [Schutz, 1967a: 231]. 
Each finite province of meaning is “real” whilst it is attended to, by virtue of the 
consistency and compatibility of experiences which define it.16 In fact, above all else, 
it is the pervasive utility of pragmatic action which guarantees to us the reality of the 
paramount world. In the words of Schutz, “our practical experiences prove the unity 
and congruity of the world of working as valid and the hypothesis of its reality as 
irrefutable [Schutz, 1967a: 231.].” Moreover, it is for us the natural world, our 
everyday world, one that we take for granted and gear into in the pursuit of our 
projects and life-plans. Consequently, it requires something akin to a shock for us to
ongoing actions and, thus, as an undivided total self [Schutz, 1967a: 216]." This idea is not as 
complicated as it first seems. The individual who fives, non-reflectively, within his working- 
acts, experiences himself as an undivided "I"; however, reflectively, as a "me", the individual 
necessarily apprehends himself only partially, as the taker of a role. See Schutz, A., Collected 
Papers: Volume 1, 2nd Edition, (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1967a), 214-218.
14 "...the world of my daily fife is by no means my private world but is from the outset an 
intersubjective one, shared with my fellow men, experienced and interpreted by others; in 
brief, it is a world common to all o f us [Schutz, 1967a: 312]."
15 This is the most complicated o f these various aspects o f the paramount reality. The first point 
to note is the significance o f bodily movements for the constitution o f the time-perspective. 
Schutz argues that there are two aspects to our experience o f these: "...inasmuch as they are 
movements in the outer world we look at them as events happening in space and spatial 
time...inasmuch as they are experienced together from within as happening changes, as 
manifestations of our spontaneity pertaining to our stream o f consciousness, they partake o f  
our inner time or duree [Schutz, 1967a: 215]." Outer-time, termed by Schutz "objective" or 
"cosmic" time, is universal and measurable; inner-time, in contrast, is where "...our actual 
experiences are connected with the past by recollections and retentions and with the fixture by 
protentions and anticipations [Schutz, 1967a: 215-216]." Crucially, it is through our working 
acts that these two aspects are unified into a vivid present "The vivid present originates, 
therefore, in an intersection o f duree and cosmic time [Schutz, 1967a: 216]." This is the 
central idea behind the notion of standard time, with one further complication - that of 
intersubjectivity. The paramount reality is a world o f consociates, contemporaries, 
predecessors and successors. The individual shares a variety o f disparate temporal 
relationships with all o f these [see Schutz, A., (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1967a), 218-222]. 
However, in the natural attitude (of the paramount reality), these manifold relations are 
integrated into one homogenous dimension o f time, which is common to all o f us [see 222]. 
This Schutz terms standard time. See generally, see Schutz, A., (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1967a), 
214-222.
16 The incompatibility o f an experience within a particular finite province o f meaning, means 
either the withdrawal o f the accent of reality from that particular province, or the invalidation 
o f the experience within that realm. See Schutz, A., (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1967a), 230.
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break out of the bounds of this province and enter the realm of another. According to 
Schutz, however, such shocks occur frequently in the journey of our lives. He 
mentions, as examples, the shock of falling to sleep as the transition into the realm of 
dreams; the Kierkegaardian “leap” into the world of religious experience; and the 
transformation that occurs as the curtain rises in a theatre [Schutz, 1967a: 231.]. Thus, 
during the course of a day, an individual will occupy a number of different orders of 
reality, each of which may be considered a modification of the paramount reality of 
the world of working.
A province of meaning is finite by virtue of the uniqueness of its cognitive style. This 
uniqueness means: (i) that an individual cannot exist within two or more provinces 
simultaneously;17 and (ii)that there is no possibility of developing a mediating 
mechanism to refer these provinces to one another.18 However, perhaps the most 
significant consequence of this finiteness is that experiences treated as real from the 
standpoint of any one particular province will appear only as falsity from the 
standpoint of another.19 Interestingly, the corollary of this point is that those 
experiences which would be judged as illusion or phantasy by the standards of the 
world of working can, nevertheless, attain an accent of reality within the bounds of a 
non-paramount world. To understand this let us briefly consider Schutz’s treatment of 
the various worlds o f  phantasms.
Included amongst these worlds are the realms of fiction, day-dreams, fairy tales and 
jokes. Schutz argues that each of these:
originates in a specific modification which the paramount reality of our 
daily life undergoes, because our mind, turning away in decreasing 
tensions of consciousness from the world of working and its tasks,
17 See Schutz, A., Collected Papers: Volume 1, 2nd Edition, (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1967a), inter 
alia, 207; 230; 232; and 340-341.
18 See Schutz, A., (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1967a), 232.
19 See Schutz, A.,(Nijhoff, The Hague: 1967a), 232.
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withdraws from certain of its layers the accent of reality in order to
20replace it by a context of supposedly quasi-real phantasms.
A diminished tension of consciousness means a certain freedom from the constraints 
of the world of working:21 we are no longer governed by the pragmatic motive; the 
objects of this world no longer offer up their resistance and demand our mastery; we 
are freed from our subjection to standard time; and we are no longer restricted by the 
limits of our reach (actual, restorable, or attainable). Of course, we intuitively 
understand this freedom when we talk of escaping into the world of a novel or into 
day-dreams. However, slightly more problematic is the sense in which experiences in 
such realms retain an accent of reality.
According to Schutz, they do so because they remain uncontradicted within the 
particular finite province of meaning to which they belong. In this he is merely 
echoing William James, who states that “the sense that anything we think of is unreal 
can only come... when that thing is contradicted by some other thing of which we think. 
Any object which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto  believed and posited  as 
absolute reality  [James, 1901: 288-289].” Thus, to take the world of theatre as an 
example, at the point at which the curtain rises, transporting us into the realm of the 
play, we leave the reality of the world of working behind. However, it is only in terms 
of this reality that the play is phantasy, in its own terms we experience it as real as 
anything. This formula can be expanded to apply to phantasy more generally. Husserl 
puts it thus:
We cannot say that he who phantasies and lives in the world of 
phantasms (the “dreamer”), posits fictions qua fictions, but he has 
modified realities, “realities as i f ’ ...Only he who lives in experiences 
and reaches from there into the world of phantasms can, provided that
20 Schutz, A., Collected Papers: Volume 1, 2nd Edition, (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1967a), 234.
21 See Schutz, A., (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1967a), 234-235. For a discussion o f the world within 
reach, see 224-226.
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the phantasm contrasts with the experienced, have the concepts fiction 
and reality.22
Thus, for as long as we occupy each particular world of phantasm, we apprehend its 
experiences as real because for this time these experiences remain uncontradicted. Of 
course, this maxim can be extended to include finite provinces of meaning generally, 
since: “Each world whilst it is attended to is real after its own fashion; only the reality 
lapses with the attention [James, 1901: 293].”
So far, I hope that I have demonstrated the sense in which there exist a number of 
different orders of reality, each defined by its own peculiar cognitive style. And 
further, that of these the world of working is the paramount reality, and that all others 
may be considered its modifications. Of course, the question which now needs to be 
addressed is how does Schutz’s theory of multiple realities relate to my interest in the 
normative sphere? It will be remembered, that I am concerned with a specific aspect of 
this sphere, namely, with the realm of value-orientations, which comprises the 
attitudes of judgement and evaluation - normally taking the form of morals, values, 
beliefs, ideals, etc. - which individuals bring to the social world. I wish to treat this 
realm as a finite province of meaning and to explicate it using some of the concepts 
explored above. The major advantage of this approach is that it focuses attention upon 
the internal structure of this realm, and allows me to consider this in relation to wider 
questions of subjectivity and politics.
The Realm of Value-Orientations as a Finite Province of Meaning
In line with other non-paramount realities, the realm of value-orientations represents a 
turning away from the world of working, a diminished tension of consciousness. In this 
sphere, we are free of the demands of the pragmatic motive and are no longer 
compelled to pursue the plans and projects which characterise the natural attitude. 
However, in point of fact, this is a partial escape only; whereas in the world of 
working we seek to master the external-world by means of our working acts, in the
22 Cited in Schutz, A., Collected Papers: Volume 1, 2nd Edition, (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1967a), 
238.
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realm of value-orientations we seek to master it symbolically. This point, which runs 
throughout the analyses to follow, is worth emphasising: it is my contention that the 
various types of judgement and evaluation which make up the realm of value- 
orientations, function (more or less successfully) to subordinate the external-world to 
the wills of those who inhabit it.
It seems sensible to introduce this idea by exploring one of the more straightforward of 
its manifestations in social reality. Moreover, this might most usefully be undertaken 
in terms of an already established theory. Consequently, I wish to analyse briefly 
Berger and Luckmann’s notion of symbolic universes,23 According to these theorists, 
Man’s original relation to the world is one which is intrinsically problematic. His 
relative lack of instinctual apparatus means that he is compelled to produce order out 
of a relation which is potentially chaotic and fluid. In Berger and Luckmann’s words, 
“The inherent instability of the human organism makes it imperative that Man himself 
provide a stable environment for his conduct [Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 70].” 
Obviously, this raises the question how exactly does Man produce this environment? 
The answer is that this arises out of the related processes of habitualisation, 
institutionalisation and objectivation. The details of these need not concern us here,24 
what we are interested in is that once this order is established it requires on-going 
legitimation, that is, “ways by which it can be ‘explained’ and justified [Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966: 79].”
Berger and Luckmann argue that there are four different levels of legitimation: 
(i) incipient/linguistic; (ii) rudimentary theoretical; (iii) explicit theoretical; and 
(iv) symbolic universes. The last of these, symbolic universes, are “bodies of 
theoretical tradition...”, which “encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality 
...[Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 113].”25 Each of these provides an overarching 
meaning-system which serves to integrate the world and render it subjectively
23 For this analysis, I will draw almost entirely from Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., The Social 
Construction o f Reality, (Penguin, Harmondsworth: 1966).
24 See Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., (Penguin, Harmondsworth: 1966), 70-79. For a summary 
of these processes, see Abercrombie, N., "Knowledge, order and human autonomy", in 
Hunter, J. D. and Ainlay, S. C., (Eds.), Making Sense o f  Modern Times, (Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London: 1986), 17-19.
25 For details o f the first three types o f legitimation, see Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., (Penguin, 
Harmondsworth: 1966), 112-113.
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plausible. The importance of this function is obvious when one considers that chaos, 
characterising Man’s original relation to the world, is always lurking near to the 
surface of the social world: “All social reality is precarious. All societies are 
constructions in the face of chaos. The constant possibility of anomic terror is 
actualised whenever the legitimations that obscure the precariousness are threatened or 
collapse [Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 121]. Religion is, perhaps, the single most 
important symbolic universe. Particularly, it provides Man with a framework to deal 
with marginal situations - such as, death, tragedy and natural disaster - which, by their 
very nature, threaten the basis of social order. In general, “...The symbolic universe 
shelters the individual from ultimate terror by bestowing ultimate legitimation upon 
the protective structures of the institutional order [Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 120].”
It is now easy to understand one of the ways in which, within the realm of value- 
orientations, we seek the imaginative mastery of the world. The external-world is 
subordinated to the wills of those individuals who comprise it, to the extent that the 
beliefs, values, morals and ideals which make up symbolic universes render it 
meaningful. The ability of mankind to assign meaning to the world saves him from 
the annihilation which its contingency threatens. In the realm of value-orientations, 
anomic terror is held at bay and the world retains its taken-for-granted character.
Political Discourses as Symbolic Universes
At this point, in line with my general interest in social integration and political 
mobilisation, and to illustrate further the sense in which the beliefs and values of the 
realm of value-orientations function to render the external-world meaningful, I wish to 
make my first references to specifically political phenomena and processes; expressly, 
I wish to consider whether political discourses function in a fashion similar to 
symbolic universes; that is, whether these discourses, as above, “encompass the 
institutional order in symbolic totality [Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 113].”
26 I think it needs to be emphasised that I am using the term "symbolic universe" only as 
shorthand for a particular organisation o f beliefs, values, morals and ideals. To this extent, 
the individual who is oriented to the world in terms o f a symbolic universe can be said to be 
living within the realm of value-orientations. Obviously, this applies wherever I talk about 
particular belief systems.
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Strictly speaking, the scope of a symbolic universe is too broad to include political 
discourses amongst their number. Berger and Luckmann claim that at the level of a 
symbolic universe, “the reflective integration of discrete institutional processes 
reaches its ultimate fulfilment. A whole world is created. All the lesser legitimating 
theories are viewed as special perspectives on phenomena that are aspects of this 
world [Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 114].” Indeed, according to this view, one might 
expect political discourses themselves to make reference to higher orders of 
legitimation. In which case, such discourses might be better considered as instances of 
a lower level of legitimation, perhaps that which, according to Berger and Luckmann, 
“contains explicit theories by which an institutional sector is legitimated in terms of a 
differentiated body of knowledge [Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 112].” In this respect, 
one might note, for example, Miliband’s claim that the discourses of liberal- 
democracy - and their associated material practices (in Britain, centred on the Houses 
of Parliament) - serve to legitimate the political status-quo of Western capitalist 
societies.27
However, political discourses also contain themes which belong quite properly to the 
realm of symbolic universes; that is, themes which perform an integrative function in 
relation to the totality of human experience. To illustrate this, one might, for example, 
point to the fact that the discourses of both liberal-democracy and Marxism include 
theories of Man and society. In the former, the individual is the measure of the world, 
and the community, “a fictitious body, composed of individual persons who are 
considered as constituting as it were its members.” According to this view, the 
successful society is that which enables the individual to pursue, without hindrance, 
his rational self-interest. In Marxist discourse, Man and society are tied together: “...As 
society produces man as man, so it is produced by him.” Man is both individual and 
social: “...Though man is a unique individual...he is equally the whole, the ideal whole, 
the subjective existence of society as thought and experience.”29 It is Man’s alienation
See Miliband, R., Capitalist Democracy in Britain, (Oxford University Press, Oxford:
1982).
28 Jeremy Bentham, cited in Wamock, M., (Ed.), John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism, (Collins,
Glasgow: 1962), 35.
29 Marx, K, cited in Alexander, J., The Antinomies o f Classical Thought: Marx and Durkheim,
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, London: 1982), 29.
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from his species-being in capitalist society, and the potential for his liberation, which 
justifies the Marxist revolutionary agenda.
The point about these themes, and others like them, is that they form part of the 
knowledge that an individual has of his own society. Consequently, they are integral to 
the way that he represents this society to himself. Particularly, they function to explain, 
and perhaps justify, the specific form taken by an institutional order. Additionally, they 
also function to legitimate certain types of action. In this respect, one might note, for 
example, that the patterns of accumulation and consumption characteristic of modem 
Western societies are justified by the constellation of meanings which surround the 
notion of “individual rights”; or, alternatively, that “terrorist” organisations justify 
their activities by means of discourses of revolution. Thus, in their broad legitimating 
function, political discourses, like symbolic universes, directly address the “why” of 
institutional arrangements; they fall into the category of additional legitimations (for 
the institutional order is, in part, self-legitimating), to be drawn upon by individuals to 
make sense of their social worlds. To sum up, then, the ideas, beliefs and values of 
political discourse, forming an aspect of the realm of value-orientations, constitute an 
important resource for the individual who seeks the symbolic mastery of the world; 
that is, the beliefs and values of political discourse can be used in a strategy o f  
mastery.
The Fear of Death
It will have been noted that throughout this discussion the contingency of Man’s 
relation to the world has been treated as an explanatorily significant variable. In fact, 
this is a theme which is to run throughout the whole of this work. To date, in addition 
to the uncertainty, noted above, which results from being confronted by a world that 
has no intrinsic meaning, it will be remembered that I have also detailed the Sartrean 
notion of anguish and, most significantly, explored the idea that there exists a solitary 
self, an aspect characterised by estrangement and isolation. The fact that Man is
30  . .  .1This is particularly significant when one considers that the members of these societies are 
regularly confronted by images o f starvation. I am thinking o f the famines in places like 
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Somalia, etc.
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confronted by a number of such “existential dilemmas” is of central importance to the 
task of uncovering the various relations between subjectivity and the realm of value- 
orientations. Consequently, at this point, I wish to consider one further example of 
Man’s uncertainty in the world; namely, his anticipation of his own death.
The importance of Man’s awareness of his own mortality has been appreciated for a 
long time by the advocates of what might be termed “Existential” philosophy. In this 
respect, the Kierkegaardian concept of “dread” and Heidegger’s re-working of this 
theme are of particular significance. However, perhaps the clearest recent exposition 
of these ideas is to be found in Ernest Becker’s The Denial o f Death. According to 
him, “the idea of death, the fear of it, haunts the human animal like nothing else; it is a 
mainspring of human activity - designed largely to avoid the fatality of death, to 
overcome it by denying in some way that it is the final destiny of man [Becker, 1973: 
ix].”32 It is Man’s dual nature which condemns him to this flight from death. On the 
one hand, he is a self-conscious, symbolically mediated being - one who possesses a 
mind which “soars out to speculate about atoms and infinity, who can place himself 
imaginatively at a point in space and contemplate bemusedly his own planet. This 
immense expansion, this dexterity, this ethereality, this self-consciousness gives to 
man literally the status of a small god in nature...[Becker, 1973: 26].” Yet, on the other 
hand, he is just a body and, consequently, subject to the laws of decay of an 
unforgiving universe. Thus, “...Man is literally split in two: he has an awareness of his 
own splendid uniqueness in that he sticks out of nature with a towering majesty, and 
yet he goes back into the ground a few feet in order blindly and dumbly to rot and 
disappear forever [Becker, 1973: 26.].” It is not simply the fact of this ambiguity which 
condemns Man to suffer what might, after Kierkegaard, be termed dread. It is rather 
that with self-consciousness comes the awareness that the self, in its dependence on 
the physical body, is fated to eventual and certain destruction. In the words of Becker, 
“the final terror of self-consciousness is the knowledge of one’s own death, which is 
the peculiar sentence on man alone in the animal kingdom [Becker, 1973: 70].”
31 Kierkegaard, S., The Concept o f Dread (OUP, London: 1944); Heidegger, M., Being and 
Time, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford: 1962).
32 Compare with Schutz, A., Collected Papers: Volume 1, 2nd Edition, (Nijhoff, The Hague: 
1967a), 228.
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The important question is: in terms of this analysis, what is the significance of this 
“peculiar sentence”? The answer is that it constitutes an important motive for the 
symbolic mastery of the world. In this respect, we have already noted the important 
function that symbolic universes perform in rendering the external-world meaningful. 
Needless to say, this function extends to the more specific task of the management of 
death. Thus, Berger and Luckmann argue that “...It is in the legitimation of death that 
the transcending potency of symbolic universes manifests itself most clearly, and the 
fundamental terror-assuaging character of the ultimate legitimations of the paramount 
reality of everyday life is revealed [Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 119].” Of course, this 
function is not restricted solely to those beliefs and values which are associated with 
specific symbolic universes.33 This can be illustrated by recalling the Burghers of 
Sartre who, in their flight from uncertainty, assign a transcendent and objective reality 
to even the most mundane of the beliefs and values which govern their behaviour;34 
and in doing so, they escape not only the anguish that their freedom brings, but also, by 
means of their location within a reality perceived as timeless and objectively 
meaningful, one which links them with their predecessors and successors, their own 
mortality. In other words, they gain a semblance of immortality by virtue of their status 
as individual instances of a particular moral and historical tradition, even if this
i f
tradition does not have the compass of a symbolic universe.
Thus, in general terms, it is my claim that in the realm of value-orientations there is an 
attempt to escape the spectre of death. Again, this can be illustrated with reference to 
political discourse. One might note, for example, that a political philosophy provides 
its devotees with a ready-made framework of meaning which might be used to 
accomplish such an escape. Political philosophies make explicit reference to both the 
past and the future, both in their analyses of society and in the celebration of their own 
particular traditions. Thus, for example, the individual who aligns himself with a 
Marxist position, finds suddenly that he lives in a meaningful world, one that connects
Notwithstanding the fact that all beliefs and values are probably, in the final analysis, related 
to one symbolic universe or another.
34 See Chapter 2, 57.
35 Berger and Luckmann make a similar point with respect to symbolic universes. See Berger, 
P. and Luckmann, T., The Social Construction o f Reality, (Penguin, Harmondsworth: 1966), 
120- 121 .
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him with the past through the struggles of the oppressed, and with the future through 
the inevitability of revolution. For him, past, present and future are united in a 
meaningful totality, one which functions to confer upon him a quasi-immortality.
It is possible to express this idea in terms of one of the criteria identified by Schutz in 
his specification of finite provinces of meaning. It will be remembered that each 
province has a specific time perspective associated with it. Thus, for example, the 
world of working is characterised by civic or standard time, and it is this time which 
structures the plans and projects of our everyday lives. In the realm of value- 
orientations, however, we are free of the constraints of standard time. We find instead 
that we occupy an inviolate world of timeless, permanent structures; a world which 
stretches to infinity and offers us shelter, as much from the certainties of life in the 
paramount reality, as from its uncertainties. The fear of death belongs to the Heraclitan 
chaos of the world of everyday-life; in the timeless, permanent world of value 
orientations it is banished.
Whilst it is undoubtedly the case that Man’s anticipation of his own death constitutes a 
significant motive for the symbolic mastery of the world, it is important not to over­
emphasise its significance to the point where other existential anxieties are forgotten. 
In fact, there are a number of pertinent difficulties with the claim that Man is in 
perpetual flight from death: (i) it is not clear how this claim can be falsified - an 
individual’s denial that he is concerned with death can simply be taken as evidence of 
the efficiency of the various defence mechanisms that he employs; (ii) there is no 
logical or necessary reason why an awareness of death should lead to fear or dread; 
this is a purely contingent relation; and (iii) there are empirical difficulties with this 
argument; for example, the body of evidence which suggests that the terminally ill 
come, in time, to accept their fates.36 In general, it is probably wise to be sceptical of 
the wilder statements of the “morbidly-minded”.37 Thus, for example, there are no 
grounds for accepting, at face value, claims such as Schutz’s, that “the whole system
36 For example, Kubler-Ross, E., On Death and Dying, (Tavistock, London: 1970).
37 Ernest Becker’s term for those who stress the significance o f the fear of death. See Becker, 
E., The Denial o f Death, (The Free Press, New York: 1973), 15.
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of relevances which governs us within the natural attitude is founded upon the basic
38experience of each of us: I know that I shall die and I fear to die.”
In fact, it is quite possible that the fear of death is not the greatest of Man’s existential 
anxieties. This can be illustrated by comparing the fear of death with the fate of Man 
in the solitary relation. In this respect, the important question is: what place, 
respectively, do these existential anxieties occupy in an individual’s subjectivity? Are 
they both ever-present aspects of his biography? Certainly, as we have seen, those who 
advocate a “morbidly-minded” position maintain that our mental functioning is 
suffused with the terror of death.39 However, I think that one must question the validity 
of this assertion. An individual’s greatest protection from the various uncertainties of 
life derives from his simple participation in a structured institutional order.40 Whilst he 
pursues, through working acts, the plans and projects of daily-life, any awareness that 
he has of his own mortality exists only at the fringes of his experience. Therefore, the 
fear of death is not, in any obvious sense, a problem of everyday-life.41 In fact, quite 
the opposite is the case: this fear emerges only when the accent of reality is withdrawn 
from the protective structures of the social world, such as is the case on the death of a 
relative or close friend. Fundamentally, the fear of death relies on the sort of attitude of 
contemplation which is most readily adopted only when the demands of the world of 
working are in abeyance. Consequently, it is fair to say that whilst engaged in the 
world of working the individual is relatively free of the fear of death. This can be 
contrasted with the situation of the solitary self, which finds Man unable to escape the 
isolation and estrangement which consciousness brings. As I have argued, it is the very 
nature of consciousness which condemns Man to this fate. In perpetual flight from
38 Schutz, A., Collected Papers: Volume 1, 2nd Edition, (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1967a), 228.
39 See Becker, E., The Denial o f  Death, (The Free Press, New York: 1973), 15-20.
40 Anthony Giddens makes this point in a discussion o f practical consciousness (i.e., the non- 
conscious dimension o f the knowledgeability of human-agents): “Practical consciousness is 
the cognitive and emotive anchor of the feelings of ontological security characteristic of 
large segments o f human activity in all cultures. The notion o f ontological security ties in 
closely to the tacit character o f practical consciousness - or, in phenomenological terms, to 
the “bracketings” presumed by the “natural attitude” in everyday life [Giddens, 1991: 36].”
41 It is still possible to retain a commitment to the view that states that the fear of death 
underpins subjectivity and social action, if  one or both o f the following propositions are true. 
Either: (i) that the institutional order owes its existence to Man's desire to overcome death; 
and/or (ii) that the participation of social actors in this order is motivated by the same desire. 
However, there are, of course, any number o f reasons why these propositions must be 
rejected, not least o f which is the fact that both suggest an unsustainable reductionism.
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uncertainty, he is compelled to seek the comfort of a social identity. However, 
ultimately this is a fruitless endeavour, because the intentionality of consciousness is a 
perpetual reminder to him that he is not what he is. The important point is that, unlike 
with the fear of death, Man cannot escape this fate by immersing himself in the world 
of working. Despite his best, and continued efforts, he cannot transcend his own nature 
to attain the solidity of being he so desires.42
This is an important point, and one worthy of emphasis - Man’s fate as a solitary self is 
in a very real sense Sisyphean. He is both compelled to look to the social world in an 
attempt to make himself real, but fated to be thwarted in this, being able to achieve 
only a semblance of the identity he seeks. Crucially, the inevitability of 
disappointment does not free him from the chains of compulsion. For Man, the quasi­
solidity of a social identity is preferable to the uncertainty of indefiniteness. 
Consequently, he is compelled forever to strive for this identity.
The Realm of Value-orientations and the Transcendence of the 
Solitary Relation
In terms of the interests of this chapter, we are led, therefore, to the question: what role 
does the realm of value-orientations play in Man’s pursuit of a social identity and the 
reaffirmation of his self? To answer this question, it is first necessary to recognise that 
every social group has a number of core beliefs and values which are central to its 
identity and integrity. To understand this, one need only consider: (i) that social groups 
exhibit, within their discourses, a reflexive awareness of the “sacred” character of such 
beliefs and values; and (ii) that an individual receives direct experiential confirmation 
of the reality of the social group to which he belongs by the fact that he shares the 
beliefs and values of those others with whom he participates in we-relations. The 
important point, in these respects, is that an individual’s awareness that he belongs to a 
particular social group is tied up with his commitment to the core beliefs and values of 
this group. Upon entering the realm of value-orientations, to the extent that he 
embraces and articulates these beliefs and values, the individual is transported to the
42 The justification for these assertions is to be found above, in Chapter 2, 48-64.
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very heart of collective-life. In the realm of value-orientations, therefore, he celebrates 
the identities which he shares with his fellow-men, and to this extent confirms and 
strengthens his social identity. This can be expressed in terms of one of the 
characteristics of a finite province of meaning; namely, as a specific form of sociality. 
The realm of value-orientations is a world of imagined intersubjectivity, a world that 
implicates one’s fellow-men. To this extent, within this realm, the individual is able to 
transcend the bounds of the solitary relation and to attain a reaffirmation of the self.
It is worth emphasising precisely what is being claimed here: namely, that any social 
group will hold certain beliefs and values to be central to its identity; and that 
members of social groups, to the extent that they are able to embrace these beliefs and 
values within the realm of value-orientations, will confirm and strengthen their social 
identities. It is possible to illustrate these general points with reference, once again, to 
the themes of political discourse. In this respect, consider how the terms “democracy” 
and “freedom”, and their associated themes and discursive practices, function in the 
folkways of modem liberal-democratic societies. The themes which surround these 
terms are among the most significant of all those used to express the essential 
character of these societies; that is, they are central to notions of national identity, 
“nationhood”, and so on. Indeed, in their integrative function, they display almost 
magical properties. Thus, to live in one of the countries of the “Free World” is to be 
located at “the culmination of the whole “Western political tradition”.43 It is to be 
united with generations of one’s ancestors at the determination of their struggles, and 
it is to stand in common opposition to the tyranny of the “Unfree World”. It is also to 
be part of that tradition which most clearly embodies and represents the conception of 
Natural Rights. To use such themes to identify oneself with an in-group (a nation) is to 
accept the status of Citizen (among other citizens) and to embrace a particular type of 
social identity (“I am a British Citizen...”). It is an example of Sartrean seriousness - 
where reality is conferred upon the serious-man to the extent that he belongs to the 
world - and it functions as such.44
43 Watkins, F., cited in Sabine, G. H. and Thorson, T. L., A History o f Political Theory, 4th 
Edition, (Diyden Press, Illinois: 1973), 669.
44 See Chapter 2, particularly, 57-58.
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The efficacy of the themes surrounding “democracy” and “freedom” in generating 
social identity can be further understood by considering how these often operate 
significantly at what might, after Barthes, be termed the level of myth or connotation,45 
Consider the following hypothetical British newspaper headline: “Britain Chooses 
John Major”.46 At a simple linguistic level, this statement is more or less 
straightforwardly denotative; that is, it has a specific meaning which is constituted by 
the sum of its signs. This meaning has a certain fullness, a determinate history, in this 
instance that of a particular General Election and, consequently, it invites - or, at least, 
does not preclude - further analysis, argumentation and refutation. However, such a 
statement also operates at a second level of signification, where it becomes a mere 
signifier, form rather than meaning, for a whole range of associated concepts. Thus, 
“Britain Chooses John Major” signifies to the individual...that he is part of an on-going 
and sovereign democratic process, one which sees his Nation periodically exercising 
its collective will in the choice of its leaders, and that he will accept the authority of 
the latter precisely because they rule by common consent.47 Thus, at this level, the 
statement interpellates the individual as a Citizen of a democratic nation and, 
consequently, functions to bind him to his fellow citizens 48
An important aspect of the functioning of myth is that it naturalises the historically 
contingent. In myth, as we have seen, a statement is deprived of its full meaning - 
having its history wrenched away from itself, it becomes an empty gesture (a form) 
married to a particular concept (in our example, British democracy/citizenship). 
Importantly, however, the meaning of the statement, that is, the signifier as the final 
term of the first order of signification, although alienated, is not obliterated. Rather, it 
is held in abeyance, to be called upon to naturalise the signification, that is, to function
45 See Barthes, R., Mythologies, (Paladin, London: 1973), 117-174; and Barthes, R., Elements j
o f Semiology, (Hill and Wang, New York: 1968). The analysis to follow draws heavily upon [
the Mythologies essay "Myth Today". However, it is not intended that my treatment should 
exactly mirror the approach o f Barthes.
46 This refers to the British General Election of April 9th 1992.
47 Interesting in this respect is the claim o f W. J. M. MacKenzie that government elections are 
"rituals o f choice", where individuals participate as choosers in a social activity which 
confers legitimacy upon the authority o f the person/party chosen. Cited in Dowse, R. and 
Hughes, J., Political Sociology, 2nd Edition, (John Wiley & Sons, Chichester: 1986), 298.
48 It should be pointed out that the content o f this interpellation does not reside in the statement 
itself, but rather depends upon the operations o f an individual, these being determined by his 
particular stock of knowledge.
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as an alibi, disguising the real intention of the myth by the immediacy of its presence - 
British Democracy? It is just a fact: after all, Britain did choose John Major49 In 
general, therefore, myth:
abolishes the complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of 
essences, it does away with all dialectics, with any going back beyond 
what is immediately visible, it organises a world which is without 
contradictions because it is without depth, a world wide open and 
wallowing in the evident, it establishes a blissful clarity: things appear 
to mean something by themselves.50
Thus, the myth of Democratic Citizenship, existing at the intersection of the discourse 
of liberal-democracy and the typificatory frameworks employed by members of these 
societies, functions to render meaningful and naturalise the contingencies of group 
membership.51
From this discussion, it should be clear that the themes of political discourse can be 
central to the identity and integrity of a social group; and moreover, that they function, 
to the extent that this is the case, to confirm and strengthen the social identities of the 
members of these groups. In this respect, it is also worth noting that the greater the 
levels of integration achieved by a social group - whether or not this is generated by 
political discourse - the better able is the group to deliver “ontological security” to its 
members. Or, to put this another way, the higher the levels of agreement within a 
social group about core beliefs and values, and the greater the degree of commitment 
to these beliefs and values, the more acute the experience of intersubjectivity within 
the realm of value-orientations and, therefore, the better able is the individual to 
reaffirm his sense of self.
49 After Barthes, R., Mythologies, (Paladin, London: 1973), 134. This is a complicated idea - 
see 126-142; particularly, 138-142.
50 Barthes, R., (Paladin, London: 1973), 156.
51 Jerome Bruner argues that one chooses oneself in myth: "It is not simply society that patterns 
itself on the idealizing myths, but unconsciously it is the individual man as well who is able 
to structure his internal clamor of identities in terms of prevailing myth. Life then produces 
myth and finally imitates it [cited in Edelman, 1971: 53]."
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However, it should be noted that there is second aspect to the intersubjectivity which 
characterises the realm of value-orientations. It is also, like all imagined realms, a 
solitary world, removed from the perceived intersubjectivity of the paramount reality. 
It is a world which the individual occupies alone; a world where he employs beliefs 
and values which are peculiarly his. In addition, one must also recognise that the 
intentionality of consciousness necessarily separates the individual from those 
attitudes which he adopts in this realm, with the consequence that these attitudes 
become, for him, merely contingent. The importance of this second aspect is that it 
undermines the social identities generated in the first aspect (i.e., as imagined intersub­
jectivity). Thus, the realm of value-orientations promises solidity of being, but delivers 
only quasi-solidity.
Social Groups and the Realm of Value-orientations
It will have been noted that I have made use of an analytic framework which closely 
ties the beliefs and values of the realm of value-orientations to the typificatory 
frameworks of specific social groups. It is perhaps sensible to make a number of 
comments concerning this relation. The first point to make is that the beliefs and 
values utilised by a particular individual are formally determined not at the location of 
the typificatory frameworks of the particular social group to which he is oriented, but 
rather at the intersection of those frameworks, associated with various social structures 
and groups, which form part of his biography; that is, those to which he either is or has 
been oriented. Moreover, it is important to remember that the individual occupies a 
social world which consists not of a series of absolutely delimited social groups, but 
rather of a network of interlocking and overlapping social structures. These points 
mean that there can be no straightforward relation between beliefs and values and the 
typificatory frameworks of particular social groups.
However, the notion which ties these together remains useful. Firstly, this can be 
specified as a purely abstract relation. A social structure is specified in terms of the 
typificatory frameworks associated with the average courses o f action pursued by
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anonymous social actors.52 To the extent that such frameworks incorporate a system of
53  • •beliefs and values, something which can also be specified ideal-typically, it is 
possible to talk of the beliefs and values of particular social groups. Secondly, the 
social world comprises, for the individual, a series of in-groups and out-groups. For the 
time that he is oriented to the demands of a particular in-group he will subordinate the 
interests and relevances associated with his membership of other social groups. In 
practice, this means that the beliefs and values used by an individual will tend to be 
associated with his current group, even if, as above, these are formally determined at 
the intersection of the typificatory frameworks of a number of groups. It is this which 
makes possible, in the sense of an average type construction, the empirical 
identification of beliefs and values which are associated with particular social groups.
“The Political” and “the Social”
In line with this general approach to typificatory frameworks and their relationship to 
social structure, it is also possible to make a number of comments concerning the 
relationship between “the political” and “the social” (i.e., the non-political). It will be 
remembered that in the introduction to this thesis, I argued that it is not possible to 
delineate clearly these realms. It is now possible to go some way towards clarifying 
their precise relationship. The first point to note is that “the political” and “the social” 
have no ontological status in the world; they exist only to the extent that they are 
imagined by social actors. The social world becomes ordered only by means of the 
constitutive function of consciousness. To this extent, “the political” and “the social” 
do not exist, a priori, as identifiable and distinct spheres. Nevertheless, it remains 
quite possible to treat these as constituted realms, and to specify their relationship in 
abstract or theoretical terms.54 In this respect, it is possible to say that “the political”, 
as it is generally understood [see above, 11-10], is enclosed by “the social”; that is, the 
political sphere exists within the confines of the wider social group to which it refers,
52 See Chapter 1, 29-32.
53 For an example o f how this might be done, see my treatment o f the requirements for the 
idealised performance o f the Parsonian mother-role, Chapter 1, 30.
54 This is the sense in which I have talked about social structure and social groups throughout 
the whole o f this work. Social actors, be they "lay-actors" or sociologists, impose order on 
the world; the social world, as we understand it, has to be constituted.
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and the social actors comprised therein take the cultural pattern of this group as “a 
baseline of orientation”.
However, this kind of response goes only part the way to determining the limits of “the 
political”. In this respect, it will be remembered that I am also concerned to break 
down the distinction between “the political” and “the social”. Specifically, I hope to 
demonstrate that there is a political dimension to all social relationships. To this end, I 
wish to turn now to examine Man’s original relationship with his fellow-man, and to 
show that this is built fundamentally upon conflict.
Intersubjective Conflict
In order to demonstrate these conflictual foundations, I wish to analyse briefly Hegel’s 
treatment of the travails of self-consciousness.55 In those sections of The 
Phenomenology o f the Mind which deal with self-consciousness, Hegel is concerned to 
chart the dialectical progress of the individual self-consciousness towards self- 
certainty. The idea of self-certainty is a complex one - however, it seems to be most 
clearly expressed by the notion of “belongingness”. According to Charles Taylor, 
Hegel has in mind that self-consciousness aims towards:
integral expression, a consummation where the external reality which 
embodies us and on which we depend is fully expressive of us and 
contains nothing alien...It is the longing for total integrity which for 
Hegel underlies the striving of self-consciousness, at first after crude 
and unrealizeable versions of the goal, then when man has been 
educated and elevated by conflict and contradiction, after the real 
thing.56
C f
Hegel, particularly in The Phenomenology o f Mind, is notoriously difficult to comprehend. 
In the analysis to follow, I have relied quite heavily on the guidance o f Charles Taylor in his 
Hegel, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1975), and Stanley Rosen in G. W. F. 
Hegel: An Introduction to the Science o f  Wisdom, (Yale University Press, New Haven and 
London: 1974). It should be pointed that for stylistic reasons (only), I will sometimes refer to 
self-consciousness (or the Sartrean For-itself) as an "it" and sometimes as a "he".
56 Taylor, C., Hegel, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1975), 148.
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In terms of the interests of this section of the chapter, this journey to self-certainty is 
significant because it underpins the original relationship between self-consciousness 
and the other.
According to Hegel, self-consciousness emerges when consciousness recognises the 
reflection of itself in the objects towards which it is directed. Thus, “consciousness of 
another, of an object in general, is in fact necessarily self-consciousness, reflectedness 
in self, consciousness of oneself in one’s other.”57 However, whilst self-consciousness 
requires an external object to define itself, it is at the same time threatened by this 
object. The external object is foreign to the self; it is an otherness, in the face of which 
self-consciousness is unable to attain self-certainty. Thus, in a state of desire, self- 
consciousness seeks to negate the otherness of the external object by assimilating it. In 
the words of Hegel, “...Self-consciousness presents itself here as the process in which 
this opposition is removed, and oneness or identity with itself established [Hegel, 
1974: 65].” However, there is a predicament in the negation of the external object 
because if this entails the object’s destruction then self-consciousness, dependent upon 
the moment of otherness, is robbed of the foundations of its own existence. Therefore, 
self-consciousness requires an object which can be negated, whose foreignness can be 
annulled, without the object itself being destroyed. According to Hegel, only another 
self-consciousness fulfils this requirement, since only this is able to effect its own 
negation, and yet remain an external object. Specifically, he claims that a self- 
consciousness must seek the acknowledgement and recognition of other self-conscious 
beings, only in this way can it attain the self-certainty it desires. These arguments are 
summarised by Charles Taylor as follows:
The subject depends on external reality. If he is to be fully at home this 
external reality must reflect back to him what he is. In the dialectic of 
desire, we are faced with foreign objects which we then destroy and 
incorporate; what is needed is a reality which will remain, and yet will 
annul its own foreignness, in which the subject can nevertheless find
57 Cited in Taylor, C., Hegel, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1975), 150.
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himself. And this he finds in other men in so far as they recognize him 
as a human being.58
With this insight, therefore, that “...Self consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in 
that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness [Hegel, 1974: 70]”, we 
are led to the dialectic of Master and Slave. Although, for Hegel, mutual recognition 
between self-consciousnesses will ultimately bring the self-certainty that these seek, 
this will not be easily won. At first, neither self-consciousness is certain of the truth of 
the other (as self-consciousness), and hence both are deprived of the source of their 
own certainty. Consequently, each will try to attain the recognition of the other 
without reciprocating. According to Hegel, the resulting struggle - for one-sided 
recognition - is necessarily to the death, because in risking their own lives, these self- 
consciousnesses can demonstrate to each other, and to themselves, their freedom from 
their particular bodily forms, and hence their status as beings for themselves,59 
However, it is clear that in this context the death of either participant would be 
irrelevant, since it would deprive the survivor of recognition altogether. Hence, the 
solution, to a struggle which must put the life of each participant in danger, is the 
enslavement of one and the mastery of the other. “...The one is independent, and its 
essential nature is to be for itself; the other is dependent, and its essence is life or 
existence for another. The former is the Master, or Lord, the latter the Bondsman 
[Hegel, 1974: 74].”
However, it is Hegel’s view that the opposition between Man and his fellow-man is 
something which will in time be overcome. The dialectic of Master and Slave, and the 
conflict that this entails, is simply one of the stages that self-consciousness must pass 
through on its journey to self-certainty. Interestingly, it is the Slave, and not the
58 Taylor, C., Hegel, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1975), 152.
59 In this respect, the following quote from a person who has played "Russian Roulette" is quite 
interesting: "Now with the revolver in my pocket I thought I had stumbled on the perfect 
cure. I was going to escape in one way or another...The discovery that it was possible to 
enjoy again the visible world by risking its total loss was one I was bound to make sooner or 
later. I put the muzzle o f the revolver to my right ear and pulled the trigger. There was a 
minute click, and looking down the chamber I could see that the charge had moved into the 
firing position. I was out by one. I remember an extraordinary sense o f jubilation, as if  
carnival lights had been switched on in a dark drab street. My heart knocked in its cage and 
life contained an infinite number o f possibilities." Cited in Taylor, S., Suicide, (Longman, 
London: 1989), 48-49.
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Master, who takes the next steps on this journey. However, we need not be concerned 
here with the details of this argument. What is important is that Hegel’s is an 
optimistic view - Man will eventually, by means of reciprocal recognition, co-exist in 
harmony with his fellow-man. To conclude this chapter, however, I wish to consider 
briefly a contrasting view, namely Sartre’s, in order to demonstrate the fallacy of 
Hegel’s approach, and to show that the relation between self-consciousness and the 
other is inevitably and necessarily conflictual.
As we have seen, Hegel’s optimism rests fundamentally on the possibility of reciprocal 
recognition between self-consciousnesses. This recognition is reciprocal to the extent 
that the other, whose recognition will confer integrity upon the For-itself, appears to 
the For-itself as another self-consciousness and one who, therefore, requires similar 
recognition. It is this possibility that Sartre rejects when he argues that:
the for-itself as for-itself can not be known by the Other. The object 
which I apprehend under the name of Other appears to me in a radically 
other form. The Other is not a for-itself as he appears to me; I do not 
appear to myself as I am for-the-Other. I am incapable of apprehending 
for myself the self which I am for the Other, just as I am incapable of 
apprehending on the basis of the Other-as-object which appears to me, 
what the Other is for himself.60
In fact, it is this inability of the For-itself to apprehend the other as a subject, and also 
its inability to appear to itself as it appears to the other, which forms the conflictual 
foundations of the relation between self-consciousnesses.
According to Sartre, it is through the experience of being looked at that the For-itself 
first becomes aware that there exist other self-consciousnesses in the world. In Sartre’s 
words, “my fundamental connection with the Other-as-subject must be able to be 
referred back to my permanent possibility of being seen by the Other. It is in and 
through the revelation of my being-as-object for the Other that I must be able to 
apprehend the presence of his being-as-subject [Sartre, 1969: 256].” However, for me
60 Sartre, J-P., Being and Nothingness, (Routledge, London and New York: 1969), 242.
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to experience the other as a subject is to be drawn into his world. It is to become an 
object for the other, an object in a world which is closed to me. In this relation, my 
own being flows away from me, since I am, in a world which is not mine, for the other 
what I cannot be for myself (i.e., an object). To reclaim myself, therefore, as 
unlimited, pure possibility, I must resist this look of the other and strive instead to 
reduce him to an object. Needless to say, he in turn must resist my attempts to 
transcend his transcendence. Thus, “...While I attempt to free myself from the hold of 
the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the 
Other, the Other seeks to enslave me [Sartre, 1969: 364].” It follows, therefore, that 
“...Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others [Sartre, 1969: 364].”61
Clearly, if  one accepts this analysis, then there are a number of general implications 
for political theory. If Sartre has correctly described the nature of being-for-others, it 
follows that not only is the social world characterised by conflict and struggle, it is 
also founded on them. Moreover, to the extent that conflict is characteristic of all 
social relationships, and to the extent that these, therefore, involve the exercise of 
power, it becomes possible to collapse the distinction between the political and the 
non-political.
Of course, the kind of existential conflict that Hegel and Sartre are talking about rarely 
finds straightforward and overt expression in the social world. Nevertheless, it is 
recognisable in the strategies of symbolic mastery that individuals employ to attain 
meaning and belonging in the world. These strategies are a manifestation of what ?
might be termed the will to symbolic negation; that is, they are a manifestation of the 0
necessity experienced by individuals to negate the threat posed by the foreignness of 
the other whilst, at the same time, preserving the moment of otherness. To understand 
what is involved in a symbolic negation, let us consider, for a moment, the functioning 
of the disparaging epithets associated with political discourses. To take one specific
61 The play In Camera is Sartre's eminently successful attempt to translate this philosophical 
idea into literary form [see Sartre, J-P., Two Plays, (Hamish Hamilton, London: 1946). In 
Being and Nothingness, having established conflict as the foundation o f being-for-another, 
Sartre goes on to describe its manifestation in a number o f concrete relations with others. 
These include relations o f love, masochism and sadism. See Sartre, J. P., Being and 
Nothingness (Routledge, London and New York: 1969), 364-412.
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example, to label someone as a “loony-lefty”62 achieves a symbolic negation primarily 
by two mechanisms. Firstly, by means of a “symbolic capture”, whereby the 
inexplicable - in this instance, the fact that there exist individuals who hold beliefs and 
values which challenge the perceived self-evident “truths” of a “transparently” 
consensual world-view - is rendered explicable by a cognitive act of assimilation and 
transformation; that is, by a cognitive act which assimilates and transforms the 
inexplicable by binding it to well-known and established typifications and relevances 
(“Marxists? They are just lunatics”). And secondly, by means of the exercise of 
“scorn”, which functions to annul the threat posed by the existence of beliefs and 
values which conflict with those held by the individuals who seek to achieve the 
symbolic negation. Importantly, neither of these mechanisms has the effect of 
annihilating the moment of otherness, which is preserved, in a neutralised form, to 
function, in its difference, as a source of identity and cohesion.
Of course, it is not only by means of disparaging epithets that a symbolic negation can 
be achieved. For example, in complete contrast, a compliment can be characterised as 
an attempt by an individual to impose his definitions, his reality, upon the other,; that 
is, it can be characterised as a negation of the subjectivity of the other. If the 
compliment is accepted, then the other has reduced himself to an object in the eyes of 
the individual who pays the compliment. He acquiesces to a world defined by the 
compliment payer, around whom his being coalesces. To this extent, the individual 
who pays the compliment has perpetrated an act of aggression. By reducing the other 
to an object, he has exercised his power over him
In general terms, any act of judgement that an individual makes of another individual 
has the character of a symbolic negation. To judge someone is, by definition, to turn 
them into an object. It is to negate their subjectivity and the threat that this poses to the 
integrity of the self. Thus, the normative sphere - or, more precisely, the realm of 
value-orientations - is central to the process of symbolic negation. It is in terms of the 
judgements which comprise this realm that symbolic negation is normally achieved. 
For example, a disparaging epithet, as we have seen, negates by means of a
62 rpiThe term "loony-left" or "lunatic left” is used by the "right-wing” in Britain (i.e., primarily 
the British Conservative party and its supporters) to characterise those who are perceived to 
hold "extreme” "left-wing" views.
91
combination of familiarity and scorn; a favourable judgement, by an affirmation; and a 
religious judgement (e.g., “This man is evil”), by an appeal to a higher authority. The 
efficacy of normative judgements in achieving symbolic negation is largely founded on 
their relative immunity to the threat posed by the foreignness of the other. This 
immunity is rooted in the fact that these judgements are subject to a specific epoche; 
namely, a suspension of doubt in their reality and validity. To understand this, it is 
necessary only to recall that uncontradicted experiences will appear, within a finite 
province of meaning, to be as real as anything.
An interesting point with respect to the paramountcy of the normative sphere for the 
task of achieving symbolic negation is that the beliefs and values which comprise this 
sphere, as it will be remembered, are also the mechanisms by which individuals 
achieve the symbolic mastery of the world. It follows, therefore, that on those 
occasions that a symbolic negation is attained by means of a normative judgement, a 
degree of symbolic mastery is also achieved. Indeed, generally speaking, the process of 
symbolic negation is central to the struggle for symbolic mastery, since the aim of 
symbolic negation is to ensure that individuals inhabit “external realities” which are 
fully expressive of them. Therefore, the process of symbolic negation, to the extent that 
it functions to locate individuals in the world and to deliver a certain solidity of being - 
and notwithstanding the fact that it is founded upon an analytically distinct existential 
dynamic - is central to the strategies that individuals employ to achieve a reaffirmation 
of the self.
It will be remembered that when I discussed the various mechanisms employed for the 
symbolic mastery of the world, I noted that the beliefs and values of the realm of 
value-orientations are closely related to the typificatory frameworks of particular 
social groups. Obviously, this close relationship has important consequences for 
understanding the process of symbolic negation. Most significantly, it means that the 
attitudes of judgement that individuals employ to effect a symbolic negation will tend 
to be derived from the typificatory frameworks of social groups which are for them 
sometimes in-groups. Moreover, it is normally within the bounds of in-groups that the 
threat posed by the other, in its most generic sense, is managed. Specifically, the 
members of any particular social group share a degree of common identity, rooted in
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the similarity of their biographical situations (and all that this implies). As a result, 
they do not experience each other with the degree of otherness which characterises the 
relationships of those who do not share in a common identity. Therefore, the grounds 
exist, within an in-group, for the establishment of what might be termed an “existential 
compromise”, whereby any particular member of the group is able to submit to the 
gazes of the others in the group (in Sartrean terms), on the understanding, firstly, that 
he will be able to reclaim himself at a later date, and secondly, that the other members 
of the group, should the occasion arise, will submit to his gaze. In this way, within the 
in-group, it is possible for an individual to gain both an apprehension of his own 
objectivity as he submits to the gazes of his consociates, and to retain the integrity of 
his self in his expectation that they will be willing to submit to his gaze.
However, it must be stressed that such a compromise does not solve the impasse 
between the For-itself and the other. It merely represents a strategy for its man­
agement. An individual cannot remain a subject and, at the same time, experience the 
other as a subject. Consequently, their relationship - subject to object, freedom to 
unfreedom - is necessarily conflictual.63 Moreover, the possibility of existential 
compromise is dependent upon the presence of a mutual perception on the part of 
individuals that they share a common identity. However, it is clear that such a 
perception often does not exist; and that where it does, it is frequently fragile and 
transient. Therefore, the will to symbolic negation retains its analytical significance as 
a concept with which to explore the dynamics of intersubjectivity. The original 
relationship between Man and his fellow-man is based fundamentally upon conflict; 
the distinction between “the political” and “the non-political” is dissolved.
Conclusion
To sum up, in this chapter, I have continued to explore the general idea, first 
articulated in the previous chapter, that the nature of Man’s relation to the external- 
world has significant consequences for social action. Specifically, I have argued that 
the inexplicable and chaotic character of this relation requires that individuals seek the
63 To understand this, see Sartre's analysis o f the relation between lovers in Being and 
Nothingness, (Routledge, London and New York: 1969), 364-379.
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symbolic mastery of the external-world; and I have claimed that this is achieved, most 
significantly, by means of the various judgements which comprise the normative 
sphere. I have also argued that the original relation between Man and his fellow-man 
is necessarily conflictual, and that, as a result, individuals are compelled to negate 
symbolically the other. In both these respects, I have been able to make my first 
references to specifically political phenomena and processes, arguing that the ideas, 
beliefs and values of political discourse constitute an important resource in the 
struggle for symbolic mastery and symbolic negation.
The significance of these kinds of arguments lies partly in the fact that they are 
indicative of one of the major claims of this thesis; namely, that in order to understand 
political phenomena and processes, it is necessary to pay attention to issues of 
consciousness, subjectivity and intersubjectivity. In the next chapter, I will begin to 
deal more explicitly with this claim. Specifically, I will use some of the ideas 
developed in the first part of this thesis, to consider whether the kinds of conflict 
which characterise the relationship between Man and his fellow-man are also present 
in the relationships between disparate social groups.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
SOCIAL GROUPS
I wish to begin this chapter by briefly taking stock of the various arguments concerning 
what might be termed “the socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity” which have 
been articulated in this thesis to date. These arguments are as follows: (i) the reaf­
firmation o f  the se lf - 1 have claimed that the uncertainty that individuals experience in 
the solitary relation requires that they constantly strive to reaffirm their senses of self; 
(ii) the symbolic mastery o f  the external-world - it is my contention that the nature of 
the relationship between Man and the external-world demands that he seeks its 
symbolic mastery; and (iii) the will to symbolic negation - it is my claim that the 
conflictual underpinning of the relationship between the se lf and the other requires 
that individuals strive to negate the threat posed by the foreignness of the other.
Up to this point, whilst I have been concerned to analyse the formal character of these 
dynamics, I have said very little about their precise “location” in subjectivity, nor have 
I considered, in any detail, the character of the various “modes of experience” within 
which they are manifest in consciousness. It is possible to make use of a topological 
analogy to shed some light on these issues. At the deepest levels of subjectivity - the 
levels of the nonconscious or nonconscious motivation - these socio-existential 
dynamics exist in their purest form, functioning as motives for both cognitive 
orientation and social action; that is, at these levels, they exist simply as dynamics to 
cognition and action. At the intermediate levels of subjectivity, mediated by the 
totality of social-experience, these dynamics are manifest in various of the relatively 
diffuse emotions - including hopes, desires, fears and so on - which individuals experi­
ence (e.g., the fear of the social other,; and the desire to belong to a social group); and 
also in modes of common-sense thinking (e.g., the cognitive arrangement of the world 
into “people like us” and “people like them” - something which I will explore in detail 
in this chapter). At the highest levels of subjectivity, the socio-existential dynamics are 
manifest in various specific actions, beliefs and attitudes; specifically, in those actions, 
beliefs and attitudes which articulate and express the emotions and common-sense 
thinking which characterise these dynamics as they are manifest at the lower levels of
subjectivity (such actions, beliefs and attitudes might include, for example, an 
individual’s dislike of people who do not belong to his ethnic group; his love of his 
country; and his cognitive perception that it is natural that he should love his country).
The most significant point to understand about this topological analogy is that the 
various levels of subjectivity are relatively autonomous. Therefore, there are no 
determined relationships between the forms taken by the socio-existential dynamics of 
subjectivity at the various levels of subjectivity. Consequently, it is possible that 
dynamics which are quite distinct analytically will nevertheless be manifest in similar 
kinds of emotions, common-sense thinking, actions, attitudes and beliefs; and, the 
corollary of this point, that a single dynamic, on different occasions or in different 
individuals, will be manifest in quite distinct emotions, common-sense thinking, 
actions and so on.
In this chapter, I wish to explore further some of the political implications of the 
existence of these socio-existential dynamics and, thereby, to demonstrate the 
inadequacies of political analyses which do not pay sufficient regard to issues of 
consciousness, subjectivity and intersubjectivity. In addition, I wish to consider a 
number of new substantive issues. Most importantly: (i) Marxist treatments of the state 
and the potential for the emergence of a conflict-free society; and (ii) the “bounded” 
nature of the social world; specifically, the idea that the social world comprises social 
groups which are for individuals sometimes in-groups and sometimes out-groups. In 
fact, it is specifically my intention to demonstrate that the emergence of a conflict-free 
* society is impossible because there is an interest in conflict itself, an interest which is 
exacerbated in the relations of opposition which necessarily exist between divergent 
social groups.
Marxist Theories of the State
It is necessary to begin this analysis of Marxist theories of the state with a caveat; 
namely, that it is not my intention to offer a definitive analysis of the latest theoretical
and empirical treatments of this area of study.1 Rather, I will briefly outline what 
might be termed a “classical” Marxist theory of the state, and I will detail one of the 
major debates (namely, the debate between Nicos Poulantzas and Ralph Miliband) that 
has occurred in Marxist theory concerning the nature and functioning of the capitalist 
state. I will then move on to consider some of the issues surrounding the notion of a 
transition to socialism. The justification for this strategy is that it will serve the major 
purpose of this chapter, which, as I have stated, is to demonstrate the flaws in political 
analyses which relatively neglect issues of consciousness, subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity. Additionally, it will provide a theoretical context for the arguments 
concerning the nature of social conflict which I will make in the second half of the 
chapter.
According to Marx and Engels, “...The executive of the modem state is but a 
committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie [Marx and 
Engels, 1959: 51].” It is well known that Marx did not attempt a systematic study of 
the state; nevertheless, it is doubtful that he ever revised his opinion that the state in 
capitalist society is, above all else, an instrument of the ruling-class.2 This idea that the 
state exists in order to serve ruling-class interests is bound up with the other major 
element in the Marxist approach; namely, the idea that with the advent of a classless 
society, the state will have outlived its usefulness and will, therefore, wither away into 
non-existence. Engels describes this process as follows:
The proletariat seizes political power and turns the means of 
production into state property... .But in doing this it abolishes itself as 
proletariat, abolishes all class distinctions and class antagonisms, 
abolishes also the state as state. Society thus far, based upon class 
antagonisms, has had need of the state... .As soon as there is no longer 
any social class to be held in subjection...a state is no longer 
necessary... .the government of persons is replaced by the
1 In this respect, see Jessop, B., “Recent theories o f the capitalist state”, The Cambridge 
Journal o f  Economics, (1977), 1, 353-373.
2 See Miliband, R., The State in Capitalist Society, (Quartet Books, London: 1973), 7.
administration of things, and by the conduct of processes of production.
The state is not “abolished”. It dies out.
It is not my concern here to examine the empirical validity of the Marxist claim that 
the state in capitalist society serves the interests of the ruling-class (although it might 
be pertinent to point out that it would be difficult to understand the last thirty years of 
British socio-political history without an understanding of the role that the state plays 
in mediating the relationship between capital and labour;4 and also to note that 
Anthony Giddens claims that “the state, as everyone else, is dependent upon the 
activities of capitalist employers for its revenue, and hence the state operates in a 
context of varying capitalistic “imperatives”...”5). Instead, I wish to explore what is 
perhaps the most important theoretical issue for Marxist analyses of the state: namely, 
the form and structural location of the capitalist state (needless to say, the way in 
which one deals with this issue will have a direct bearing on how one might assess the 
empirical validity of the Marxist position).
As I stated earlier, Marx himself did not produce a definitive account of the state. 
Indeed, it is only in the last 25 years or so that Marxists have, in any numbers, turned 
to this area of study at all.6 Whilst recent theoretical expositions all share a common 
starting point - namely, that the state operates fundamentally in the interests of the 
ruling-class7 - there is a considerable disagreement about the precise character of the 
state and the nature of the relations which define it. Obviously, I am unable to conduct 
a survey of the various positions held by different Marxist theorists;8 however, it might
3 Engels, F. in Marx, K., and Engels, F., Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, (Edited: 
Feuer, L.), (Fontana/Collins, Glasgow: 1981), 146-147.
4 See, for example, Coates, D., Labour in Power? (Longman, London: 1980); Gamble, A., 
Britain in Decline, (MacMillan, London: 1981); Hall, S. and Jacques, M., The Politics o f  
Thatcherism (Lawrence and Wishart, London: 1983); and Miliband, R., Panitch, L. and 
Saville, J., The Socialist Register, (The Merlin Press, London: 1987).
5 Giddens, A., A Contemporary Critique o f Historical Materialism, (MacMillan, London and 
Basingstoke: 1981), 211.
6 With one o f two notable exceptions, particularly, V. I. Lenin's The State and Revolution 
(Progress Publishers, Moscow: 1949); and Antonio Gramsci's Selections from Prison 
Notebooks, (Edited: Hoare, Q. and Smith, G. N.), (Lawrence and Wishart, London: 1971).
7 See Miliband, R., Marxism and Politics, (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1977), 66-67.
8 For such a survey, see Jessop, B., “Recent theories o f the capitalist state”, The Cambridge 
Journal o f  Economics, (1977), 1, 353-373..
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be illuminating to consider two specific theoretical approaches and to detail some of 
the problems inherent in each.
According to the first of these approaches, the state is an instrument of bourgeois rule 
by virtue of the fact that its key positions are occupied by members of this class. This 
position is frequently, and in some ways unfairly, associated with Ralph Miliband, 
who argues that:
The most important fact about advanced capitalist societies...is the 
continued existence in them of private and ever more concentrated 
economic power. As a result of that power, the men - owners and 
controllers - in whose hands it lies enjoy a massive preponderance in 
society, in the political system, and in the determination of the state’s 
policies and actions.9
In other words, the state, in its activities, will tend to favour capital in general, because 
its key members share common ties with the bourgeoisie. However, whilst this 
approach, in demonstrating that this is in fact the case, has provided a valuable critique 
of the pluralist-democratic position,10 it is, nevertheless, subject to a number of 
criticisms. The most serious of these is that it does not take account of “objective- 
relations”. This charge is levelled most famously by Nicos Poulantzas who argues that:
The relation between the bourgeois class and the State is an objective 
relation. This means that if the function of the State in a determinate 
social formation and the interests of the dominant class in this 
formation coincide, it is by reason of the system itself: the direct 
participation of members of the ruling class in the State apparatus is not
9 Miliband, R., The State in Capitalist Society, (Quartet Books, London: 1973), 237.
10 See Miliband, R., Marxism and Politics, (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1977), passim.
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the cause but the effect, and moreover a chance and contingent one, of 
the objective coincidence.11
In fact, to focus exclusively upon the class origins of a state elite in order to explain 
state activity, results in a number of explanatory weaknesses. Particularly, it is difficult 
to account for: (i) those instances where the ruling class itself is not directly 
represented in the state apparatus (as was the case in that part of the 19th Century 
which saw the landed aristocracy in Britain ruling on behalf of the bourgeoisie); 
(ii) those occasions where the state pursues policies which are directly contrary to the 
wishes of the dominant class (e.g., Roosevelt’s New Deal)', and (iii) the more general 
requirement that the state should be relatively autonomous of the ruling class, in order 
that it might pursue policies against the short-term interests of capital.
In the second approach, as represented by the work of Nicos Poulantzas,12 the state is 
conceived not in instrumental terms, but instead according to the objective function it 
performs “as the organisation for maintaining both the conditions of production and 
the conditions for the existence and functioning both of the unity of a mode of 
production and of a formation [Poulantzas, 1973: 50].” By defining the state in terms 
of objective relations (i.e., in terms of its insertion within the framework of a capitalist 
mode of production), Poulantzas is able to claim, as above, that “the direct 
participation of members of the capitalist class in the State apparatus and in the 
government, even where it exists, is not the important side of the matter [Poulantzas, 
1969: 245].” In fact, as far as the capitalist state is concerned, this “best serves the 
interests of the capitalist class only when members of this class do not participate 
directly in the State apparatus, that is to say when the ruling class is not the politically 
governing class [Poulantzas, 1969: 246].”13 The advantages of this “relative 
autonomy” are two-fold: (i) the state avoids becoming the site o f inter-fractional
11 Poulantzas, N., “The problem o f the capitalist state”, in Blackburn, R., (Ed.), Ideology in 
Social Science: readings in critical social theory, (Fontana/Collins, Glasgow: 1972), 245.
12 See Poulantzas, N., Political Power and Social Classes, (New Left Books, London: 1973).
13 It is Poulantzas' claim that the members o f the state apparatus, despite diverse class origins, 
fonn a specific social category, whose objective function it is to actualise the role o f the state. 
Thus, although they are not tied to the ruling class, they serve its interests, because the totality 
of this role itself coincides with the interests o f the ruling class [see Poulantzas, N., “The 
problem o f the capitalist state”, in Blackburn, R., (Ed.), Ideology in Social Science: Readings 
in critical social theory, (Fontana/Collins, Glasgow: 1972), 246-247],
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disputes between competing capitalist interests; and (ii) the state is able to pursue 
policies which favour the working-class in the short-term, to the long-term interests of 
capital in general.
Although this second approach avoids some of the difficulties which result from 
analysing the state in terms of the class origins and actions of its functionaries, it is 
itself by no means free of problems. A number of these result directly from defining 
the state in functional terms as a factor o f cohesion: (i) to the extent that the existence 
of a social phenomenon is not accounted for by the function it necessarily performs, 
this approach does not give a sufficient explanation of the state;14 (ii) the state can 
never be precisely specified; by definition, it includes all those institutions which 
function to secure this cohesion;15 and (iii) the contention that the state necessarily 
serves the interests of the capitalist class is apparently unfalsifiable; relative autonomy 
allows that any action of the state apparently favourable to the working class can be 
explained away in terms of the requirement for system maintenance.
A more general criticism of the “structural relations” approach is that it treats social 
actors as simply the bearers of objective instances, paying no regard, therefore, to the 
reflexive nature of social action. In this regard, for example, Miliband criticises 
Poulantzas for leading us “straight towards a kind of structural determinism, or rather 
a super-determinism, which makes impossible a truly realistic consideration of the 
dialectical relationship between the State and the “system” [Miliband, 1970: 259].” Of 
course, for Miliband, the problem is simply one of degree; that is, how much freedom 
should one allow social actors considering the fact that they operate within a system of 
structural constraint?16 However, in fact, it is not possible to reduce the issue of the 
relationship between social actors and institutions to questions concerning the balance 
between freedom and structural constraint. It is possible to demonstrate this fact, by 
considering how one might attempt to reconstitute the Marxist conception of the state 
in the theoretical terms outlined in Chapter 1.
14 This is the well known difficulty o f all functionalist explanations. In this context, see 
Giddens, A., A Contemporary Critique o f Historical Materialism, (MacMillan, London and 
Basingstoke: 1981), 17-19; and 215.
15 See Jessop, B., “Recent theories o f the capitalist state”, The Cambridge Journal o f  
Economics, (1977), 1, 355.
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In this respect, it is first necessary to recall: (i) that social actors use stocks of 
knowledge in order to orient their actions to the demands of the situations that they 
face; and (ii) that a social structure can be specified in terms of the typificatory 
frameworks associated with the average courses o f  action  followed by anonymous 
social actors. Therefore, one can pose the question: how is it possible to hold onto the 
view that the state has an inherent tendency to favour the long-term interests of the 
ruling-class, if  one accepts that the state comprises no more than social actors 
following average courses o f  action? One possible response, which would perhaps be 
favoured by those who view the state as an instrument of the ruling-class, is to argue 
that the functionaries of the state, by virtue of essentially bourgeois biographical
• • 17situations, possess stocks of knowledge which are commensurate with this role. 
However, this response is still vulnerable to the criticism, noted earlier, that the state 
has operated quite adequately in the interests of capital when controlled by a non­
capitalist elite.
We are returned, therefore, to the question of objective relations’, or more specifically, 
to the possibility that there are situational and structural “constraints” which 
predispose the state to act in the interests of the capitalist class. How then might one 
specify these constraints? To answer this, it is necessary first to recognise that the state 
is an imagined entity; that is, it is defined by social action which has been identified as 
regular and non-random. It follows, therefore, that it is possible to specify the state in 
terms of the typificatory frameworks which are associated with the average courses o f  
action which constitute this regular and non-random action.18 For example, the 
juridical function of the state might be said to exist at the intersection of the 
typificatory frameworks which: define the roles that comprise the various juridical 
agencies; specify the law and define the relationship between it and the state; define 
the relationship between the law and “the people” (i.e., the obligatory character of the 
law; its legitimacy; etc.); and specify the relationship between the state and “the
16 See Miliband, R., Marxism and Politics, (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1977), 73
17 See my discussion o f social structure, Chapter 1, 29-32.
18 See also my treatment o f the requirements for an ideal performance o f the Parsonian mother- 
role, Chapter 1, 30.
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people” (i.e., the legitimacy of state power; the obligations that the state must fulfil; 
etc.).
In the terms of this analysis, notions of freedom and structural constraint are 
conceptually redundant. The state is specified in terms of the purely formal relation­
ship between a constituted regularity of action and the typificatory frameworks which 
govern that action; and more generally, social structures are constituted realities which 
function to facilitate the analysis of action which has been identified as regular and 
non-random. However, these facts do not preclude the development of an ideal-typical 
model of the state, in terms of which the typificatory frameworks which define the 
state intersect in such a way so that it operates in the interests of the capitalist class. 
Obviously, it is only possible here to hint at the precise nature of such a model. In this 
respect, let us consider briefly Anthony Giddens’ claim, already noted, that “the state, 
as everyone else, is dependent upon the activities of capitalist employers for its 
revenue; and hence the state operates in a context of various capitalistic “imperatives” 
[Giddens, 1981: 211].” He cites Lindblom:
Because public functions in the market system rest in the hands of busi­
nessmen, it follows that jobs, prices, production, growth, the standard 
of living and the economic security of everyone all rest in their hands. 
Consequently government officials cannot be indifferent to how well 
business performs its functions... A major function of government, 
therefore, is to see to it that businessmen perform their tasks.19
i
The important point is that it is possible to express these kinds of arguments in the 
terms specified by the theoretical framework that I have just outlined. For example, it 
might be argued, in these terms, that anonymous state functionaries follow average 
courses o f action which seek to secure the conditions necessary for capitalist 
reproduction, to the extent that their action is oriented towards a framework of 
typifications which equates their interests, both personal and institutional, with the 
success of the capitalist project. Or counterfactually, that if they do not adopt average
19 Lindblom, C. E., cited in Giddens, A., A Contemporary Critique o f Historical Materialism, 
(MacMillan, London and Basingstoke: 1981), 212.
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courses o f action which function to secure capitalist reproduction, then the 
consequences, to the extent that the state is in fact dependent upon national and 
international capitalism, will be incompatible with the framework of typifications 
which equates the interests of these functionaries with perceived institutional and 
national interests.
Of course, this kind of analysis begs many more questions than it answers. Most 
importantly, it is necessary to demonstrate, in similar kinds of terms, that the state is in 
fact dependent upon capitalist reproduction; and indeed, that the notion of capitalist 
reproduction is meaningful at all. However, these tasks are well outside the bounds of 
this particular study. Therefore, I wish now to move onto the second part of this 
analysis o f Marxist political theory, to consider the issues surrounding the idea of a 
transition to socialism.
The Transition to Socialism
It is the Marxist claim that the germs of revolution and the conditions for the transition 
to a classless, conflict free society are to be found in the capitalist mode of production. 
Crudely, the seeds of the destruction of capitalism lie in the universality of working 
class alienation and in the inability of capitalism to provide long-term material 
compensation for this alienation.20 In other words, the proletariat will throw off its 
chains in order to transcend its alienation and exploitation. However, as it is 
continually pointed out, capitalist societies have proved stubbornly resistant to such 
revolutionary change, which consequently calls into question the validity of the 
Marxist position. One possible explanation for the unexpected longevity of these 
societies is that, contrary to the expectations of Marx, they have been able to secure 
real and long-term increases in the standards of living of significant numbers of the 
working class. In other words, it might be that Marx was quite simply incorrect in his
20 For this reading o f Marx, see Balbus, I., Marxism and Domination, (Princeton University 
Press, New Jersey: 1982), 48-55.
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assumptions concerning the immiseration of the proletariat and that, consequently, he 
overestimated the fragility of capitalist system.21
However, let us suppose that immiseration had occurred, would one then expect to see, 
as Marx predicted, the emergence of a truly revolutionary and liberatory class-force? 
It will be remembered that I have argued, in Chapter 1, that a collective awareness 
among social actors is likely to emerge when they share similar biographical situations 
and a common social world.22 With immiseration and the concentration of industry, 
according to Marx, “...The various interests and conditions of life within the ranks of 
the proletariat are more and more equalised...”, as the modem labourer, “...sinks 
deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class.”23 To this 
extent, the conditions specified above are satisfied; however, whilst one might be 
justified in expecting that these circumstances would engender some form of class 
consciousness -and quite possibly class action - far more problematic is the notion that 
this consciousness would be either revolutionary or liberatory.24
Social class is only one out of the many identifiable social structures which make up 
the social world. These are experienced by social actors with varying degrees of 
acuteness, according to the specificity of the particular structure. Accordingly, I 
argued, in Chapter 1, that institutionally defined action complexes, such as the kinship 
or occupational systems, are the most acutely experienced and, therefore, the most 
likely to engender a common identity. The significant point is that such institutional 
forms are not only experienced more acutely than social class, even where 
immiseration has occurred, but also that they compete with social class for the 
allegiance of social actors, with consequent repercussions for the class struggle. Most 
significantly, there is the possibility that certain sectors of the proletariat - for example, 
particular occupational groups - will pursue sectional rather than class interests. 
Clearly, this is related to larger questions of reformist politics; specifically, to the
21 For the idea o f immiseration, see Marx, K. and Engels, F., Marx and Engels: Basic Writings 
on Politics and Philosophy, (Edited: Freuer, L.), (Fontana/Collins, Glasgow: 1959), 60-61.
22 See Chapter 1, 32-35.
23 Marx, K. and Engels, F., (Fontana/Collins, Glasgow: 1959), 57; and 61.
24 Of course, this is a well documented difficulty. See, for example, Balbus, I., Marxism and 
Domination, (Princeton University Press, New Jersey: 1982), 52.
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possibility that such groups will seek to ameliorate their conditions within the 
framework of the capitalist mode of production. Of course, it will be claimed that such 
a scenario can be discounted on the grounds that absolute immiseration brings 
unprecedented homogeneity to the working-class. However, even if one does accept 
the inevitability of class struggle, one cannot rule out the possibility that a form of 
instrumentalism will emerge, whereby this struggle is used as a vehicle to achieve 
interests and goals - for example, those based on a “consumerist” orientation - which, 
strictly speaking, by virtue of their genesis within the typificatory frameworks of non­
class formations, are neither “revolutionary” nor “liberatory”.
O f course, immiseration has not occurred in the form that Marx, at least in his earlier 
works, expected.25 As a consequence, these non-class formations become increasingly 
significant as alternative sites for the allegiance of social actors. In contrast to social 
class, which when defined in Marxist terms is only experienced very diffusely, social 
actors apprehend these formations as relatively permanent and concrete features of 
their lives. In fact, it is primarily through their membership of such groups that social 
actors are defined and located within the social world; it is, as I have argued, in these 
groups that they find their social identity. The existence of such formations hinders 
the development of revolutionary consciousness in a number of fairly obvious ways: (i) 
by the fact that they offer to individuals an alternative to a class identity; (ii) by 
underpinning many of the conflicts which characterise the social world; and (iii) by 
uniting individuals across class boundaries, as members of wider collectivities such as 
the Christian church, the Nation and “the West.”26
It has long been recognised by Marxist theorists that it is necessary to take into account
7 7non-class formations when devising a revolutionary strategy. However, these kinds of
251 am aware that Marx moved away from the relatively crude position that he articulated in 
The Communist Manifesto. See, for example, Balbus, L, Marxism and Domination, 
(Princeton University Press, New Jersey: 1982), 52-53. Balbus also deals with the difficulties 
entailed by the rejection o f the immiseration thesis.
26 One should also note the significance o f social structures which, although not institutional in 
form (e.g., gender and race), are integral to an individual's social identity.
27 See, for example, Gramsci, A., Selections from Prison Notebooks, (Edited: Hoare, Q. and 
Smith, G. N.), (Lawrence and Wishart, London: 1971), 161; and passim. And also the work 
of Stuart Hall, who talks specifically o f the "contradictory nature o f human subjects, o f social 
identities..."; and the need for the Left in Britain to address "the identities which the people 
carry in their heads - their subjectivities, their cultural fife, their sexual life, their family life, 
their ethnic identities, their health...[Hall, S., 1987: 21]".
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formations have a significance beyond merely their impact on the potential for 
revolution. In fact, they are necessarily pivotal in determining the form of any post­
capitalist society. Most significantly, the continued existence of non-class formations 
in a post-capitalist society, necessarily precludes the possibility that this society might 
be conflict-free. It is inconceivable that these formations will simply disappear with 
the overthrow of capitalism;28 to this extent, they will remain a potential source of 
conflict, domination and exploitation. O f course, it will be objected to these arguments 
that the transcendence of scarcity29 will remove the foundations of conflict, and that 
with convergent interests, social groups will coexist harmoniously. However, this 
objection is based upon an assumption which is unsustainable; namely, that the 
benefits of conflict are necessarily derived from the ends to which it is directed. In 
contrast to this, I wish to claim that there is an interest in conflict itself; an interest 
rooted in the socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity.
The Social World as a “Bounded” Reality
In order to justify this claim, it is necessary to turn now to consider the “bounded” 
nature of the social world; that is, the idea that the social world comprises social 
groups which are for individuals sometimes in-groups and sometimes out-groups. To 
anticipate, I wish to argue that the social identities which individuals attain by means 
of their membership of in-groups are enhanced in the opposition of these groups to 
various out-groups. It is my intention, by exploring this argument, to clarify and 
substantiate the grounds of my critique of the Marxist position.
I have argued that the defining characteristic of a social structure is that it exhibits a 
complex of non-random and regular behaviour. As an abstraction, therefore, a social 
structure is both discrete and bounded, characterised by its own particular typificatory 
framework. This is seen most clearly in the case of institutional structures, where a
28 There are a number o f reasons why this is the case: (i) the fact that a socialist world will 
remain an apparently structured world, which is the necessary condition for the emergence of 
such formations; (ii) because it is inconceivable that identities built on perceived differences 
of sex and race will simply wither away in a post-capitalist society; and (iii) similarly, 
because institutional frameworks cannot be eradicated.
29 For a critique o f the notion o f the transcendence o f  scarcity, see Balbus, I., Marxism and 
Domination, (Princeton University Press, New Jersey: 1982), 114-121.
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high degree of specificity is guaranteed by the normative, spatial and temporal 
regulation of behaviour. To the extent that social structures are delimited in this 
fashion, they stand in relations of opposition to one another. In other words, each 
particular structure is related to and commands its own particular area of social life. 
This has important consequences for a social actor’s experience of individual social
30structures and the social world in general.
Turning first to the pre-reflective experience of social structures, there are a number of 
significant points to be noted. Firstly, a  social actor receives pre-reflective experiential 
confirmation of the reality of the various action complexes to which he is subject by 
virtue of the distinctiveness of each in relation to the others. In other words, the 
distinctiveness of any particular complex emerges in tandem with the experience of 
other similarly discernible complexes. For example, a social actor’s experience of his
31family is reinforced in its difference from the parallel experience of his workplace. 
Secondly, in certain instances membership of a particular social structure necessarily 
precludes membership of an associated one. For instance, to be female means being 
subject to those forces and processes exclusive to such an identity and therefore not 
being subject to those exclusive to a male identity. Such a relation of opposition can 
only be experienced by a social actor through a change of status over time. Finally, it 
is possible to specify social structures according to their exclusivity; or rather, 
according to their pervasiveness in terms of the relative inclusion and exclusion of 
social actors. On this basis, one might establish a classifieatory framework, within 
which social relations and structures range from those which exclude all bar two social 
actors - for example, the primary dyadic relation between mother and child - to those 
defined by the almost complete inclusion of social actors - for example, the societal 
relation. The social actor experiences this continuum in an extremely complex 
fashion. As far as pre-reflective awareness is concerned, it is, as above, because social
30 It is necessary to emphasise that the analysis to follow is entirely abstract in character. In this 
respect, it should be remembered that social structures are denied a material reality; and that 
when I talk about the way that they are experienced by social actors, I am doing so in a 
formal and abstract sense; that is, I am talking about the way in which they are experienced 
by anonymous social actors (see the theoretical framework which I outlined in Chapter 1).
31 Needless to say, this applies significantly only when social structures reach a certain level of 
specificity.
32 For an example of a change in gender identity, see Garfinkel, H., Studies in 
Ethnomethodology, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford: 1984), 116-185.
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actors are subject to a whole series of such relations and structures that they become 
aware of the differing relations of inclusion and exclusion in each particular instance. 
More specifically, such awareness is enabled because social structures vary in their 
social contexts and in the frequency and anonymity of their associated we-relations.
It is upon the foundations established by these kinds of pre-reflective experience that a 
fully reflective appreciation of the various oppositions between social structures and 
groups is built. This appreciation emerges simultaneously with a social actor’s 
recognition that he shares a series of common identities with his fellow-men. This can 
be illustrated by considering what is involved in the distinction between an in-group 
and an out-group. According to Sehutz, this distinction serves primarily to distinguish 
between the way that a particular social group is experienced by its own members, in 
contrast to the way that it is apprehended by the members of other distinct groups. The 
limiting condition on the existence of an in-group is that its members should be aware 
that they share a common situation. This common situation is derived from a shared 
relative natural conception of the world. The members of an in-group are united by a 
common system of relevances and typifications, which functions to define and locate 
them within the social world. Thus, within the bounds of their in-groups, individuals 
“find their bearings without difficulty...guided by a set of recipes of more or less 
institutionalised habits, mores, folkways, etc., that help them come to terms with 
beings and fellow-men, belonging to the same situation [Schutz, 1964: 251].” To the 
extent that the situations which confront these individuals are embedded in the cultural 
pattern of the in-group, and to the extent that this pattern is handed down to every 
member of the group by way of the social stock of knowledge,33 the cultural pattern 
forms an integral aspect of their biographies.
The crucial point is that an individual will be, at any one time, a member of a number 
of these social groups. Formations as diverse as families, colleges, occupations,
33 The fact that social actors use typifications and relevances derived from an established 
cultural pattern to master the situations which confront them serves to reproduce this pattern. 
Note the similarity between this idea and Anthony Giddens’ notion o f the production and 
reproduction o f social structure [see Giddens, A., New Rules o f Sociological Method, 
(Hutchinson, London: 1976), 93-129].
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villages and closed clubs will be experienced as in-groups.34 Attached to each one will 
be a framework of typifications and relevances which serves to “define its situation”; 
each will have its own peculiar rationale which functions to motivate the action of its 
members. Furthermore, these groups stand in a complicated network of relations to 
one another. This has a number of important dimensions:
1. It is hierarchical in the sense that each group is more or less enclosed by the 
larger one of which it is a part. For example, families exist within nations; and 
nations make up the trans-national groupings (e.g., the Western world) of the 
world community. Each group derives a baseline of orientation from the 
cultural pattern of the larger group(s) to which it refers. In other words, the 
typifications and relevances employed by a social group will in some way 
reflect those of the wider group of which it is an element.
2. The typifications and relevances associated with particular social structures and 
groups will enter as elements in the situations which unfold within the bounds 
of other nominally unrelated groups. For example, a social actor’s gender 
identity is a significant element in every face-to-face relation; gender, as a 
social structure, therefore, cuts across the boundaries of all social groups.
3. As I noted above, membership of a particular social structure or group, in 
certain instances, necessarily precludes membership of other associated 
structures and groups. In such instances, social groups face each other, in-group 
to out-group, in a relation of “natural” and mutual opposition. One might 
consider, for example, the relation between opposing armies or rival political 
parties.
It is through his membership of such multiple social groupings that an individual 
experiences and becomes reflectively aware of the apparently diverse nature of the 
social world. As I argued in Chapter 1, such awareness derives, in part, from the 
social stock of knowledge; that is, the individual is simply taught that the world is
34 See Schutz, A., Collected Papers: Volume II, (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1964), 91; and 252-253, 
for an indication that he was aware that the term in-group can be employed to denote such 
formations.
35 See Schutz, A., (Nijhoff, The Hague: 1964), 252.
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made up of recognisable and discrete social formations. Further, integral to the 
folkways of each social group will be a self-conception, specifying the group’s 
identity, its limits, functioning and relation to other social formations.
However, an individual’s awareness that the social world is diverse also emerges 
directly from his daily journey through the realms of the various social formations. 
These are built on divergent frameworks of typifications and relevances; they 
command different aspects of social life, appeal to different interests in motivating 
action, and carry their own particular role expectations and normative demands. Quite 
simply, such formations are very different and the social actor participates directly in 
this diversity. This is the major experiential factor in the reflective apprehension that 
the world is made up of discrete and bounded social groups.
In-group and Out-groups
Furthermore, not only does the individual, in this fashion, come to apprehend the 
social world as diverse, he also experiences it as comprising formations which are for 
him sometimes in-groups and sometimes out-groups. Specifically, he experiences the 
typifications and relevances of particular social groups as elements of his stock of 
knowledge at hand. On entering the realm of any one of these, he draws upon an 
appropriate schema and orients himself to the world according to its requirements. In 
doing so, he subordinates to the perceived demands of this current group, the interests 
and relevances which he associates, exclusively, with his membership of other social 
groups.36 The current group functions as an in-group for as long as the individual feels 
himself bound by its typifications and relevances; that is, for as long as it alone defines 
his world. Significantly, while this is the case, he apprehends all other social groups as 
being out-groups. It is worth emphasising what is being claimed here: namely, that
36 Anthony Giddens’ notion o f “lifestyle sectors” is pertinent in this respect: “A lifestyle sector 
concerns a time-space “slice” o f an individual’s overall activities, within which a reasonably 
consistent and ordered set o f practices is adopted and enacted Lifestyle sectors are aspects of 
the regionalisation o f activities. A lifestyle sector can include, for instance, what one does on 
certain evenings o f the week, or at weekends, as contrasted to other parts o f the week; a 
friendship, or a maniage, can also be a lifestyle sector in so far as it is made internally 
cohesive by distinctive forms o f elected behaviour across time-space [Giddens, 1991: 83].
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such groups become out-groups because the individual subordinates their typificatory 
frameworks to those of the group which he currently participates in.37
The political significance of such oppositions is obviously limited by an individual’s 
continued membership of social groups which are for him only temporarily out­
groups.38 Nevertheless, that these oppositions are of some importance can be 
illustrated by returning briefly to the question of class and non-class interests. Earlier 
in this chapter, I argued that the significance of non-class formations is that they offer 
alternative sites for the allegiance of social actors and, therefore, undermine the 
potential for class consciousness. Further, I claimed that the greater the specificity of a 
particular formation, the more successful it would be in gaining this allegiance. Thus, 
for example, if  an individual experiences his family more acutely than he experiences 
his membership of the working-class, one would expect his family, rather than his 
class, to lay the greatest claim upon his allegiance. If this is the case, then despite his 
membership of both social structures, the family functions as an in-group and the 
working-class as an out-group. Therefore, the typifications and relevances associated 
specifically with his class membership are subordinated to those associated with his 
family membership.
It is now easy to understand how sectional interests emerge and how an interested 
party might seek to cash in on these by appealing directly to the typifications and 
relevances which characterise particular non-class formations. Of course, it is 
precisely these concerns that lead Marxists to argue that any socialist strategy must be 
hegemonic. This necessity can be understood in Schutzian terms: the success of any 
revolutionary strategy depends, in part, on its capacity to address and reconstitute the
37 Of course, this is a simplified reconstruction - the reality is much more complex. Firstly, as I 
noted earlier, social structures enclose and cross-cut one another. Therefore, they will not be 
experienced as being absolutely delimited and exclusive. Secondly, an individual will rarely 
be so immersed in die typifications and relevances o f a particular social structure, that he 
absolutely buries the interests and relevances associated with the other social structures in 
which he participates. However, a simplified reconstruction serves: firstly, to emphasise that 
oppositions pervade the social world; and secondly, to provide the ground for an analysis of 
the co-existence o f forms o f consciousness that are apparently contradictory (e.g., a 
consumerist consciousness and a class consciousness).
38 It should be noted that I have moved deliberately (and obviously) beyond Schutz's usage o f 
this terminology. Further, it should be stressed that, according to the terms o f this analysis, it 
is only a matter o f time before a group which is currently an out-group becomes once more 
an in-group.
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private domains o f relevance of individuals, so that they come to understand that their 
interests as members of families, occupations, ethnic groups, and so on are ineluctably 
linked and subordinate to their class interests. However, the task of constructing such 
a consciousness is continually undermined by the experience of individuals that the 
world is diverse and divided Thus, in the end, failure in this task is guaranteed by the 
very aspect of experience which necessitates its undertaking.
Of course, as I noted earlier, the problems which confront the Marxist account do not 
derive solely from the conflicts of interest which arise as a consequence of an 
individual’s membership of multiple social-formations. A further barrier to the 
emergence of a genuinely liberatory consciousness exists in the other major dimension 
of the in-group/out-group distinction; namely, the fact that social actors define 
themselves as members of in-groups in terms of their non-membership of out-groups; 
or, to put this another way, the fact that social actors apprehend the world in terms of a 
series of “Us” and “Them” dichotomies. To understand this, one has only to consider 
the oppositions which exist between national, racial, religious, political, sexual and 
sporting groups, to name but a few. William Graham Sumner recognises the 
divisiveness of such oppositions, when he states that “...Each group thinks its own 
folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways 
this excites its scorn.”39 Further, and crucially, social groups are united in this scorn; 
the individuals of an in-group reaffirm their identity with their fellow members in then- 
collective opposition to the relatively anonymous individuals of particular out-groups. 
In the words of Rolf von Eckartsberg, “...We live in terms of “in groups” and define 
ourselves in contrast to “out groups””.40
The significance of this fact can hardly be over-stated. According to R. D. Laing, the 
“Us” and “Them” dichotomy is a matter:
39 Cited in Schutz, A., Collected Papers: Volume II, (Nijhoff The Hague: 1964), 244.
40 Eckartsberg, R., von, “Schutz’s promise for social psychology”, in Embre, L., (Ed.), Worldly 
Phenomenology: The Continuing Influence o f Alfred Schutz on North American Human 
Science, (Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press o f 
America, Washington: 1988), 43.
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of life or death importance in the most urgent possible sense, since it is 
on the basis of such primitive social phantasies of who and what are I 
and you, he and she, We and Them, that the world is linked or 
separated, that we die, kill, devour, tear and are tom apart, descend to 
hell or ascend to heaven, in short, that we conduct our lives.41
Similarly, Edmund Leach notes that “...The violence in the world comes about because 
we human beings are forever creating barriers between men who are like us and men 
who are not like us [Leach, 1968: 46].” With regard to the Marxist account, it is clear 
that in dividing the working class, such oppositions preclude the development of a 
genuinely liberatoiy consciousness. Moreover, it is possible for an interested party to 
articulate these oppositions in such a way that it is guaranteed that a liberatory 
consciousness will not emerge (at which point the oppositions become a focus of 
political contestation).42 Furthermore, as I stated earlier, to the extent that such oppo­
sitions are carried over into post-capitalist society, they remain potential sources of 
conflict, domination and exploitation. Indeed, it is fair to say that for as long as social 
actors apprehend the social world in terms of the opposition of in-groups and out­
groups the advent of a conflict free society remains out of the question.
We are thus returned to the point at which we left the first half of this chapter. The 
Marxist account can only be rescued from this quandary if it can be demonstrated that 
the springs o f co-operative wealth, characteristic of post-capitalist society, bring 
unprecedented harmony to the new order; that is, if it can be shown that with the 
transcendence of scarcity there necessarily occurs a convergence of interests, which 
rules out the possibility of conflict, exploitation and domination. It will be
41 Laing, R. D., The Politics o f Experience and the Bird o f  Paradise, (Penguin, 
Harmondsworth: 1967), 79. The groups that form the basis o f the "Us" and "Them" 
distinction are phantasies, for Laing, because they exist only in so far as we invent and 
perpetuate them [see 65-66].
42 In this respect, one might consider, for example, the "authoritarian populist" account o f the 
years o f "Thatcherism" (i.e., die years o f the Conservative administrations in Great Britain 
between 1979-1990). In this account, the Thatcherite project was hegemonic in that it sought 
to build a new historic bloc out o f the ruins o f the post-war setdement. This had a strong 
populist undercurrent, which rested heavily upon the rhetoric o f "Us" and "Them" 
distinctions. For example, a central plank to the 1979 General Election campaign was the 
ideological juxtaposition o f "The People" ("Us") and "Trade Union Barons" ("Them"). See, 
generally, Hall, S. and Jacques, M., The Politics o f Thatcherism, (Lawrence and Wishart, 
London: 1983), 19-39; and passim.
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remembered, that I objected to this scenario on the grounds that it assumes that the 
benefits of conflict are derived solely from the ends to which conflict is directed. In 
contrast to this view, it is my contention that there is an interest in conflict itself.; an 
interest rooted in the socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity. It is to this claim that I 
now wish to turn my attention.
The Interest in Conflict
In Chapter 2, I argued that an individual, in the solitary relation, suffers isolation, 
estrangement and a lack of definiteness. As a consequence, he is compelled to turn to 
society to make himself real and he succeeds in becoming so to the extent that he is 
able to embrace his various social identities. Thus, subjectivity is built on a dynamic 
which requires the constant reaffirmation of the self. In concrete terms, this is 
routinely achieved through an individual’s membership of various in-groups, which 
serve to define and locate him within the social world; that is, an individual gains a 
social identity, or a series of social identities, in his relation to the typifications and 
relevances of particular in-groups, and through this identity (these identities) he 
achieves the solidity of being that the solitary relation demands. In terms of the 
interests of this chapter, the crucial point is that this solidity is enhanced in the in­
group’s opposition to various out-groups. In a relation of opposition, a social group is 
more real to an individual and, consequently, he is more real to himself. As William 
James notes, “...All the qualities of a man acquire dignity when he knows that the 
service of the collectivity that owns him needs them. If proud of the collectivity, his 
own pride rises in proportion. No collectivity is like an army for nourishing such 
pride...”.43 And similarly, Mead argues that “...To join ourselves with others in the 
common assault upon the common foe we have become more than allies, we have 
joined a clan, have different souls, and have the exuberant feeling of being at one with 
this community [Mead, 1964: 357].”44 Of course, it does not matter whether this foe is
43 James, W., “The moral equivalent o f war”, International Conciliation, (1910), 27, 495.
44 Both James and Mead are referring to the increased social cohesion which accrues to 
national groupings in relations o f opposition. In line with my analysis above, I am extending 
this notion to include the opposition between in-groups and out-groups within national 
boundaries. In fact, Mead widens the scope o f his analysis, in a similar fashion, in his essay 
"The Psychology o f Punitive Justice". See Mead, G. H., Selected Writings, (Edited: Reck, 
A.), (University o f Chicago Press, Chicago: 1964), 212-239.
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real or imagined, the assault literal or metaphorical, the effect is just the same: in a 
relation of opposition, the individual experiences himself and his group with a greater 
intensity than in any relation of inclusion (i.e., in any relation without an oppositional 
element). It is important to emphasise what is being claimed here: namely, that the 
rewards associated with a social identity which accrue in the hostile relation cannot be 
achieved to the same degree in a relation of “neighbourliness” (to borrow Mead’s 
term), even if this is neighbourliness directed to a common end.45 And further, that by 
satisfying, in this fashion, the individual’s desire for identity and solidity of being, 
opposition and conflict are rewarding and valuable in themselves.
Many aspects of social reality and forms of social behaviour can be analysed in these 
kinds of terms. In this respect, one might consider, for example: (i) the relations 
within and between opposing sets of football supporters;46 (ii) Durkheim’s discoveiy 
that suicide rates decline during the years of war;47 and (iii) that the Falklands-Factor 
transformed the electoral fortunes of the Conservative Party in 1982-1983.48 One 
might also recall the fictional Burghers of Sartre’s Nausea, who “founded the 
Federation of Bouville Ship-owners and Merchants to unite in a powerful group all 
men of goodwill, to co-operate in the task of national recovery, and to hold in check 
the parties of disorder...” 49
45 Of course, this is not to claim that there is no pay-off, in terms o f the reaffirmation o f 
identity, in such a relation. Clearly, an event such as "Live Aid" (an event o f live popular 
music, organised by Bob Geldof in 1985, to raise money for people starving in Africa), 
which can be understood as neighbourliness to a common end, has a significant pay-off in 
this sense. However, it is possible to argue that such an event is constructed in opposition to 
poverty, "Western greed", the establishment, and so on.
46 The concept o f deindividuation, used in the analysis o f crowd behaviour, seems particularly 
pertinent in this respect. This refers to the loss o f personal identity which occurs when the 
individual becomes an anonymous member o f a crowd. In such a state, an individual's 
problems o f identity are solved; being defined by the crowd he attains a degree o f solidity o f 
being which approaches that attained by an In-itself. The concept o f deindividuation was first 
proposed by Festinger, L., Pepitone, A. and Newcomb, T. M., “Some consequences o f 
deindividuation in a group”, Journal o f Abnormal and Social Psychology, (1952), 47, 383- 
89.
47 And, more generally, the concept o f egoistic suicide, where "the individual self asserts itself 
to excess in the face o f the social self and at its expense...[cited in Giddens, A., Capitalism 
and Modem Social Theory, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1971), 84]." See 
Durkheim, E., Suicide: A Study in Sociology, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London: 1970).
48 See, for example, Hall, S. and Jacques, M., The Politics o f Thatcherism, (Lawrence and 
Wishart, London: 1983), 257-288.
49 Sartre, J-P., Nausea, (Penguin, Harmondsworth: 1963), 122.
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The fact that there is an interest in opposition and conflict renders a conflict free 
society, Marxist or otherwise, inconceivable. The continued existence of social groups 
and structures in any post-capitalist formation guarantees that this too will be 
experienced as comprising in-groups and out-groups. These groups necessarily remain 
a potential source of opposition and conflict because in the antagonistic relation they 
are experienced more acutely by their members, and the consequent pay-off in terms 
of the reaffirmation of the self goes some way to satisfying the demand of the solitary 
relation for a solidity of being. In opposition Man is made real; and in conflict, real or 
imagined, the petty divisions and concerns of yesterday melt away, as the barrier 
which separates consciousness from consciousness is transcended.50 There are no 
moral equivalents51 to opposition and conflict and it is this which guarantees their 
continuing significance, and which rules out the emergence of a conflict free society.
The impossibility of the emergence of a conflict-free society is further demonstrated if 
one considers how these arguments dovetail with those made in the previous chapter. 
In this respect, perhaps the first point to note is that the conflict between in-group and 
out-group normally occurs entirely at the level of the normative sphere; or, more 
precisely, entirely at the level of competing typificatory frameworks. As I noted above, 
within the folkways of an in-group, the out-group is at best marginalised and at worst
50 The poet Lawrence Binyon greeted the advent o f the first World War with the following 
words:
Now in thy splendour go before us,
Spirit o f England, ardent-eyed,
Enkindle this dear earth that bore us,
In the hour o f peril purified.
The cares we hugged drop out of vision,
Our hearts with deeper thoughts dilate.
We slip from days o f sour division 
Into the grandeur o f our fate.
Excerpt from Binyon, L., "The Fourth o f August”, in Gardner, B., (Ed.), Up The Line To 
Death: The War Poets, (Methuen, London: 1986), 7.
51 William James' expression, o f course. I should point out that James thinks that there lies a 
possible moral alternative to war, in a community army, conscripted to do battle against 
nature. See James, W., “The moral equivalent o f war” International Conciliation, (1910), 
27, 495-498.
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treated with derision and scorn. This point is easily understood if one considers, for 
example, the various disparaging epithets employed by national, religious, racial and 
sexual groups to belittle those who remain outside their bounds; and, as another
52example, one might note that political discourse is, by its very nature, conflictual, 
and will embody a full range of normative judgements which can be employed to 
discredit the dissenters associated with out-groups. In general, an in-group will employ 
the beliefs and values of its folkways to counter the threat posed by the existence of 
out-groups. The normative sphere, forming part of the armoury of the in-group, is 
essential for the group’s integrity.
In line with the analysis of the previous chapter, the threat posed to an in-group by an 
out-group derives, in part, from the simple existence of alternative and competing sets 
of typifications and relevances. The reality of the world of the in-group remains taken- 
for-granted and unproblematic for as long as it is uncontradicted. In this context, the 
out-group, with its differing norms, values, customs and habits, brings into question 
this taken-for-grantedness. It threatens the integrity of the in-group and undermines the 
protective and legitimating structures of this group’s normative order.53 But, at the 
same time, the out-group, as we have seen, is a source of identity and cohesion for the 
in-group. Thus, put simply, the out-group both threatens and confirms the reality of the 
in-group.
In this sense, the relationship between in-group and out-group is analogous to that 
between Hegel’s Master and Slave. It is in the interests of the in-group to subordinate 
the out-group, since the out-group threatens the integrity of the in-group. However, the 
destruction of the out-group is strategically irrelevant, since it deprives the in-group of 
the source of its identity. In this respect, it is significant that the conflict between these 
groups normally takes place entirely at the level of the normative sphere, since to 
subordinate a social group from within this realm is to preserve the moment of 
otherness,54 It is worth considering for a moment what it means to subordinate an out­
52 This is so, at least to the extent that political discourse is directed towards securing or 
maintaining power in the face o f opposition (real or imagined).
53 Obviously, the degree to which an out-group poses a threat to an in-group depends, in part, 
on the extent o f the difference between their respective folkways.
54 Nietzsche’s comments about the spiritualisation o f  enmity are interesting in this respect: “It 
consists in profoundly grasping the value o f having enemies... Almost every party grasps that
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group from within the normative sphere; or more specifically, from within the realm of 
value-orientations. Centrally, this involves subjecting and binding the out-group to the 
folkways of the in-group - to the world-view and definitions comprised therein - in 
such a way as to render the out-group explicable and non-threatening;55 it is to assimi­
late the out-group within the relative natural conception o f the world of the in-group. 
To this extent, it is a negation, not of the out-group in its exteriority, which would 
cancel its otherness, but of the world-view that this group suggests.
It will also be remembered that I argued in the previous chapter that in the realm of 
value-orientations the individual seeks the imaginative mastery of the external-world. 
It is clear that we can understand the attempts of the in-group to subordinate the out­
group in similar terms. However, in the case of a social group, it is an entirely 
abstracted conception - the negation that the in-group achieves must be reconstituted 
as the sum of the imagined negations of its individual members. In this respect, the 
important point is that it is the image of the out-group, imaginatively constructed out 
of the social stock of knowledge, which for the individual constitutes the negation. The 
efficacy of a purely imaginary negation, as I have previously indicated, is based on the 
fact that uncontradicted experiences will appear, within a finite province of meaning, 
to be as real as anything. The beliefs and values of the realm of value-orientations, as I 
noted in the previous chapter, are subject to a specific epoche, namely, a suspension of 
doubt in their reality and validity. Consequently, the characteristics ascribed to an out­
group within this realm will appear as simple empirical facts about this group. 
However, it should be noted that judgements of this sort are not subject to the same 
on-going verification as are, let us say, those of the world of working and, as a
it is in the interest o f its own self-preservation that the opposing party should not decay in 
strength; the same is true o f grand politics. A new creation in particular, the new Reich for 
instance, has more need o f enemies than friends: only in opposition does it feel itself 
necessary, only in opposition does it become necessary... [Nietzsche, 1990: 53-54].”
55 In fact, this is more complicated than it might at first appear. The in-group will bind the out­
group to its folkways so that the latter poses no threat to the "truth” o f the world as defined 
by the in-group. However, at certain times, it may be necessary for the in-group to portray the 
out-group as a simple threat, in order to motivate its members (i.e., the members o f the in­
group) to resistance. Nevertheless, this in no sense implies that die value or "correctness" o f 
die folkways o f the in-group will be questioned. Indeed, quite the opposite is the case - it will 
be stressed that it is in order to protect the traditions o f die in-group that the very real threat 
of the out-group must countered.
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consequence, being vulnerable to empirical contradiction,56 require constant renewal - 
for example, by reference to a broader framework of meaning.
Of course, this emphasis upon the imaginary dimension of a negation is not to deny 
that there will be occasions when the conflict between in-group and out-group 
becomes overt and violent. Indeed, as I have already noted, on occasions like these 
there is an increased pay-off to subjectivity in terms of the reaffirmation of both 
individual and group identity. Once again it is possible to draw parallels with Hegel’s 
analysis of the progress of self-consciousness towards self-certainty. The individual, 
risking his own life on behalf of his social group, not only confirms his status as being- 
for-himself, but also cements his identity with the group and reaffirms that the group is 
fully expressive of him. Similarly, in this type of conflictual relation, the identity and 
integrity of the in-group is enhanced, both in the risk that is posed to its existence and 
in that it demonstrates, by the very act of putting itself at risk, that it is the master of its
cn
own possibilities. However, it should be noted that even in these overtly conflictual 
situations there is a significant aspect of the identity which accrues to the respective 
social groups which is purely imaginary. For the many, who do not on a daily basis 
participate in actual conflict, the threat to themselves and to their in-group is 
imaginary, and the risk to their lives, through identification with the combatants, is 
vicarious. Of course, this does not in any way nullify the ability of overt conflict to 
unite a social group. As I argued above, it does not matter whether a foe is real or 
imagined, an assault literal or metaphorical, the effect is just the same: in a conflictual 
relation, the individual experiences himself and his group with a greater intensity than 
in a non-conflictual relation.
In sum, therefore, it is my argument that a conflict-free society is impossible: firstly, 
because the threat posed by the out-group threatens the integrity of the in-group; and
56 For an example o f such empirical contradiction, and o f the disjunction between expectation 
and actuality, see Modris Eksteins' treatment o f the 1914 Christmas truce, where the British 
and German soldiers came face to face with those they had been shooting at across the 
trenches (Ekstein, M., Rites o f Spring: The Great War and the Birth o f the Modem Age, 
(Black Swan, London: 1990), 176-183; particularly, 180-182.
57 In this respect, note also Randall Collins' argument that: "The group that faces death together 
has a special bond. It is a "community o f political destiny" o f a sort matched by no other. 
Such groups acquire a solidarity deriving from a "community o f memories" deeper than 
ethnic, linguistic, or other cultural ties [Collins, R., 1986: 156]."
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secondly, because in the conflictual relation the solidity of the in-group is enhanced, 
with the consequences: (i) that the threat posed by the out-group is diminished; and (ii) 
that there is a pay-off in terms of the ability of the in-group to deliver ontological 
security to its members.
Needless to say, the significance of these kinds of arguments is not restricted to 
analyses concerning the possibility of certain future types of society. They are also 
significant for understanding political forms and processes as they unfold in present 
day societies, and the remaining chapters will be devoted to exploring precisely these 
kinds of themes. Of course, it should be stated that Marxist theorists - especially those 
influenced by Gramsci - are quite aware that understanding the issues surrounding 
subjectivity is important for political analysis. However, significantly, the Marxist 
problematic must necessarily restrict the depth to which the analysis of subjectivity 
can proceed For example, it is one thing to argue that any viable Marxist account must 
take note of the role that social groups play in the construction of personality, but it is 
quite another to maintain, as I do, that there are significant “existential facts” about 
consciousness which become manifest in social action. Crudely, in order to remain 
true to the materialist conception of history, Marxist analysis must remain firmly 
rooted in society, and can afford to have little truck with dynamics that issue directly
f O
from consciousness. However, the difficulty, of course, is that there are no grounds 
for such restriction; subjectivity cannot be reduced to solely those aspects of the self 
which can be explicated in terms of the societal relation. As philosophers since 
Descartes have appreciated, consciousness commands its own, and irreducible, aspect 
of reality.59 Therefore, to the extent that Marxists do not address this, their account 
remains necessarily partial.
58 See Balbus, I., Marxism and Domination, (Princeton University Press, New Jersey: 1982), 
chapter 5, for a discussion o f the problems entailed in a Freudo-Marxist synthesis (this is 
analogous because o f the human subject/societal tension).
591 am aware that this is still a matter o f controversy. For example, J. B. Watson claimed that 
thought processes are the product o f the tiny movements o f the speech apparatus; and, more 
significantly, Gilbert denied that the individual’s life is "a double series o f events taking place 
in two different kinds o f stuff (i.e., the physical and the mental)...[Ryle, G., 1949: 160].” 
Nevertheless, in line with my analysis in Chapter 2, I feel justified in my claim that 
consciousness is not reducible to society.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have been concerned to demonstrate some of the inadequacies of 
political analyses which do not pay sufficient regard to issues of consciousness, 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity. To do this, I have critically examined Marxist 
treatments of the state and also the idea that capitalism will be transcended by a 
conflict-free society. The grounds of my critique of the Marxist approach have been 
broadly as follows:
1. There is, in Marxist theory, an inadequate specification of the relationship between 
social structure and social action, which results in the kinds of dispute that engaged 
Miliband and Poulantzas.
2. To the extent that the Marxist approach precludes a serious analysis of the nature of 
self-reflective consciousness, subjectivity is inadequately theorised. Consequently, 
there can be no satisfactory account of social action in either capitalist or post­
capitalist society; and, it follows, no convincing theoretical specification of either 
society.
3. The Marxist account pays scant regard to the diverse and bounded nature of the 
social world. Consequently, it is unable to theorise the role that discrete social 
groups and formations play in the construction of subjectivity. Therefore, there can 
be no convincing theoretical statement of the conditions necessary for the 
emergence of genuinely revolutionary and liberatory consciousness.
More positively, I have attempted, in this chapter, to show how the socio-existential 
dynamics of subjectivity are mediated by the experience of a social world which 
apparently comprises in-groups and out-groups; and I have argued that this has 
significant consequences for the character of inter-group relations. Specifically, I have 
claimed that conflict is an inevitable characteristic of the social world: firstly, because 
oppositions between in-group and out-group are a macro-transformation of the original 
conflictual relation between consciousness and consciousness; and secondly, because 
in the conflictual relation, the individual enjoys a heightened sense of the reality of the
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in-group, which goes some way to meet the demand of the solitary relation for a 
solidity of being.
In subsequent chapters, I will to continue to explore the socio-existential dynamics of 
subjectivity and their relationship to political forms and processes. However, in 
contrast to the largely critical tenor of this chapter, I will shift to a more positive 
emphasis, in order to demonstrate how an understanding of consciousness, subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity can contribute substantively to a theorisation of specific political 
phenomena.
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CHAPTER FIVE: RITUAL AND POLITICS
It will be clear by now that one of the central claims of this thesis is that individuals 
achieve a certain solidity of being by means of their membership of various social 
groups. In this respect, I noted, in Chapter 3, the significance of the realm of value- 
orientations, arguing that upon entering this realm, the individual is transported to the 
very heart of the social groups of which he is a member. In the realm of value- 
orientations, I claimed, he celebrates the identities which he shares with his fellow- 
men, and to this extent transcends the bounds of the solitary relation. I argued that this 
can be expressed in terms of one of the characteristics of a finite province of meaning, 
namely, as a specific form of sociality. The world of value-orientations is a world of 
imagined intersubjectivity, a world which implicates one’s fellow-men. In this sense, 
therefore, it functions to reaffirm the social identities of those individuals who occupy 
it.
In my discussion of political discourse in that chapter, I considered some of the 
implications for political analysis of this ability of individuals to find an imagined 
intersubjectivity within the realm of value-orientations. Essentially, it was my claim 
that individuals gain social identities, transcending the solitary relation, insofar as they 
are able to embrace the themes of particular political discourses. In doing so, they both 
locate themselves in the world, and signal (to themselves) the identities which they 
share with their fellow-men. In this chapter, I wish to look at these sorts of issues from 
a slightly different angle. Specifically, I wish to consider whether the intersubjectivity 
attained within the realm of value-orientations is purely and inevitably imaginary, or 
whether, instead, there is a sense in which this is “real”, being grounded in processes 
and phenomena which are intrinsically social, and I want to consider these issues 
primarily through an analysis of ritual.
The first point to make is perhaps an obvious one, that is, that the realm of value-
orientations is, like all finite provinces of meaning, a private sphere, belonging to the
interiority of consciousness. There are two points worth noting in this respect: (i) it
follows that this realm - and indeed, more broadly, the normative sphere - can only be
abstractly related to a particular social group (usually in terms of an ideal-typical or
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average-type construction); and (ii) one must reject any neo-Durkheimian suggestion 
that the normative sphere is an emergent social fact, and particularly, the idea that 
society, through its collective sentiments, can become conscious of itself.1 However, 
the inwardness of the realm of value-orientations does not preclude the possibility that 
there might be aspects of this realm which are more than simply imaginatively social. 
Indeed, there is a sense in which this realm is inextricably bound to the social world, in 
that, as I suggested above, the beliefs and values which comprise it are socially 
derived. In this respect, one might consider that we are bom into an:
inter-subjective world which existed long before our birth, experienced 
and interpreted by others, our predecessors, as an organized world....All 
interpretation of this world is based upon a stock of previous 
experiences of it, our own experiences and those handed down to us by 
our parents and teachers, which in the form of “knowledge at hand” 
function as a scheme of reference.
Thus, society confronts every particular individual as an apparently external and 
objective reality, a reality which is then reappropriated as a stock of knowledge at 
hand.3 It follows, therefore, that the beliefs and values used in the realm of value- 
orientations are a product of this reality. Hence, whilst the private nature of this realm 
means that the experience of intersubjectivity attained by embracing the beliefs and 
values of an in-group is purely imaginary, the objects of this experience, the beliefs 
and values themselves, are rooted squarely in the very “real” intersubjectivity of the 
social world.
However, in terms of the interests of this work, there is a more interesting sense in 
which the realm of value-orientations is grounded in intersubjectivity. It will be 
remembered that the paramount world of everyday-life, the world of working, is
1 See, for example, Durkheim, E., The Elementary Forms o f  Religious Life, 2nd Edition, 
(George Allen & Unwin: London: 1976), 422.
2 Schutz, A., On Phenomenology and Social Relations, (Edited: Wagner, H. R.), (University o f 
Chicago Press, Chicago and London: 1970), 72.
3 In this respect, see also, Berger, P., The Social Reality o f Religion, (Faber and Faber, London:
1969), 3-4.
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subject to a process of on-going verification, whereby its reality is continually affirmed 
by the pervasive utility of pragmatic action.4 Therefore, built into the very structure of 
this world are the mechanisms of its own legitimation and renewal. However, this is 
not the case with the realm of value-orientations. The beliefs and values of this realm 
are not subject to a pragmatic imperative, consequently, the issue of instru­
mental/material utility seldom arises in questions about validity. Moreover, these 
beliefs and values often deal with precisely those aspects of social reality which are 
not amenable to the pragmatic attitude (i.e., the “why?” questions of social life), 
therefore, in terms of the legitimation of this realm, empirical validity is of little 
consequence. As a result, in contrast to the world of working which attains on-going 
legitimation through the efficacy of pragmatic action, the realm of value-orientations 
must ultimately look beyond itself for verification and renewal.5
There are a number of important implications of the fact that this realm is not subject 
to inevitable, on-going verification. Particularly, it lends a certain fragility to the 
beliefs and values which are found there, since these are deprived of the ultimate 
legitimation that they work (that is, they do not “work” in the same sense as the 
habitual knowledge of the world of working). Thus, for example, it is possible to bring 
these into question by the simple posing of an alternative framework of beliefs and 
values, since this demonstrates the contingency of the first.6 Obviously, should this 
fragility be exposed then the ability of the realm of value-orientations to protect the 
individual and society from the perils of various forms of existential anxiety will be 
compromised. In the face of this threat, this realm retains its integrity through two 
related processes. Firstly, by the fact of on-going socialisation, which means that the 
beliefs and values associated with the folkways of a particular social group are 
continually reinforced through the operation of the social stock of knowledge and its 
associated mechanisms of transmission. Importantly, it is this which makes possible 
the employment of counter-measures against perceived threats to the integrity of the
4 See Chapter 3, 68.
5 1 say "ultimately", because associated with every particular framework o f beliefs and values 
there will be a set o f defensive strategies and concepts (see Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., The 
Social Construction o f  Reality, (Penguin: Harmondsworth: 1966), 122-134). However, in the 
final analysis, the effectiveness o f these strategies and concepts depends upon the integrity o f 
the framework that they are employed to protect.
6 See, for example, Berger, P. and Luckmann, T., (Penguin: Harmondsworth: 1966), 126.
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realm of value-orientations7 And secondly, through the operation of ceremonial 
reaffirmation, that is, through collective and ritualistic celebration of the in-group and 
its folkways. It is to this form of “universe maintenance”, in order to demonstrate the 
second sense in which the realm of value-orientations is grounded in intersubjectivity, 
that I now wish to turn my attention.
Ritual
To anticipate, I will argue that ritual functions to bind individuals to the folkways 
which define their in-groups. It does so, firstly, because it is an experience in 
intersubjectivity, and secondly, because it is oriented to a socially defined symbolic 
order, which it celebrates. Furthermore, I wish to argue that ritual will often have 
number of more specific political functions: (i) many collective political phenomena, 
for example, elections, party conferences, mass rallies, etc., can be understood in terms 
of an analysis of ritual; (ii) ritual can be used to reinforce, but also to challenge, 
existing political arrangements; and (iii) it can be used by a particular social group - 
for example, a nation, a political party or a group of striking workers - to construct a 
unity, to build support, to engender acquiescence, etc., in the pursuit of a particular 
aim.
However, before exploring these aspects of ritual, it is first necessary to establish a 
working definition of the term. Ritual, in the sense in which the term will be employed 
here, refers to celebratory, collective action, which is oriented towards objects, real or 
imagined, that are, in some sense, set apart from the mundane world of everyday-life.8 
Examples of ritual occasions include, a Sunday morning church service, the laying of 
wreaths at the Cenotaph on Remembrance Day, and the singing of National Anthems 
at major sporting occasions. It is important to distinguish between religious ritual and
Berger and Luckmann, in their discussion o f conceptual machineries o f  [symbolic] universe 
maintenance, identify two sorts o f strategies; namely, therapy and nihilation [see Berger, P. 
and Luckmann, T., The Social Construction o f Reality, (Penguin: Harmondsworth: 1966), 
130-134].
8 See Bocock, R., Ritual in Industrial Society, (George Allen & Unwin, London: 1974), 60. It 
should be noted that the term ritual is also employed to refer to those regular and repeated 
actions o f everyday-life which by virtue o f their associated meanings function as a mode of 
communication (e.g., a handshake, the act o f dressing in a certain fashion, etc.). If I use the 
term in this sense, I will say so.
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civic ritual, the former being ritual activity which is directed towards the sacred order 
(e.g., a church service), and the latter being that which is directed to the secular world 
(e.g., the singing of the National Anthem).9 I am primarily interested in the second of 
these forms of ritual. However, I wish to begin this analysis more generally, by 
examining Emile Durkheim’s treatment of ritual.10
Underlying many of the arguments which follow in this section is the claim that an 
individual is able to achieve in a collective celebration a state of consciousness which 
is qualitatively different from those characteristic of everyday working-life. According 
to Durkheim, Man is transformed by the intensity of collective experience: “...Vital 
energies are over-excited, passions more active, sometimes stronger; there are even 
some which are produced only at this moment [Durkheim, 1976: 422.].” Therefore, 
there is a reality to collective life, an effervescence, which lifts Man above his 
condition as a mere man.11 For Durkheim, the first consequence of this transformation 
is that Man looks to his immediate environment to account for his changed experience. 
Thus, he attributes to those objects with which he is in most direct contact, qualities 
which lift them from the world of the profane into the world of the sacred. “In a word, 
above the real world where his profane life passes he has placed another...to which he 
attributes a higher sort of dignity than to the first [Durkheim, 1976: 422].” The 
important point is that the objects of the sacred realm, as a result of their association 
with the mana12 produced in collective celebration, come to represent both this sacred 
energy and, more generally, the collectivity. Consequently, they provide an enduring
9 This distinction is important in modem industrial societies. In this instance, I mean the sacred 
order to refer to those beliefs and practices that concern the supernatural/cosmological (e.g., 
in Christianity, a personal divinity). However, it should be noted that it is not possible to 
equate the religious with the sacred. For example, in Durkheim's work, whilst the sacred is 
defined in terms o f its opposition to the profane, it is quite possible for the secular world to 
partake o f the sacred. Chi this point, see Alexander, J. C., The Antinomies o f  Classical 
Thought: Marx and Durkheim, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London: 1982), 242-250.
10 For my analysis o f Durkheim's work on ritual, I rely heavily on Alexander J. C., (Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, London: 1982), 233-250; and 259-287.
11 See, for example, Durkheim, E., The Elementary Forms o f Religious Life, 2nd Edition, 
(George Allen & Unwin: London: 1976), 416-422.
12 Mana is the term used by, for example, North American Indians, to describe the energy that 
is produced in ritualistic celebration. In this respect, the following quotation is informative: 
"When they are once come together, a sort o f electricity is formed by their collecting which 
quickly transports them to an extraordinary degree o f exaltation. Every sentiment expressed 
finds a place without resistance in all the minds, which are very open to outside impressions; 
each re-echoes the others, and is re-echoed by the others. The initial impulse thus proceeds, 
growing as it goes, as an avalanche grows in its advance [Durkheim, 1976: 215-216]."
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link between the individual and the source of this energy, namely, collective life. This 
means that the emotions experienced in a collective celebration can be reproduced 
simply by association with the sacred object. Thus:
The believer who has communicated with his god is not merely a man 
who sees new truths of which the unbeliever is ignorant: he is a man 
who is “stronger”. He feels within him more force, either to endure the 
trials of existence, or to conquer them. It is as though he were raised 
above the miseries of the world, because he is raised above his 
condition as man.13
Therefore, by communion with the sacred object, the individual is made one with his 
society.
In the simple societies which concern Durkheim in The Elementary Forms o f  
Religious Life, the sacred object (i.e., the totem) is normally a relatively insignificant 
animal or plant. Therefore, it derives its efficacy as a source of social cohesion purely 
from the fact that it gives material expression to collective sentiments. In these 
societies, as a consequence of the ubiquity of religion within the sphere of collective 
representations,14 this object is also always a religious object. However, this is not the 
case in those more advanced societies where there exist scientific, political, moral and 
legal frameworks which are relatively distinct from the religious sphere. As we have 
seen, the sacredness of an object consists in the fact that it expresses the energy of the 
collectivity. For Durkheim, this sacredness is manifest in the separateness of sacred 
objects, and in the system of interdictions15 which, by maintaining this separateness, 
prevent the denial of these objects. Thus, the distinctive characteristic of sacred 
objects is that “the society which professes them does not permit its members to deny
13 Durkheim, E., The Elementary Forms o f Religious Life, 2nd Edition, (George Allen & 
Unwin: London: 1976), 416.
14 It is by means o f collective representations that a collectivity represents to itself its own 
collective existence. Collective representations are often material things, as in the case o f a 
totem; however, they can also be abstract ideas, beliefs, etc.
15 Durkheim gives the name "negative cult" to the system o f negative rites/taboos which 
maintain the separateness o f the sacred realm.
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them.”16 It is clear that if one accepts this conception of the sacred then there are 
secular phenomena which share in this characteristic. In this respect, Durkheim talks 
of “common beliefs of every sort connected to objects that are secular in appearance, 
such as the flag, one’s country, some form of political organisation, certain heroes or 
historical events,” which are “in a certain manner, indistinguishable from beliefs that 
are properly religious.”17 More specifically, he points to the motherland, the French
1 ftRevolution and Joan of Arc as secular instances of sacred things. Such phenomena, 
just as truly religious phenomena, are protected against contamination by the profane: 
“Public opinion does not willingly allow one to contest the moral superiority of 
democracy, the reality of progress, [or] the idea of equality, just as the Christian does 
not allow his fundamental dogmas to be questioned.”19 In fact, this interpenetration of 
the sacred and the secular is an inevitable consequence of Durkheim’s wider 
theoretical stance. All collective beliefs, whether religious or secular, necessarily 
partake of the sacred, quite simply because they embody the collective effervescence 
of voluntary association, which itself is the basis of social order.
This relation between the sacred and the secular can be further illustrated by 
considering the functioning of ritual in secular society. We have seen that sacred 
objects have the power to transform the individual, to carry him right to the heart of 
collective experience. However, the power of these objects is not inviolable - it is 
subject to deterioration and extinction. According to Durkheim, the collective 
representations which constitute sacred objects:
attain their greatest intensity at the moment when men are assembled 
together and are in immediate relations with one another, when they all 
share the same idea and the same sentiment. But when the assembly has
16 Cited in Alexander, J. C., The Antinomies o f Classical Thought: Marx and Durkheim, 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, London: 1982), 237.
17 Cited in Alexander, J. C., (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London: 1982), 238.
18 See Alexander, J. C., (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London: 1982), 238.
19 Cited in Alexander, J. C., (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London: 1982), 238.
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broken up and each man has returned to his own peculiar life, they
20progressively lose their original energy.
Consequently, it is necessary periodically to renew these representations, in order that 
the sacred objects to which they are attached are reinvigorated. This is achieved 
through positive rites (or rituals) which “retemper them in the very source of the 
religious life, that is to say, in assembled groups [Durkheim, 1976: 346].” The 
important point is that this applies not only to those representations which are properly 
religious, but also to those of secular society, for “...There can be no society which 
does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective 
sentiments and collective ideas which make its unity and personality [Durkheim, 1976: 
427].” This is the end to which various occasions of civic ritual are directed, and 
these, Durkheim argues, “do not differ from regular religious ceremonies, either in 
their object, the results which they produce, or the processes employed to attain these 
results [Durkheim, 1976: 427].” Thus, by means of the revivifying effect of civic 
ritual, the social group is able to reaffirm its collective identity and to renew the sacred 
character of its collective sentiments.
It is now possible to make a number of comments concerning the intersubjective 
grounding of the realm of value-orientations. It will be remembered that I have argued 
that the beliefs and values of this sphere are bound to the social world to the extent 
that they are derived from the typificatory frameworks associated with particular social 
groups. However, it is clear that from a Durkheimian perspective these beliefs and 
values are much more radically grounded in the social milieu than I had previously 
considered. According to this view, these do more than simply order and legitimise the 
institutional sphere. In addition, they are an expression of the general effervescence of 
voluntary association, that is, they represent collective experience.21 Moreover, for
20 Durkheim, E., The Elementary Forms o f  Religious Life, 2nd Edition, (George Allen & 
Unwin: London: 1976), 345.
21 Note that for Durkheim this applies just as much to beliefs, values, ideals, etc., as it does to 
material (totemic) objects: "It is, in fact, at [such] moments o f collective ferment that are bom 
the great ideals upon which civilisations rest. The periods o f creation or renewal occur when 
men for various reasons are led into a closer relationship with each other, when reunions and 
assemblies are most frequent, relationships better maintained and the exchange o f ideas most 
active....At such moments this higher form o f life is lived with such intensity and 
exclusiveness that it monopolises all minds to the more or less complete exclusion o f egoism 
and the commonplace. At such times the ideal tends to become one with the real, and for this
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their continued efficacy, they require periodic renewal within the emotional 
intersubjectivity of ritualistic association. Thus, from this perspective, the beliefs and 
values of the realm of value-orientations are in a very real sense collective phenomena. 
However, the important question concerns the individual’s experience of this realm; 
that is, whether this experience remains necessarily private. The answer to this 
question largely depends on how consciousness is transformed by voluntary 
association. It has been my claim to now that the individual is always fundamentally 
estranged from his fellow-man. However, for Durkheim, this is not the case - in 
voluntary association he transcends himself to attain real sociality. Now, if Durkheim 
is correct in this assertion, and, moreover, the individual is able to recapture this 
sociality by imaginatively orienting himself to beliefs and values which have a sacred 
character, then it is possible that the individual might attain an intersubjectivity within 
the realm of value-orientations which is more than simply imaginatively social. 
However, for the moment, I wish to defer judgement on this question, suffice it to say 
that the transformative power of ritual, deriving from high levels of moral density and 
emotional intensity, offers perhaps the best chance of attaining “real” intersubjectivity 
within a realm which is necessarily private.
To date, I have demonstrated that ritual functions to reaffirm and revivify the social 
group, and that it does so, firstly, because it is an experience in intersubjectivity - one 
which lifts Man above his condition as mere man; and secondly, because it celebrates 
a symbolic order which itself represents and expresses collective-life. It should also be 
clear that ritual plays an important role in the individual’s search for a solidity of being 
- by binding him to the folkways of his social group, which it at the same time 
reinforces. Moreover, it should be noted that this role has increased significance if one 
concludes that the sacred character of the beliefs and values of the realm of value- 
orientations means that the individual might attain “real” intersubjectivity within this 
private sphere. In general, it is fair to say that ritual derives its overriding importance 
from integrative abilities which necessarily operate both at the level of society and 
individual consciousness. This general integrative function can be seen clearly if one
reason men have the impression that the time is close when the ideal will in fact be realised 
and the Kingdom o f God established on earth [Durkheim, 1953: 91-92].”
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examines how ritual operates within the political sphere, and it is to this that I will 
now turn my attention.
Political Ritual
According to Randall Collins, there is an organic relationship between ritual and 
politics, that is, politics itself is ritual.22 In this section, I wish to analyse some 
instances where this is clearly the case. Specifically, I will: (i) consider the place that 
ritual occupies within the activities of a political party; (ii) examine how nation states 
use ritual to ensure legitimacy in the eyes of their populations; and (iii) in order to 
draw together some of the ideas developed under the two headings above, undertake 
an analysis of the functioning of ritual in one particular historical context, namely, the 
years of the German Third Reich (1933-1945). Having explored these areas, I will be 
in a position to draw some conclusions concerning the relations between politics, ritual 
and the realm of value-orientations.
The ubiquity of ritual in political life stems, in part, from two related sets of demands. 
Firstly, there are those demands associated with group formation and group identity - 
these centre on the requirement that a minimum degree of identity must be attained by 
any group which seeks to make an impact on the political stage. Secondly, there are 
those demands associated with the notion of legitimacy, where this denotes the extent 
to which the functioning of a social group within a specific sphere is accepted by those 
who are implicated in this functioning:23 if one accepts that every group with political 
intentions seeks some degree of legitimacy, then this concern becomes fundamental in 
mediating their relation to wider society. The precise nature of this relation will be 
influenced by a number of factors, which include: (i) whether the spheres within which 
the particular group operates are ostensibly “democratic” (where the importance of 
legitimacy is institutionalised); (ii) whether the group is ruling, seeks to rule, or is 
looking merely to exert some influence over policy making; and (iii) whether the 
group has access to the forces of coercion.
See Collins, R., "The Durkheimian tradition in conflict sociology", in Alexander, J. C., (Ed.), 
Durkheimian sociology: cultural studies, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1988), 
107-128 (see particularly, 115-119).
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The important point is that both sets of demands (i.e., for group identity and political 
legitimacy) will in some degree be met by the functioning of ritual. Consequently, 
ritual activity is integral to the conduct of political life. Collins expresses this general 
argument as follows:
The key points are that ritual is the mechanism by which solidarity 
groups are both formed and mobilized: hence that ritual creates the 
actors of politics; and that ritual is a weapon usable by some groups to 
dominate others, by manipulating emotional solidarity as well as the 
lines of group identification to the advantage of some and the 
disadvantage of others. Politics may thus be described as a struggle by, 
with, and over “the means of emotional production”.24
Thus, according to this view, ritual is the lifeblood of political activity - it is a 
mechanism of both struggle and renewal. In concrete terms, this can be illustrated by 
considering the place that it occupies in the activities of a political party.
The political party, like all abstract constructions, is an imagined entity.25 However, 
the representations which constitute it are grounded in the reality of collective and 
ritualistic experience. In this respect, one might note the important role played, for 
example, by constituency party meetings and annual conferences, as arenas of 
collective experience within which members can renew their commitment to the party. 
Annual conferences, in particular, are highly ritualistic affairs, whose symbolic 
function is perhaps more significant than any purported decision-making role.26 These
Functioning, in this context, refers normally, but not necessarily, to the rule o f a social group.
24 Collins, R., "The Durkheimian tradition in conflict sociology", in Alexander, J. C., (Ed.), 
Durkheimian sociology: cultural studies, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 
1988), 117
25 That is, the political party is imaginatively constructed out o f the typifications and relevances 
employed by individual social actors. In that individuals act towards this imagined entity - 
note W. I. Thomas' dictum, "if men define situations as real they are real in their 
consequences" - complexes o f action emerge, which, when apprehended and specified 
abstractly, signal the reality o f the political party for both social scientists and lay social 
actors alike. In this respect, see also my discussion o f the imaginative status of the state, 
Chapter 4, 102-104. It should be noted that in the following discussion, unless otherwise 
stated, concrete references will be to British party politics.
26 This applies certainly to the annual conference o f the Conservative Party, which has no 
formal decision-making powers (at the level o f policy-making). It is not so obviously the case
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are demonstrations of collective solidarity - addressed to friend and foe, member and 
non-member alike - which make full use of a whole range of symbolic gestures and 
activities, including slogans, emblems, staged applause and the singing of party 
“anthems”.27 They constitute a collective arena within which the ideals and 
philosophies which are central to party identity can be reaffirmed, and, consequently, 
they play an important role in defining and redefining the lines of political struggle. 
Within the collective effervescence characteristic of such occasions, the themes of 
political discourse assume, for party devotees, a sacred character. Whatever doubts had 
been ushered in by the contingency of the previous year’s events, these will be 
banished within the heightened emotional intensity of collective celebration, and the 
party’s ideals and philosophies, invigorated once again, take on talismanic qualities, 
protecting their bearers from the perils of existential anxiety. The general point is 
that the reality of a political party for its rank and file members is grounded in the 
intersubjectivity of its collective occasions, and that such occasions perform an 
important integrative function in revivifying the collective representations which 
constitute the party.
However, the importance of ritual in the functioning of a political party is not 
restricted to the integrative role which it plays in occasions such as the annual 
conference.29 Whilst such occasions are indeed essential in establishing the reality of
for the Labour Party, where, strictly speaking, the annual conference is the sovereign 
decision-making body. However, in practice, the Parliamentary Labour Party retains 
considerable decision-making autonomy. See Miliband, R., Capitalist Democracy in Britain, 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1982), 69-71.
27 With regard to American political life, note, in this respect, the 1992 pre-election Democratic 
and Republican conventions.
28 I have deliberately exaggerated the reinvigorating and integrative powers o f the party 
conference for the purposes o f illustration.
29 Other occasions include not only constituency party meetings (as mentioned above), but also 
party rallies. With respect to the latter, one might consider, for example, the stage-managed 
rally, organised by the Labour Party, that took place at Sheffield on 1st April 1992, shortly 
before the General Election. This was described by Jill Sherman o f The Times [02/04/92] as 
follows:
Music videos, flashing lights, fireworks and streamers were added to the oratory of 
Neil Kinnock as the Labour party campaign went into glitzy overdrive last night at a 
mass meeting in Sheffield that produced a strange mixture o f pop-concert and self- 
indulgent political rally.
The presidential style event cost £150,000 to stage and was attended by an audience 
o f 10,000 who paid £1 a head to see their leader in person. The party faithful were
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the party for rank and file members, for others - for example, those who have been 
elected to parliament, or those who, additionally, hold offices of state - there are 
alternative settings, all manifesting some degree of ritual behaviour, which perform 
similar functions. For these people, the reality of party politics consists, not only in 
those activities associated with the national and constituency parties, but also in the 
traditions, procedures and rituals of the various state institutions. This has a number of 
important political consequences. For example, Aneurin Bevan observed that the new 
Member of Parliament experiences a culture shock on first entering the House:
his first impression is that he is in church. The vaulted roofs and 
stained-glass windows, the rows of statues of great statesmen of the 
past, the echoing halls, the soft-footed attendants and the whispered 
conversations, contrast depressingly with the crowded meetings and the 
clang and clash of hot opinions he has just left behind in his election 
campaign. Here he is, a tribune of the people, coming to make his voice 
heard in the seats of power. Instead, it seems he is expected to worship; 
and the most conservative of all religions - ancestor worship.30
This observation suggests two important points:
bussed to the Sheffield Arena for the performance while Mr Kinnock arrived by 
helicopter.
That scene was shown on a giant video screen mounted on one side o f the stage - the 
medium by which the pop group Simply Red, the violinist Nigel Kennedy, the athlete 
Steve Cram, and other stars lent their endorsement to the party.
...[A]s the leader addressed the masses, the shadow cabinet gathered on stage to be 
presented as a government in-waiting before a grand firework finale to a jazzed up 
version o f Jerusalem.
At the end o f a day which Labour had spent celebrating its advantage in Tuesday's 
polls the extravaganza bore all the hallmarks o f an early victory celebration.
Also interesting, with respect to party rallies, is George Younger's comment that the annual 
conference o f the Scottish Conservative Party in May 1981 reminded him o f a Nuremberg 
Rally [cited in Young, H., One o f Us: Final Edition, (Pan Books, London, Sydney and 
Auckland: 1991), 273].
30 Cited in Miliband, R., Capitalist Democracy in Britain, (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 
1982), 42.
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1. That the traditions of established state institutions exert an inherently 
conservative pressure on the key actors in party politics.31 In this respect, for 
example, Ralph Miliband argues that British parliamentarism functions to 
isolate left-wing M.Ps from the radicalism of constituency activists. He points 
particularly to the conservatism of the House of Commons, and notes Bevan’s 
claim that “...The atmosphere of Parliament, its physical arrangements, its 
procedures, its semi-ecclesiastical ritual...are all profoundly intimidating for the 
products of a broad school system who are the bearers of a fiery message from 
the great industrial constituencies”.32
2. That the institutions of state perform, in addition to any decision making or 
policy implementation role, a ritualistic and symbolic function. In this respect, 
one might note Murray Edelman’s claim that government institutions provide an 
arena for the ritualisation of conflict, within which outcomes are not so much 
determined, as legitimised.33 It follows from this position, that politics, p e r  se, is 
largely ritualistic: thus, for example, electoral conflict can be seen as a mainly 
symbolic and ritualistic engagement; that is, “it engages the interest of a large 
segment of the population and legitimizes the electoral result and the 
succeeding administration...”, however, it does not “offer a reliable or major 
means of influencing instrumental payoffs through subsequent legislative, 
administrative, and judicial decision-making... [Edelman, 1971: 23].”
Thus, from this perspective, the key actors of party politics, for the most 
part, are engaged in a series of elaborate rituals, all designed for the management 
of conflict. These rituals differ from those in which the rank and file members 
participate, and, consequently, the party - and party politics generally - has a
31 By "key actors", I simply mean those individuals who occupy positions o f significance in a 
party's hierarchy - (e.g., MPs, Cabinet members, etc.). I do not mean to indicate that these 
people necessanly have special significance for political analysis.
32 See Miliband, R., Capitalist Democracy in Britain, (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 
1982), 42. The traditions and rituals o f state institutions are not only a barrier to the 
radicalism o f the Left, but also to that o f the Right.
33 See Edelman, M., Politics and Symbolic Action, (Markham Publishing Company, Chicago: 
1971), 21-24.
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different reality for these two groups.34 It is this, as I noted above, which lies 
behind the apparent radicalism of constituency parties when one compares them 
with their respective parliamentary parties. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
ritual performs a function common to both groups, in that it attaches those who 
participate to particular myths and, therefore, confers upon them a social identity 
(or social identities).35
To date, I have looked at the significance of ritual for the political party mainly in 
terms of issues of party self-identity and integration. That is, I have considered how the 
representations which constitute a political party are grounded and reaffirmed, for 
party members, in the intersubjectivity of collective experience. However, in addition 
to these sorts of questions, there are also those associated with the notion of 
legitimacy. In other words, it is necessary to explore the role which ritual plays in the 
struggle between political parties for the allegiance of a population. O f course, a 
political party can never secure the positive support of an entire population (i.e., a 
nation-state). In fact, in a parliamentary democracy, it is normally only at a general 
election that a party is required to maximise its support. At other times, it is sufficient 
merely that those who are implicated in a party’s actions accept these as legitimate. 
Thus, in the case of a ruling party, whilst the support of the people might be desirable, 
all that is necessary is that it is recognised that the party has a right to rule.37 However, 
one must be careful not to discount the significance of positive support: (i) a ruling 
group will, of course, always choose to rule by consent, on the basis of widespread
34 Interestingly, perhaps one o f the functions o f the party conference is to temporarily bridge 
this gap.
35 For a discussion o f the relation between political myth and social identity, see Chapter 3, 
82-83.
36 Obviously, the notion o f competing political parties applies only to multi-party systems o f 
government. Nevertheless, in a single party system, ritual still plays a central role in securing 
die allegiance o f the population for the ruling party.
37 This can be understood by considering how a government responds when an unpopular 
policy provokes what it perceives to be an unfavourable reaction from the public. The 
pressure to change a policy is at its highest when public reaction is such that it brings into 
question the legitimacy o f the government. For example, in recent years, public reaction has 
provoked policy reversals with respect to local government finance (1990-1991) and 
proposals for the immediate closure o f 31 mines (1992). However, in other areas o f policy, 
where it is perceived that unpopular proposals have not produced similar reactions of 
outrage, policies remain unchanged. In this respect, consider, for example, legislation for the 
abolition o f the metropolitan authorities (1986); and the Health Service reforms (1990). It is 
normal for a government to be unpopular; much more serious are questions about the 
legitimacy o f its rule.
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support, rather than by coercion;38 (ii) in a parliamentary democracy, parties must be 
ever mindful of the demands of electoral politics;39 (iii) an opposition party’s ambition 
to form the next government rests largely on its ability to build support during its 
period in opposition; and (iv) a party’s ideals and philosophies will often make claims 
to universality, consequently, there is an in-built pressure on a party to attract 
advocates for its cause.40 The important point is that ritual is central to a party’s ability 
to generate either support for, or acceptance of, its functioning, a point which can be 
illustrated by considering the wider significance of the ritualistic occasions, settings 
and activities detailed above.
I have noted that the annual party conference is addressed to party members and non- 
members alike. Of course, only a select few directly participate in the proceedings; 
however, the media - television in particular - play an important role in allowing others 
to participate indirectly. Thus, addressing a potentially very large audience, the annual 
conference embodies and disseminates a number of important political messages. 
Firstly, as I noted above, it is a demonstration of collective solidarity, designed to 
present the party as a unified and vibrant force one which both commands and affords 
support. In this respect, those ceremonial techniques which are central to the integra­
tive function of the conference (i.e., slogans, emblems, singing, etc.), find a resonance 
also in the country at large, where a television audience are addressed, for the moment, 
as potential supporters, by the collective effervescence which unfolds before them.41 
Secondly, the annual conference provides an arena for the party to advocate its ideals, 
philosophies and policies, to defend its record, and to point to the deficiencies of its 
opponents. However, it is not so much the specifics of these activities which are 
important, but rather how these operate at the level of connotation. In fact, at this
38 Thus, for example, Dowse and Hughes claim that "nowhere does a ruling group or class for 
any length o f time allow itself to think or to be thought o f as ruling by force alone [Dowse, 
R. E. and Hughes, J. A, 1986: 27]." And similarly, though obviously in a different context, 
Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda minister, stated that "...It may be all very well to have 
power which rests on force o f arms, but it is better and more gratifying to win the heart o f the 
people and keep it [in Leni Riefenstalhl's film, "Triumph of the Will"].
39 For Parsons, it is this fact which guarantees that democratic government will broadly 
represent the interests o f the whole o f society.
40 In this respect, note Margaret Thatcher’s claim that she wished to free Britain o f socialism.
41 Note, with respect to American politics, that the 1992 Republican and Democratic party 
conventions were seen as important occasions for the mobilisation o f pre-election support.
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level, a number of related messages (myths) are transmitted; for example, that the 
party is strong; that it is competent; and that it offers leadership and the hope of a 
better future. Additionally, key themes are used to signify that the Party is fully 
expressive of the identities and interests of its audience. One might consider, for 
example, that the language of nationalism will signify the nationalist credentials of a 
party, and thereby tap into the national identity of a population.42 Needless to say, 
similar techniques will be used to demonstrate that opponent parties, in contrast, do 
not express these identities and interests. For example, Margaret Thatcher, at the 1975 
Conservative Party Conference, stated, in response to the claim that she had criticised 
Britain abroad, that: “It was not Britain I was criticizing, it was Socialism, and I will 
go on criticizing Socialism and opposing Socialism because it is bad for Britain. 
Britain and Socialism are not the same thing, and as long as I have health and strength 
they never will be [Thatcher, 1989: 19-20].”43 In general, the party conference - and 
other similar occasions - provides an opportunity for the party to address a large 
audience, and consequently, it is seen as an important occasion for the generation of 
support. To the extent that this support is forthcoming, it is achieved by mechanisms 
which are largely symbolic and ritualistic.
Just as the party conference embodies and disseminates a number of myths, so also do 
the activities which constitute the House of Commons and associated institutions. For 
example, this too is an arena within which the party can address potential supporters as 
a vibrant and powerful force, and it also affords regular opportunities for parties to 
demonstrate their mastery of one another. Obviously, this latter point lies behind the 
importance which is attached to set piece debates, motions of no confidence, and so 
on, even where the outcome of these is inevitable.
4 To understand how this happens at the level o f connotation, see Chapter 3, 82-83. Note that, 
for Stuart Hall and the advocates o f authoritarian populism, it is often a fundamental 
demand o f democratic politics that a party should be able to express the social identities o f 
its potential voters. See, for example, Hall, S., "Gramsci and Us”, Marxism Today, 
June 1987, 21; and passim (16-21).
43 The important point is that this statement functions as signifier for a whole range o f 
associated concepts; that is, it functions at a second level o f signification (the level o f 
connotation). Obviously, the important message resides in the juxtaposition o f concepts 
"Britain" and "Socialism”.
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However, perhaps the most important of the myths disseminated by the House of 
Commons is one that I have already dealt with; namely, the myth of democratic 
process. In this respect, I noted Edelman’s claim that government institutions, whilst 
playing no effective part in the decision-making process, nevertheless enshrine the 
democratic principle in their functioning as arenas of ritualised conflict. Clearly, from 
this perspective, the important point about Parliament is that it legitimises policy 
outcomes, and the perceived decision-making role of the governing party.44 In other 
words, Parliament articulates and disseminates the myth of democratic, representative 
government - a myth which is essential for a party’s legitimate rule. However, the 
importance of the democratic myth extends far beyond the legitimating function which 
it performs for a particular political party. It is, in fact, central to the identity of any 
nation which employs a system of parliamentary government, and, therefore, plays an 
extremely important integrative role for such nations. This points the way to the 
second of the general areas that I wish to explore concerning the relationship between 
politics and ritual; that is, it points the way to a concern with the nation state, ritual 
and social integration.
I have argued above that the major significance of ritual for political analysis resides in 
its integrative function. In this regard, I have demonstrated how political parties rely 
on the reinvigorating properties of a variety of ritualistic occasions for their identity 
and cohesion, and, moreover, that such occasions play a part in securing for parties 
wider support from the population as a whole. I now wish to consider the sense in 
which ritual functions in a similar fashion for the nation-state; that is, I wish to explore 
how civic ritual is used to reaffirm both the identity of a nation-state and the normative 
order which forms the basis of this identity. It should be pointed out that these 
concerns are directly related to the earlier questions I posed concerning the argument 
that ceremonial reaffirmation functions as a form of “universe maintenance” and, 
more generally, the idea that the realm of value-orientations is intersubjectively 
grounded.
44 In this respect, note also Miliband's argument that die importance o f the House o f Commons 
derives "from the fact that it enshrines the elective principle and thus provides the absolutely 
indispensable legitimation for the government o f the country; nothing for the containment 
and management o f pressure from below, could be more important [Miliband, 1982: 2]."
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It will be recalled that, according to Durkheim, every society needs to uphold and 
reaffirm at regular intervals the collective sentiments and ideas which make its unity 
and personality. Similarly, I have argued that the realm of value-orientations, deprived 
of ultimate legitimation, must look beyond itself for verification and renewal, without 
the like of which it is vulnerable to the perils of anomic collapse. The point about civic 
ritual, as I have already suggested, is that it functions in its collective effervescence to 
fulfil both these demands. I will illustrate this point by considering ritual in connection 
with: (i) government elections; and (ii) the British monarchy.
According to Collins:
elections...are a ritual by which loyalty to the political system itself is 
mobilised and demonstrated...Election campaigns [do] operate as a 
ritual, much like any other: they bring about an increase in the social 
and moral density, produce social assemblies and focus attention, and 
intensify common emotional needs by rapid circulation and 
reverberation. The results of such a mechanism, quite possibly apart 
from what anyone intends, is to make users, personalities, and the 
paraphernalia of political life itself into symbols representing group 
membership.45
From this perspective, a government election functions: (i) as a symbolic 
representation of the reality of democracy;46 and (ii) more generally, as a collective 
reaffirmation of group-life - that is, it affords the opportunity for individuals to 
participate actively in and to recreate some of the myths which lie at the heart of the 
identity of the social group47 Following from these points are a number of important
45 Collins, R., "The Durkheimian tradition in conflict sociology", in Alexander, J. C., (Ed.), 
Durkheimian sociology: cultural studies, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1988), 
115-116.
46 For example, Miliband argues that universal suffrage, trade unions and the various 
democratic institutions are all necessary for the containment o f pressure from below - that is, 
they have a symbolic function - but that parliamentarism ensures that policy-making itself is 
"depopularized". See Miliband, R., Capitalist Democracy in Britain, (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford: 1982), 1-53.
47 For a brief discussion o f these myths, see Chapter 3, 82-83. It is also worth considering that 
the devotional aspects o f government elections are even more pronounced in those countries 
characterised by single-party government. For example, in the old USSR, an election
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political consequences, the most significant being that government elections serve to 
reinforce the status-quo: firstly, by the practical and symbolic negation of the case for 
revolutionary change; and secondly, by binding social actors to the folkways of their 
in-groups.48
It is possible to go further than this simple recognition that government elections 
embody a ritualistic dimension, to argue that this dimension is in fact the defining 
characteristic of such elections. In this respect, Edelman’s insights are once again 
significant: the legislative powers brought by election victory do not represent, for the 
winning party, a significant opportunity to influence instrumental payoffs;49 that is, 
elections are not about a struggle for access to unlimited legislative power (although 
they may be viewed this way). Rather, elections - and the ritual and symbolism 
associated with them - allow those groups who have sufficient bargaining resources to 
exercise their power in the legislative arena relatively free of interference from the 
public at large.50 A similar sort of argument can be made from a Marxist perspective. 
It will be remembered that Nicos Poulantzas claims that the state operates “as the 
organisation for maintaining both the conditions of production and the conditions for 
the existence and functioning both of the unity of a mode of production and of a 
formation [Poulantzas, 1973: 50].” If one accepts this view, then governments, 
whatever their political complexion, act always to the long term benefit of a single 
interest, namely, capital.51 Therefore, elections cannot be understood in terms of their
functioned as a ritual, "public display o f personal re-affirmation o f the Soviet way o f life and 
the party leadership...[Swearer, W., cited in Dowse, R  and Hughes, J., (1986): 298]."
48 This is not necessarily to argue that there are no policy implications with respect to the 
outcome o f a government election. But rather that government elections limit the potential 
for radical change, because they embody and perpetuate the democratic/representational 
myth.
49 Dowse and Hughes pose the question: "does the fact that one party, rather than another, wins 
an election produce significant changes in the distribution o f national resources or is it the 
case that elections are devices by which ruling groups seduce the masses with illusions and 
influence [Dowse, R. and Hughes, J., (1986): 299]?" They conclude, after a brief survey o f 
empirical data, that "if people think that by engaging in elections they are working effectively 
to alter the distribution o f resources between the haves and have nots, they may be mistaken". 
And moreover, that there is inferential evidence "that those who believe elections to be rituals 
rather than means through which the majority o f the population can alter the distribution o f 
resources towards themselves may be correct [301]”.
50 See Edelman, M., Politics and Symbolic Action, (Markham Publishing Company, Chicago: 
1971), 23.
51 The nature o f international capitalism is such that even where a government seeks to 
represent the interests of labour, it is very much limited in the sorts o f policies which it can 
pursue. See Coates, D., Labour in Power?, (Longman, London: 1980), passim.
143
contribution to representative government, but rather must be analysed with reference 
to the part they play in securing the conditions for the reproduction of capitalism. Of 
course, this leads us back to the integrative function of elections, that is, to their ability 
to diffuse conflict, and bind individuals to folkways which sustain the status-quo. With 
respect to the management of conflict, the significant point is that elections provide a 
ritualistic setting for the release of tensions that are endemic in society. That is, 
social classes are able to engage in ritualistic struggle without threatening the ability of 
capital to generate surplus-value. Moreover, their very act of engagement in this sphere 
constitutes a reaffirmation of the “democratic” process, with the consequent pay-off in 
terms of an increase in social integration.
It is evident from this discussion that government elections, and their associated rituals 
and symbolism, play an important part in securing and reaffirming a sense of national 
identity. Furthermore, it is clearly possible that by doing so they contribute to the 
maintenance of socio-political systems that would otherwise, by virtue of fundamental 
inequalities, be severely undermined. Significantly, these same two points can be made 
about the functioning of the British monarchy. According to Edward Shils and Michael 
Young, the monarchy constitutes an avenue of communication with a society’s 
sacred values - “it is therefore enabled to heighten the moral and civic sensibility of 
the society and to permeate it with symbols of those values to which the sensitivity 
responds [Shils and Young, 1953: 81].” In concrete terms, this communication is 
achieved through a number of sacred and ceremonial occasions, in which the 
monarchy plays a central part.54 These include, for example, the Trooping of the 
Colour, the Cenotaph celebrations, Royal weddings, Royal birthdays and, most 
significantly, for Shils and Young - the Coronation celebrations.55 In an explicitly
52 Note Swartz's claim that "...Reconciliation o f quarrelling persons is explicitly sought through 
celebration o f ritual...Furthermore, rituals are celebrated which often explain and revive 
sentiments which sustain a moral order; they induce certain moods and sentiments, they teach 
men to feel and teach them what they ought to feel about [cited in Dowse, R. and Hughes, J., 
1986: 299].".
53 See Shils, E. and Young, M., "The Meaning o f the Coronation", Sociological Review, 
(1953), 1, 63-81.
54 Note that David Cannadine claims that "...With the possible exception o f the papacy, no head 
of state is surrounded by more popular ritual than Queen Elizabeth II [Cannadine, 1983: 
102]."
55 The undoubted significance o f the Coronation as a ceremonial occasion o f collective 
reaffirmation is both enhanced and tempered by the rarity o f its occurrence.
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Durkheimian vein, these authors claim that the Coronation is exactly the “kind of 
ceremonial in which the society reaffirms the moral values which constitute it as a 
society and renews its devotion to those values by an act of communion [Shils and 
Young, 1953: 67].” The Coronation Service itself “is a series of ritual affirmations of 
the moral values necessary to a well-governed and good society [Shils and Young, 
1953: 67].” The Service and the procession which followed “were shared and 
celebrated by nearly all the people of Britain. In these events of 2nd June56 the Queen 
and her people were, through radio, television and press and in festivities throughout 
the land, brought into a great nation-wide communion [Shils and Young, 1953: 70- 
71].”57 Of course, as I have indicated, the Coronation is only one of the many 
ceremonials associated with the monarchy which bind the nation together in an act of 
communion. Thus, for example, Blumler et al point to the Investiture of the Prince of 
Wales, and argue that this appeared to bring:
to the fore a profound emotional commitment to the Monarchy, to the 
representatives of which the vast majority of people were prepared to 
extend an exceptional degree of respect. Most ordinary Englishmen 
were caught up in the spirit of the event to an extraordinary degree and 
communicated their enthusiasm to each other. The feelings about the 
Queen and Prince Charles which the Investiture evoked, managed to 
fuse personal with public concerns in a symbolic fashion that Durkheim
CO
would have understood.
56 Obviously, Shils and Young are talking about the 1953 Coronation o f Queen Elizabeth II.
57 Shils and Young sum up their own analysis as follows: "A society is held together by its 
internal agreement about the sacredness o f certain fundamental moral standards. In an 
inchoate, dimly perceived, and seldom explicit manner, the central authority o f the orderly 
society, whether it be secular or ecclesiastical, is acknowledged to be the avenue o f 
communication with the realm o f the sacred values. Within its society, popular constitutional 
monarchy enjoys almost universal recognition in this capacity, and it is therefore enabled to 
heighten the moral and civic sensibility o f the society and to permeate it with symbols o f 
those values to which the sensitivity responds. Intermittent rituals bring society or varying 
sectors o f it repeatedly into contact with this vessel o f the sacred values. The Coronation 
provided at one time and for practically the entire society such an intensive contact with the 
sacred that we believe we are justified in interpreting it as we have done in this essay, as a 
great act o f national communion [Shils, E. and Young, M., 1953: 80]."
58 Cited in Lukes, S., “Political ritual and social integration”, Sociology, (1975), 9, 294.
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The general point is that the monarchy, by means of the ceremonial life associated 
with it, functions: (i) to heighten the sentiment which society has of itself; and (ii) to 
reaffirm the sacred values which underpin the unity of the group.
However, the problem of these types of approach is that they do not consider the 
possibility that certain sectors of society might be differentially benefited by this 
integrative function of the monarchy; that is, these views are excessively consensual. 
An alternative approach, yet one which nevertheless recognises the importance of 
ceremonial-life, is suggested by Clifford Geertz, when he argues that the governing 
elites which exist in all societies, whether democratically elected or not:
justify their existence and order their actions in terms of a collection of 
stories, ceremonies, insignia, formalities, and appurtenances that they 
either inherited or, in more revolutionary situations, invented. It is these 
crowns and coronations, limousines and conferences, that mark the 
center as center and give what goes on there its aura of being not 
merely important but in some odd fashion connected with the way the 
world is built.59
This ties in with Stephen Lukes’ charge that one:
should go beyond the somewhat simplistic idea of political ritual 
expressing-producing-constituting value integration...[to] take up in­
stead the fertile idea that ritual has a cognitive dimension...”; that is, 
that political ritual “helps to define as authoritative certain ways of 
seeing society: it serves to specify what in society is of special 
significance, it draws people’s attention to certain forms of 
relationships and activities - and at the same time, therefore, it deflects
59 Geertz, C., "Centers, kings, and charisma: reflections on the symbolics o f power", in 
Wilentz, S., (Ed.), Rites o f  Power: Symbolism, Ritual, and Politics since the Middle Ages, 
(University o f Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia: 1985), 15.
146
their attention from other forms, since every way of seeing it [s/c]60 also 
a way of not seeing.61
From this viewpoint, the importance of the rituals surrounding the monarchy is that 
they reinforce a particular view of society and, consequently, address individuals as 
members of the society thus defined Clearly, these processes operate largely at the 
level of connotation; thus, in the ceremonial-life of the monarchy, the individual 
recognises himself as a member of a single organic community, as a Citizen of a 
Nation with a determinate History (i.e., “the Empire”, the two World Wars, 
democracy, freedom, etc.), and as the inheritor of certain core traditions and values, 
for example, those of the family, of religion, and of loyalty to one’s country.62 The 
consequence of naturalising the historically contingent in this manner is that 
alternative conceptions of society are denied. In this respect, for example, it is clear 
that the ceremonials surrounding the monarchy symbolically negate the case for 
republicanism. What is less obvious, although it is perhaps more significant, is that 
these ceremonials also function to negate those beliefs and values which stand in
60 This should, I believe, read "is". See Lukes, S., “Political ritual and social integration”, 
Sociology, (1975), 9, 303.
61 Lukes, S., “Political ritual and social integration”, 303.
62 It should be pointed out that to recognise oneself in the rituals o f the monarchy as the 
inheritor o f certain traditions and values does not necessarily mean that one will accept or act 
upon these traditions and values. However, this fact does not negate the integrative powers of 
civic ritual (I am here talking about officially sanctioned civic ritual; that is, coronations, the 
Trooping o f the Colour, etc.). In this respect, the first point to make is that the various social 
structures which determine the typificatory frameworks employed by an individual will share 
the cultural pattern o f the nation-state as a baseline o f orientation [see Chapter 4, 110]. 
Consequently, there will be a measure o f agreement: firstly, between the beliefs and values 
associated with distinct social structures; and secondly, between those beliefs and values held 
by the individual and those celebrated in political ritual. It follows, therefore, that political 
ritual retains its revivifying function. A second point to make is that despite the significance 
o f the cultural pattern o f the nation-state, individuals do not hold one consistent set o f beliefs 
and values. Rather, these stand up against one another in relations o f relative 
consistency/inconsistency and superordination/subordination. The importance o f political 
ritual in this respect is two-fold: (a) where the beliefs and values celebrated therein hold a 
predominant place in the typificatory frameworks used by an individual, political ritual 
functions to maintain this predominance; (b) where this situation is reversed, and 
"alternative" beliefs and values predominate, political ritual, by revivifying those beliefs and 
values which are "officially" sanctioned, represents an important countervailing pressure; that 
is, it functions to hold "alternative" beliefs and values in check. The final point to make is 
that political ritual, as I have already noted, performs an important cognitive function; 
specifically, it presents certain aspects o f the world as "natural" and "immutable", thus 
reinforcing "official" definitions o f reality [see Lukes, S., “Political ritual and social 
integration”, 303-307; Therbom, G., The Ideology o f Power and the Power o f Ideology, 
(Verso, London: 1980), 18; and my discussion, above, o f the symbolic aspects of 
government elections].
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opposition to the “sacred values” that the monarchy represents. The central point, 
therefore, is that the rituals associated with the monarchy function, not only to revivify 
the collective sentiments of the social group, but also to articulate a certain 
representation of society, one which benefits those sectors of society that have an 
interest in maintaining existing social relationships. According to Stephen Lukes, 
rituals such as these, and indeed political ritual in general,63 by functioning in this 
manner, form part of what might be termed “the mobilisation of bias”; that is, the “set 
of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and constitutional procedures (“rules of the 
game”) that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons 
and groups at the expense of others.”64
To sum up, I have been arguing that ritual derives its political significance largely 
from its integrative and legitimating powers. These exist on at least two different 
levels: (i) in that an individual’s participation in a ritualistic occasion carries him right 
to the heart of his in-group; and (ii) in that ritual articulates and commands support for 
particular representations of the in-group. Specifically, I have shown: (a) how political 
parties depend upon ritualistic occasions for their self-identity and cohesion; (b) how 
ritual can be used to generate acceptance of and support for the activities of political 
parties; (c) how ritual functions to reaffirm the collective sentiments which underpin 
the unity of society; and (d) the sense in which ritual, by articulating representations of 
society which benefit certain groups at the expense of others, functions as a 
mechanism for “the mobilisation of bias”. I now wish to concretise some of these 
arguments in the context of a specific historical period by looking at the part played by 
ritual in the years of the German Third Reich.
63 Note that for Lukes these include "the elaborate and public forms o f judicial and quasi­
judicial activity [Lukes, 1975: 305]."
64 Bachrach and Baratz, cited in Lukes, S., “Political ritual and social integration”, Sociology, 
(1975), 9, 307.
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Ritual in the Third Reich
According to Alan Bullock, no regime in history has paid more attention than the Nazi 
regime to psychological factors in politics.65 Obviously, Bullock is referring here to the 
importance of ritual, symbolism and myth in the politics of this period. Indeed, it is 
claimed by George Mosse that the significance attained in the Third Reich by such 
things as ceremonial occasions, national monuments, uniforms and flags is indicative 
of a new style of politics, one which offers itself as an alternative to parliamentary 
democracy, and seeks to draw a whole population into direct participation in a 
national mystique. This new style of politics is a secularised religion, it uses 
techniques of ritual and liturgy to give concrete expression to the general will of 
society, and allows the masses to participate in self-worship.66 Similarly, Modris 
Eksteins claims that the success of the Nazi Party was built, not on the substance of its 
message, but rather in the style and mood of its politics:
It was above all the theater, the vulgar “art”, the grand guignol 
productions of the beer halls and the street. It was the provocation, the 
excitement, the frisson which Nazism was able to provide, in the 
brawling, the sweating, the singing, the saluting. Nazism, whether one 
wore brass knuckles and carried a rubber hose or simply played along 
vicariously, beating up communists and Jews in one’s mind, was action.
Nazism was involvement. Nazism was not a party; Nazism was an 
event.67
The key theme here is unity. Nazism is, from this perspective, an epic drama, a 
performance, designed to intoxicate those who participate, to carry them to the heart of
65 Bullock, A., Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, Revised Edition, (Penguin, Harmondsworth: 1962), 
379.
66 See Mosse, G., The Nationalization o f the Masses, (Howard Fertig, New York: 1975), 1-20. 
According to Mosse, the exaltation o f the general will which characterised the Nazi regime 
was stimulated by two factors rooted in the nineteenth century: (i) by the emergence o f mass 
movements and mass politics; and (ii) by the rise o f nationalism. Nationalism provided the 
symbols and liturgy necessary to transform mass movements into a coherent political force 
[see 4-9],
67 Eksteins, M., Rites o f Spring: The Great War and the Birth o f  the Modem Age, (Black 
Swan, London: 1990), 414.
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the collective-life of the nation, which they in their turn revivify. Thus, according to 
Adolph Hitler, the underlying idea of National Socialism “is to do away with egoism 
and to lead people into the sacred collective egoism which is the nation.’ As a 
consequence of thus subordinating the claims of the individual to those of the Volk, 
Nazism eradicates the distinction between the social and the political. The 
pervasiveness of ritual and symbolism in the Third Reich is indicative of the conflation 
of these two realms - it is an integral aspect of the total politics of this period.
For the purposes of analysis, it is possible to identify the existence of three broad 
categories of ritual and symbolism in the Third Reich: (i) the utilisation of sacred 
objects and symbols; (ii) the symbolic and ritualistic use of language; and (iii) various 
forms of ritualised action - ranging from a Nazi salute given in a we-relation to the 
grandeur of a Nuremberg rally.
(i) Sacred objects and symbols
In the summer of 1920, the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, although 
committed to a radical program, had yet to attain mass support. According to William 
Shirer, it was at this time that Hitler first appreciated that ritual and symbolism could 
be used to attract supporters to the party. Most significantly, Hitler thought it necessary 
that the party should have a flag to symbolise its identity, and to fight its battles under. 
Out of this necessity was bom what would in time become the new German flag, a 
swastika, superimposed black on red and white. “A symbol it really is!” Hitler 
declared. “In red we see the social idea of the movement, in white the nationalist idea, 
in the swastika the mission of the struggle for the victory of Aryan man.”69 According 
to Shirer, “the Nazis now had a symbol which no other party could match. The hooked 
cross seemed to possess some mystic power of its own, to beckon to action in a new 
direction the insecure lower middle classes which had been floundering in the 
uncertainty of the first chaotic postwar years. They began to flock under its banner
68 Cited in Bullock, A., Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, Revised Edition, (Penguin, 
Harmondsworth: 1962), 402.
69 Cited in Shirer, W. L., The Rise and Fall o f the Third Reich, (Mandarin Paperbacks, London: 
1960), 44. See generally Shirer’s discussion: 43-44.
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[Shirer, 1960: 44]”.70 Indeed, as we now know, the swastika came to represent both the 
Nazi party and the Third Reich generally. As the focus of the collective sentiments of a 
nation, it in time attained a sacred status. In this respect, one might note, for example, 
that the thirtieth article of a program for the establishment of a “National Reich 
Church” stated: “On the day of its foundation, the Christian Cross must be removed 
from all churches, cathedrals and chapels...and it must be superseded by the only 
unconquerable symbol, the swastika.”71
The swastika is an aggressive symbol, it connotes movement, struggle and revolution, 
themes which are found in much of the symbolism employed by the Nazi Party. Its 
leaders had long been aware that the symbolism of violence and aggression was 
important in securing the support of the masses.72 The use of militaristic, aggressive 
and confrontational imagery reflected this awareness. Many of the popular and 
enduring images of Nazism fall under this rubric, including, for example, the uniforms, 
the salutes, the serried ranks, the Eagle, the brownshirts and the marching. Moreover, 
these mark only the beginning of the influence of Nazi propaganda on German life. In
70 • •Within two years the swastika appeared on the armbands o f party-members, and on the Nazi 
standards which were used at party rallies (the latter being based on old Roman designs). See 
Shirer, W. L., The Rise and Fall o f the Third Reich, (Mandarin Paperbacks, London: 1960), 
44.
71 Cited in Shirer, W. L., (Mandarin Paperbacks, London: 1960), 240. In this respect, the 
following extract from a 1941 German publication entitled On Festivities in the School 
(Author: Hermann Klauss) is also insightful [cited in Mosse, G., The Nazi Culture, 
(Schocken Books, New York: 1981), 129]:
The law o f the flag rules over our lives. It also stands above our school work.
We begin each section o f the school year with a general flag-raising ceremony. We 
close it with a general flag lowering. The first great experience o f a new student is the 
ceremonial flag raising. The school year ends with the flag lowering on the last day o f 
schooL On the holidays o f the school and the Volk community the school hoists the 
flags o f the Reich and its youth.
Flag raising is honor, elevation, admonition, and avowal o f faith. The eternal 
expression - assembly, speech, song, greetings, and retreat - is an unfailing indication 
of the spirit which prevails in the community.
72 For example, Joseph Goebbels stated that "...Marxism...became great by using terror. It has 
conquered the street by terror. The bourgeois circles considered it rather vulgar and unrefined 
to go on the street and demonstrate for their ideals, or fight for them.
But the street belongs to modem politics. Whoever is able to conquer the street will be able 
to conquer the masses, and whoever has conquered the masses m il conquer the state. The 
man in the street is only truly impressed by a show o f force and discipline [cited in Reimann, 
V., (1977): 79]."
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fact, the whole of the cultural sphere became subject to the will of the Reich Ministry 
for Information and Propaganda.73 Painters and sculptors pursued “images of muscular 
beauty, vigour, size, aggression, and healthy Nordic Germanism”, which might be 
appreciated by “the lowliest Stonntrooper”.74 Musicians played the music of authentic 
German composers, particularly, Wagner, who was felt to express the Germanic 
Weltanschauung15 And in architecture, the preference was for classical simplicity, but 
with magnitude, and an awareness of the symbolic potential of open space.76 The point 
about all this symbolism is that it formed part of, and enabled individuals to participate 
in a national myth, one which sought, by reconstructing the past, to make the world 
whole again, and to offer security to a population whose identity and confidence had 
been eroded by defeat in the First World War and by the weakness of the Weimar 
Republic.
(ii) Symbolic and ritualistic language
George Mosse notes that National Socialist political thought cannot be judged in terms 
of traditional political theory. He argues that those theorists who condemn the 
vagueness and ambiguity of fascism fail to recognise its theological foundations, and, 
consequently, fail also to see that it is liturgy and the spoken word, rather than theory
77and the written word, which are central. In a similar vein, Viktor Reimann argues 
that National Socialism “was never a doctrine built on scientific premises; it had a
73 Established in 1932, and headed by Joseph Goebbels. It should be noted that the use o f the 
word "propaganda", if  this implies "brainwashing", is problematic within the context of the 
Third Reich [see Mosse, G., The Nazi Culture, (Schocken Books, New York: 1981), 10-11]. 
However, I wish to retain the use o f this term to signify that the leaders o f the Third Reich 
were aware o f the political importance o f ritual and symbolism.
74 Facetti, G., “Art in Dictatorship”, History o f  the 2(fh Century, (BPC Publishing, Bath), 
(1969), 1442-1444.
75 The organisation "Strength Through Joy" (Kraft durch Freude) ensured that the German 
population were subject to the correct cultural influences. Through this organisation, the 
people were able to hear the best orchestras in Germany play music by Bach, Mozart, 
Beethoven, Brahms, Schubert and Bruckner, as well as by Wagner [see Reimann, V., The 
man who created Hitler: Joseph Goebbels, (William Kimber, London: 1977), 170-181, for a 
discussion o f music in the Third Reich].
76 According to Mosse, the notion o f "sacred space" assumed key importance with respect to 
national monuments, and cemented the relationship between monuments and national 
festivals [see Mosse, G., The Nationalization o f the Masses, (Howard Fertig, New York: 
1975), 63.].
77 See Mosse, G., (Howard Fertig, New York: 1975), 9-10.
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primitive party program that offered solutions of actual or imagined problems, such as 
the racial problem, but only in slogans. Unlike Marxism, National Socialism left the 
details of how to execute its program open. All such a movement needed were orators 
to feed the people with these sloganized solutions [Reimann, 1977: 82-83].” Thus, 
“...There can be no doubt that National Socialism became what it was because of its 
orators... [Reimann, 1977: 82].”
It is generally accepted that the two greatest orators in the Third Reich were Hitler and 
Goebbels. Alan Bullock notes “the extraordinary impression of force”, and “the 
immediacy of passion” of Hitler’s oratory.78 And Victor Reimann talks about 
Goebbels’ ability to “bewitch” an audience, and to “set them on fire”.79 The occasions 
of their speeches were exercises in collective celebration and the ceremonial 
reaffirmation of National Socialism. They were an integral part of the national self-
Q A
representation and self-worship which characterised the Third Reich. Hitler’s 
speeches, in particular, can be understood in terms of a Durkheimian model. One 
might consider, for example, Otto Strasser’s claim that Hitler was able “to respond to 
the vibration of the human heart with the delicacy of a seismograph, or perhaps a 
wireless receiving set, enabling him...to act as a loudspeaker proclaiming the most 
secret desires, the least admissible instincts, the sufferings, and personal revolts of a 
whole nation.”81 Thus, Hitler was able to function as a sacred object, as a symbol 
empowered by an audience, reflecting back to the latter its essential nature. In front of 
the speaker’s podium, therefore, as Joachim Fest has noted, the masses celebrated 
themselves.82
78 Bullock, A., Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, Revised Edition, (Penguin, Harmondsworth: 1962), 
373.
79 Reimann, V., The man who created Hitler: Joseph Goebbels, (William Kimber, London: 
1977), 85.
80 See Mosse, G., The Nationalization o f the Masses, (Howard Fertig, New York: 1975), 
201 - 202 .
81 Cited in Bullock, A., (Penguin, Harmondsworth: 1962), 373-374.
82 Cited in Eksteins, M., Rites o f Spring: The Great War and the Birth o f the Modem Age, 
(Black Swan, London: 1990), 430. It is worth noting that Eksteins adopts a position with 
respect to Hitler that is very reminiscent o f Durkheim. For example, he claims that"... Hitler 
remains undeniably the creation o f his time, a creature o f German imagination rather than, 
strictly speaking, o f social and economic forces. He was never regarded in the first instance 
as the prospective agent o f social and economic recovery...but rather as a symbol o f revolt 
and counter-affirmation by the dispossessed, the frustrated, the humiliated, the unemployed,
153
Of course, it is important not to over-emphasise the significance of the personal talents 
of particular individuals. The speeches of Goebbels and Hitler (and other Nazi leaders) 
took place within the contexts of wider ceremonial occasions. Consequently, they 
depended for their effect, in part, upon the rituals associated with these occasions. 
Indeed, as Mosse points out, it was Hitler’s view that National Socialism should be 
much more than simply a “cult of personality”. Therefore, it was necessary to 
subordinate the role played by particular individuals in ceremonial-life to the demands 
of the national rite.83 Another point is that this emphasis on ritual meant that the 
specific content of speeches was relatively unimportant, the significance lying instead 
with the integration of the spoken word into the cultic rites of the occasion. That is, the 
audience “lived” the speeches, responding emotionally to their sound, rhythm and 
context, rather than intellectually to their content.84
Of course, the symbolic and ritualistic use of language was not confined solely to the 
orators. For instance, the Nazis also made use of a number of key phrases, which by 
popular repetition became embedded in the collective consciousness of the natioa 
Examples include, “Sieg Heil”, ‘Deutschland Erwache”, “Ein Volk, Ein Fuhrer, Ein 
Reich, Deutschland”, and the words to the Horst Wessel song. Obviously, such phrases 
operated significantly at the level of connotation. Their symbolism is the typical 
mixture of neo-classicism, rebirth and struggle, and mythic German nationalism which 
constituted the national myth. Their prevalence in German life was a central aspect of 
the reconstruction of personalities necessary for the integration of the masses into this 
myth.
(iii) Ritualised action
As I mentioned above, Modris Eksteins claims that Nazism was, above all else, action 
and involvement. In this respect, I have already alluded to the significance of various
the resentful, the angry. Hitler stood for protest. He was a mental construct in the midst o f 
defeat and failure, o f inflation and depression, o f domestic political chaos and international 
humiliation [429-430]."
83 See Mosse, G., The Nationalization o f  the Masses, (Howard Fertig, New York: 1975), 200.
84 See Mosse, G., (Howard Fertig, New York: 1975), 200-
202; and Bullock, A., Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, Revised Edition, (Penguin, 
Harmondsworth: 1962), 372-373.
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types of ritualistic activity, for example, singing, saluting and marching. Such activity 
is important whatever its context. Thus, for example, to give a Nazi salute is normally 
to signal and to reaffirm one’s acceptance of the National Socialist Weltanschauung. 
And this applies also to a whole range of other activities, such as: singing in a Nazi 
choral society;85 completing a Land Jahr in the Bund Deutscher Maedel^6participating 
in a morning festival,87and attending a Thingtheater production.88
However, it was the public ceremonies and Party mass meetings which really marked 
the zenith of ritualised action in the Third Reich. In an attempt to anchor their regime 
in the consciousness of the people, the Nazis, at a very early stage in their rule, had 
established an annual programme of national festivals. For example, on 30 January, 
the country celebrated the Nazi’s “seizure of power”; on 20 April, there was a festival 
marking the Fuhrer’s birthday; in September, the Nazi party held its annual Nuremberg 
rally; and 9 November saw a remembrance of the 1923 aborted uprising. Each festival 
had its own distinctive liturgy and rites, and all were massively structured and 
sumptuously produced.
According to Eksteins, the piece de resistance of this festal cycle was the annual 
Nuremberg rally [Eksteins, 1989: 428-429], This claim is echoed by Hamilton T. 
Burden, who states that “...The events at Nuremberg were the very heartbeat of the 
National Socialist movement; nowhere else was the true nature of party ideology 
shown so clearly and so spectacularly [Burden, 1967: ix].” The rallies lasted for 
between six and eight days,89 and were masterpieces of ceremony and theatre. They 
were highly structured affairs, meticulously planned to elicit maximum effect. 
According to Alan Bullock, “...To see the films of the Nuremberg rallies even today is
85 For a discussion o f the role o f choir societies in Nazi Germany, see Mosse, G., The 
Nationalization o f  the Masses, (Howard Fertig, New York: 1975), 144-147.
86 The League o f German Maidens: At the age o f 18, many o f the girls o f the B.D.M. did a 
year's service on a farm. See Shirer, W., The Rise and Fall o f the Third Reich, (Mandarin 
Paperbacks, London: 1960), 254.
87 Morning festivals occurred on Sunday mornings, and were a nationalist alternative to 
Christian worship. See Mosse, G., (Howard Fertig, New York: 1975), 81.
88 Thingtheater was performed in an outside auditorium, and the audience participated. 
However, it did not prove to be very successful. See Reimann, V., The man who created 
Hitler: Joseph Goebbels, (William Rimber, London: 1977), 189; and Mosse, G., (Howard 
Fertig, New York: 1975), 115-118.
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to be recaptured by the hypnotic effect of thousands of men marching in perfect order, 
the music of the massed bands, the forest of standards and flags, the vast perspectives 
of the stadium, the smoking torches, the dome of searchlights. The sense of power, of 
force and unity was irresistible, and all converged with a mounting crescendo of 
excitement on the supreme moment when the Fuhrer himself made his entry [Bullock, 
1962: 379] ”90
It is clear from this statement, and from those of other commentators, that the 
Nuremberg rallies were archetypal instances of the kinds of civic ritual which, in the
Q9words of Durkheim, “do not differ from regular religious ceremonies.” In the 
collective effervescence of these, and similar occasions, the Nazi Party and the Third 
Reich periodically renewed themselves. Such occasions were crucial for the self- 
identity and cohesion of the party and nation, and also for “mobilising bias” so that the 
National Socialist Weltanschauung became both “natural” and immutable.93 They 
represented the apex of Nazi ritual and symbolism, and the final confirmation that 
“...Nazism was grand spectacle, from beginning to end [Eksteins, 1991: 414].”
89 See Burden, H. T., The Nuremberg Party Rallies: 1929-39, (Pall Mall Press, London: 1967), 
175-193, for timetables o f the 1934-1939 rallies.
90 Without actually attending one o f these rallies, it is hard to imagine the sort o f impact that 
Bullock is talking about. I think that one simply has to accept the testimony o f those who 
were present. In this respect, it is worth quoting, at length, from the diary o f William Shirer, 
who attended the 1934 rally in connection with his job as an American Correspondent in 
Berlin: "I'm beginning to comprehend, I think, some o f the reasons for Hitler's astounding 
success. Borrowing a chapter from the Roman church, he is restoring pageantry and colour 
and mysticism to the drab lives o f twentieth-century Germans. This morning’s opening 
meeting in the Luitpold Hall on the outskirts o f Nuremberg was more than a gorgeous show; 
it also had something o f the mysticism and religious fervour o f an Easter or Christmas Mass 
in a great Gothic cathedral. The hall was a sea o f brightly coloured flags. Even Hitler's arrival 
was made dramatic. The band stopped playing. There was a hush over the thirty thousand 
people packed in the hall. Then the band struck up the Badenweiler March.. .Hitler appeared 
in the back o f the auditorium, and followed by his aides...he strode slowly down die long 
centre aisle while thirty thousand hands were raised in salute....In such an atmosphere no 
wonder, then, that every word dropped by Hitler seemed like an inspired Word from on high. 
Man's -or at least the German's - critical faculty is swept away at such moments, and every lie 
pronounced is accepted as high truth itself [Shirer, 1941: 24-25]". The other important 
sources o f insight into the Nuremberg rallies are the old newsreels and films. Most 
significant, in this respect, is Leni Riefenstahl's film o f the 1934 rally, Triumph o f the Will. 
For a discussion o f its making see Burden, H. T., The Nuremberg Party Rallies: 1929-39, 
(Pall Mall Press, London: 1967), 94-98.
91 For example, as well as the Shirer diary entry, there is Burden's claim that the Nuremberg 
rallies "are a frightening example o f the awesome power o f modem propaganda techniques. 
Borrowing from pagan cults, church rituals, and Wagnerian theater, and other ways o f 
reaching the thoughts and dreams o f the masses, the absolute state perfected, in Nuremberg, 
its ability to dominate man's mind [Burden, 1967: 166]."
92 See above, 131.
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To sum up, it should be clear that ritual performed a number of important functions in 
the Third Reich: (i) it was a mechanism for generating and reaffirming the self-identity 
of the Nazi party; (ii) it was used as an instrument to secure widespread support for the 
party, and for the programmes which it wished to undertake; (iii) it underpinned the 
construction of a Germanic national myth, functioning to sanctify its constituent 
themes and symbols; and (iv) as a mechanism for the “mobilisation of bias”, it 
presented the National Socialist Weltanschauung as legitimate, natural and inviolable. 
In general, ritual played an instrumental part in maintaining the domination of the Nazi 
party during their period of rule.
In addition to these broadly socio-political functions, ritual in the Third Reich also 
performed a number of functions at the level of the individual. Particularly, it offered 
to individuals, whose social identities and sense of belonging had been severely 
undermined by the perceived destruction of the traditional order, reconstructed social 
identities, which were rooted in the new national myth. It did so, firstly, by 
constructing, reaffirming and sanctifying this myth; and secondly, by carrying the 
individual to the heart of collective experience and the in-group (whether the latter be 
the Nazi party or the Nation). As a consequence, ritual - and National Socialism 
generally - anchored the individual in the world, and, therefore, functioned to 
transcend the solitary relation. This is the attraction of fascism, it offers truth, identity 
and a sense of belonging to individuals who are confronted by the loneliness of 
consciousness.
To conclude, I wish to summarise briefly the significant points of this chapter. It is my 
claim that by means of the collective and ritualistic celebration of the beliefs and 
values of an in-group, individuals attain as near an experience of intersubjectivity as it 
is possible to get. To this extent, ritual is functional for individuals in that it binds 
them to their in-groups and, consequently, delivers to them a certain solidity o f being. 
This it achieves through two related processes: firstly, by the simple participation of
93 See above, 148.
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individuals in intersubjectivity; and secondly, by celebrating and reaffirming the sym­
bolic order which represents and expresses the collective-life of the in-group.
The significant points as far as political analysis is concerned are: firstly, that many 
political forms and processes can be analysed using a model of ritual; and secondly, 
and more significantly, that the functional relationship between ritual and subjectivity 
can be exploited for political ends. With respect to this latter point, one need only 
consider that the attraction of Nazism, as I have just indicated, was that it offered, 
largely by means of its associated rituals and ceremonial-life, identity and security to a 
population whose confidence and sense of belonging had been undermined by the 
perceived destruction of the traditional-order.
In general, the overriding political importance of ritual derives from mobilising and 
integrative properties which operate both at the level of society and at the level of 
individual subjectivity. In this respect, my analyses of political parties, government 
elections, the British monarchy and National Socialism demonstrate how ritual and 
symbolism can be used to achieve mobilisation and integration at the level of the 
social group and society. The crucial point is that the efficacy of ritual is based upon 
its ability to articulate the demands of subjectivity; the solitary relation demands that 
individuals seek the solidity of being offered by a social identity; ritual goes some way 
to satisfying this demand.
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CHAPTER SIX: POLITICS AND SUBJECTIVITY: THE CASE OF 
POPULISM
PART I: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF POPULISM 
Introduction
It will be abundantly clear that one of the central premises of this thesis is that social 
action is more than a simple reflex of institutional patterns.1 However, this has not 
been to accept that tradition in the social sciences - according to Alan Dawe, rooted in 
the Enlightenment - which talks about social action in terms “of actors defining their 
own situations and attempting to control them in terms of their definitions [Dawe,
1970: 212] ”2 Rather, it has been to argue that there are aspects of conscious existence 
which are irreducible to the social world, and that sociological formulations must take 
these into account in the analyses that they present. Specifically, I have detailed a 
number of socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity, and I have demonstrated their 
significance for political analysis, particularly, with respect to issues of political 
integration and mobilisation.
In this regard, perhaps the most significant idea has been that of the solitary relation.
Thus, in Chapter 3, I claimed that the social world is inevitably politicised, in part, 
because the uncertainty which individuals experience in the solitary relation - and the 
more general uncertainty of their relationship to the external-world - requires that they 
seek the imaginative mastery of the world, something which can be achieved in terms 
of the themes of political (moral) discourse; in Chapter 4, I argued that Marxist 
theories of revolution and post-capitalist society are inevitably compromised by a 
failure to understand that the interest in conflict lies not only in the ends towards
1 To argue that human conduct is totally shaped by the normative order is to be wedded to an 
"oversocialized conception o f man". See Wrong, D. H., “The oversocialized conception o f  
man in modem sociology”, in Bocock, R., Hamilton, P., Thompson, K. and Waton, A., An 
Introduction to Sociology (Fontana, Glasgow: 1980), 23-51.
To be coherent, this viewpoint must commit itself to some notion o f  an autonomous social I > 
actor. It will be remembered that I have rejected this idea, because it requires that individuals / 
retain at least some degree o f  freedom.
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which it is directed, but also in the satisfaction of the demand of the solitary relation 
for a solidity of being; and in Chapter 5, I argued that by means of occasions of 
ritualistic celebration, individuals transcend the solitary relation, attaining as near an 
experience of intersubjectivity as it is possible to get, a fact which explains the effi­
cacy of political ritual as a mechanism for the “mobilisation of bias”.
These specific arguments are indicative of a number of other more general arguments 
about political reality which have been articulated, both explicitly and implicitly, in 
this work. These can be summarised as follows:
1.1 Macro-political phenomena and processes are “solely the resultants and modes of 
organisation of the particular acts of individual persons [Weber, 1947: 92]”;3
1.2 The structure of consciousness is a significant variable in the course of social 
action;4
1.3 Therefore, it is necessary that political theory concern itself with issues of 
subjectivity.
2.1 Conflict and struggle characterise the original relation of consciousness (For-itself) 
to consciousness {the other),5
2.2 Oppositions between in-group and out-group are a macro-transformation of this 
original relation;6
3 Note that "the resultants and modes o f organisation o f the particular acts o f individual 
persons" only become macro-political phenomena and processes when imagined and defined 
as such. See Chapter 1, 29-32.
4 See Chapter 2, passim.
5 See Chapter 3, 86-93.
6 See Chapter 4, 117-120;
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2.3 Therefore, in that the social world is built on conflictual foundations, the 
distinction between the political and the non-political is dissolved (to the extent that 
the politica l is about power and conflict).
3.1 The conflictual relations which characterise the social world are manifest largely 
in the w ill to symbolic negation; that is, in the necessity which individuals and social 
groups experience to negate the foreignness of the other whilst at the same time 
preserving the moment of otherness;
3.2 Symbolic negation routinely takes place within the bounds of the normative 
sphere (specifically, within the realm of value orientations); the foreignness of the 
other is annulled by its assimilation to the beliefs and values contained therein;
3.3 Political discourse, to the extent that it occupies the realm of value-orientations, 
reflects and articulates this will to symbolic negation.
4.1 Institutional, macro-politics is centrally about the pursuit of legitimacy, and the 
“manipulation of emotional solidarity” to this end;8
4.2 The raw materials of this pursuit are individual subjectivities, constituted in the 
dialectical relationship between the structure of consciousness and the totality of life- 
experience;
4.3 The relative effectiveness of a political discourse or activity in generating 
legitimacy is determined by how it dovetails (i.e., expresses, articulates, represents, 
etc.) with these constituted subjectivities.9
7 The ideas expressed in 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 are to be found largely in chapters 3 and 4. They will 
also be articulated in this chapter.
8 See Chapter 5, passim.
9 See, for example, my discussion, in Chapter 5, o f the efficacy o f political ritual. This idea 
(and idea 4.2) will also be explored in the present chapter.
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It can be seen from these arguments that I am advocating a political sociology which 
has a scope far beyond that of a traditional macro-institutional approach. Of course, 
this leads to the possible criticism that analyses constructed in these terms will always 
lack specificity, inevitably dealing merely in generalities. However, in answer to this, I 
would claim that it is already clear that this is not necessarily the case: the critique of 
the Marxist viewpoint undertaken in Chapter 4, and the analysis of political ritual in 
Chapter 5, demonstrate the substantive utility of the kind of approach that I am 
suggesting. In order to demonstrate further this utility, I wish, in this chapter, to show 
how the notion of populism can be reconstructed, drawing on the kinds of arguments 
outlined above. To do this, I will divide the chapter into two parts; in the first part, I 
will critically analyse a number of existing theories of populism, in order to establish 
and specify their various characteristic weaknesses; and in the second part, I will 
consider how it is possible to use the notion of populism in order to understand the 
“Thatcherite” political intervention.10
The Concept of Populism
The first stage in analysing populism is to establish a working definition of the term.11 
In this respect, I intend to use an ideal-typical, descriptive specification of populism 
which is based upon an abstraction of the characteristics shared by commonly 
recognised populisms.12 Specifically, I will define as “populist”, movements and 
ideologies which: (i) claim in some sense to represent and reflect the will of “the
10 For the purposes o f this analysis, "Thatcherite political intervention" refers simply to the 
policies and ideas characteristic o f the British Conservative governments between 1979- 
1990.
11 This is made all the more necessary by the fact that it has become de rigueur in sociological 
analyses o f populism to note the conceptual difficulties associated with the term. Thus, for 
example, Ernest Gellner and Ghita Ionescu present their Populism: Its Meaning and National 
Characteristics, (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London: 1969), as "the first organized attempt 
to clarify the main aspects o f a concept which during the nineteenth century and even more in 
the twentieth century has been more fundamental to the shaping o f the political mind than is 
generally acknowledged [5]."
12 This type o f approach to the problem o f defining "populism" is suggested by Worsley, P., 
"The concept o f populism", in Ionescu, G. and Gellner, E., (Eds.), Populism: Its Meaning 
and National Characteristics, (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London: 1969), 243-248 
[212-250].
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people”, which is presented as being supreme “over every other standard, over the 
standards of traditional institutions and over the will of other strata”;13 (ii) invoke an 
imagery of opposition; particularly, in their juxtaposition of the rightful interests and 
aspirations of the people with the activities of a self-interested minority (or 
minorities);14 and (iii) manifest a distaste for the trappings of parliamentary 
government, and emphasise instead the significance of a direct relationship between 
people and leadership (being distrustful of the Establishment, and anti-intellectual in 
their outlook15).16
The ideal-typical, descriptive character of this working definition is shared by many of
17the constructs of populism which have previously been developed by social theorists.
It follows that these constructs function primarily as methodological tools whose
13 Shils, E., cited in Worsley, P., "The concept o f populism", 244. Note also that Andrzej 
Walicki states that a belief in the "principles o f the people" as opposed to those o f capitalism 
was associated with almost all die historically registered meanings o f die term "narod- 
nichestvo" [Walicki, A., "Russia" in Ionescu, G. and Gellner, E., (Eds.), (Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, London: 1969), 65.]; that Torcuato di Telia defines Latin American populism as 
"a political movement which enjoys the support o f the mass o f the urban working class 
and/or peasantry...[Telia, T. S. ch, "Populism and reform in Latin America", in Veliz, C., 
(Ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America, (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1965), 47]"; 
and that Martin Kilson, in his analysis o f political change in Sierra Leone, argues that what 
defines local political pressures as populist is that they come "nearest to reflecting the 
political feelings o f what we call the masses - the litde people [Kilson, 1966: 179]".
14 In this respect, consider, for example, that Stuart Hall argues that "Thatcherism" - a type o f 
politics which he termed "authoritarian populist" - was organised, in its early stages, in 
opposition to collectivism and the socialist state [see Hall, S., "The great moving right show", 
in Hall, S. and Jacques, M., The Politics o f Thatcherism, (Lawrence and Wishart, London: 
1983), 19-39 (especially, 27-34)]; that Ernesto Laclau claims that populism in Argentina 
consisted "precisely in a reunification o f the ensemble o f interpellations that expressed 
opposition to the oligarchic power bloc...[Laclau, E., Politics and Ideology in Marxist 
Theory, (Verso, London: 1979), 188-189]"; and that the American populists pitched their 
struggle against the railroads and Eastern capital [see Hicks, J., The Populist Revolt, 
(University o f Minnesota Press, Minneapolis: 1931), 54-95].
15 See Worsley, P., "The concept o f populism", 243-247.
16 It should be noted that to emphasise the significance o f a direct relationship between people 
and leadership does not imply a commitment to a specific type o f government, but rather 
finds expression in ways and forms as diverse as the orator's podium in Nazi Germany; in the 
American populists' declared intention to "restore the government o f the Republic to the 
hands o f "the plain people"... [Ignatius Donnelly, cited in Canovan, M., Populism, (Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, New York and London: 1981), 37]"; and in the communitarianism of the 
Russian Narodniki, and their desire to establish the traditional mir as the foundation o f the 
new social order.
17 For example, see MacRae, D., "Populism as an ideology", in Ionescu, G. and Gellner, E., 
(Eds.), (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London: 1969), 163, [153-165]; Wiles, P., "A syndrome, 
not a doctrine: some elementary theses on populism", in Ionescu, G. and Gellner, E., (Eds.), 
(Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London: 1969), 166-179; and Worsley, P., "The concept o f 
populism", in Ionescu, G. and Gellner, E., (Eds.), (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London: 
1969), 243-246.
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purpose is to provide reference points against which actual occurring instances of 
populism may be compared.18 However, this approach suffers from a number of 
inadequacies and problematic consequences. Most significantly: (i) the descriptive 
nature of the constructs employed tends to preclude any real explanation of the “social 
roots” of populism;19 in other words, whilst such constructs might be useful in aiding 
the identification of populist movements and ideologies, they are of little use in 
explaining their existence; and (ii) the ideal-typical character of the constructs has the 
effect of creating a context of expectation which operates to delimit the legitimate 
field of enquiry for analyses of populism; in broad terms, this means treating populism 
as either a system of ideas, and/or as the product of certain of the consequences of 
differential modernisation (the latter approach being less common, often involving the 
kinds of explanatory framework which are frequently lacking in descriptive 
specifications of populism).
It is on the terrain of these kinds of problems that the analysis to follow is constructed. 
Specifically, I wish to claim that previous treatments of populism are flawed by their 
neglect of the realm of subjectivity; and that to specify adequately the conditions of 
emergence and functioning of the populist intervention it is necessary to consider how 
populist discourses dovetail with the structures of subjectivity. In order to substantiate 
these claims, it is important to consider the following issues: (i) the question of the 
efficacy of an appeal to the people; and the rationale for the form that such an appeal 
might take (i.e., in the terms of the traditions of a mythic past, and in opposition to 
perceived threats to this tradition); (ii) the nature of the experience of populism; par­
ticularly, the sense in which populist discourses and structures resonate with an 
individual’s experience of the social world; and (iii) whether there are consequences 
of populism that go beyond the macro-political.
18 In this respect, they have a different function to my "working definition" o f populism; where 
the latter operates simply as a starting point for a further theoretical specification o f 
populism.
19 The term "social-roots" is suggested by Angus Stewart, "The social roots", in Ionescu, G. and 
Gellner, E., (Eds.), Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics, (Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, London: 1969), 180-196. This essay has the merit o f adopting an explanatory 
approach to the analysis o f populism. Other works that do likewise include: Germani, G., 
"Politicay sociedad en una epoca de transition", cited by Laclau, E., Politics and Ideology in 
Marxist Theory, (Verso, London: 1979), 147-151; Telia, T. S. di, "Populism and reform in 
Latin America" in Veliz, C., (Ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford: 1965), 47-74; and Laclau, E., (Verso, London: 1979), 143-198.
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Three Theories of Populism
As an entry into these issues, I wish to undertake a critical analysis of three previous 
theories of populism; namely: Torcuato di Telia’s, “Populism and Reform in Latin 
America”; Angus Stewart’s, “The Social Roots”; and Ernesto Laclau’s, “Towards a 
Theory of Populism”.20 These theories have in common that they are not merely 
content to describe the shared characteristics of various populisms, but they seek in 
addition to explain the occurrence of populism as a form of politics. Their critical 
analysis will have the following benefits: it will allow the identification of the most 
significant social factors in the emergence of populism, whilst at the same time 
demonstrating the sense in which previous theories are deficient as a consequence of 
their neglect of the realm of subjectivity; and it will provide the basis for the 
reconstruction of the concept of populism that I will undertake in Part II of this 
chapter.
According to Torcuato di Telia, populism is a phenomenon which is associated with 
the underdeveloped world; however, it cannot be explained away straightforwardly as 
a characteristic of underdevelopment. Rather, the important point is that “the 
developing countries of today are not only poor in absolute terms, but they are on the 
periphery of richer, central areas. They suffer from what economists call the 
“demonstration effect” [di Telia, 1965: 48].” With respect to populism, perhaps the 
most significant aspect of this effect is the “revolution of rising expectations”, 
whereby the aspirations of the populations of developing countries are raised far 
beyond the point where they can be satisfied. In this circumstance, argues di Telia, 
democracy cannot function properly:
Groups lacking sufficient economic or organizational power demand a
share in both the goods and the decision-making processes of society.
They no longer “know their place”.... They form a disposable mass of
20 See footnote 19.
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supporters, larger and more demanding than any Louis Napoleon would 
have dreamed of.21
It is di Telia’s claim that in addition to this mass of supporters, a populist mobilisation 
requires the existence of an elite group committed to an anti-status quo ideology. In 
developing countries, this group tends to emerge as a consequence of “status 
incongruence”; that is, as a consequence of the chasm between aspiration and job 
satisfaction [di Telia, 1965: 50]. The mobilised masses and the incongruent group(s) 
complement each other, and the likely political outcome, with other possibilities ruled 
out by a number of factors,22 is a populist coalition.
Di Telia argues that the populist coalition tends to be defined and solidified by a 
radical ideology which draws largely upon the language of Marxism and socialism. 
This ideology is used instrumentally as a mechanism of mobilisation and social 
control; that is, as a mechanism to integrate and mobilise both the masses and the 
various incongruent groups. To this extent, it relies for its success upon the efficacy of 
its emotional engagement; upon the ability of its concepts to become “sacred words, 
[the] objects of a belief to which one is committed [di Telia, 1965: 53].”
Thus, in general, the sources of populist strength are:
1. a mobilised mass formed as a consequence of a “revolution of rising 
expectations”;
2. an elite committed to an anti-status quo mobilisation;
3. an ideology of widespread emotional appeal.23
21 Telia, T. S. di, "Populism and reform in Latin America" in Veliz, C., (Ed.), Obstacles to 
Change in Latin America, (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1965), 48.
22 Most significantly: (i) the unpopularity o f the labour and liberal alternatives; (ii) the absence 
of an organisational framework for the emergence o f a labour movement; and (iii) the lack of 
emotional appeal o f non-populist ideologies [see Telia, T. S. di, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford: 1965), 51-52].
23 After Telia, T. S. di, (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1965), 53.
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Of course, di Telia’s analysis is not without its problems; most significantly, it appears 
to be committed to too narrow a view of the sorts of social conditions which lead to 
the emergence of populism, and, consequently, it is artificially restrictive in the kinds 
o f regime which it considers “populist”. For example, Ernesto Laclau argues that to 
link populism to a transitional phase of development is to accept a number of highly 
questionable assumptions, and leads one to deny that populism can exist in the 
developed world, despite the apparently populist character of a number of the regimes 
and movements which have emerged there (for example, the Fascist movements).24 
However, notwithstanding this over-specificity, there are insights in di Telia’s account 
which have, as it will become clear, general applicability for the understanding of 
populism. Of particular importance are the notions: (i) that populism is 
characteristically associated with situations of socio-economic marginality, whether 
these exist at the level of nation, social class and/or social/occupational group; and (ii) 
that populist ideologies perform functions which are primarily integrative.
Significantly, both these ideas are to be found in the second of the works on populism 
that I wish to consider; namely, Angus Stewart’s The Social Roots. According to 
Stewart, populism emerges in the context of differential modernisation. In this respect, 
the social relationship which is most basic to populism is that between “metropolis” 
and “province”.25 There are two significant dimensions to this relationship: firstly, 
there is the tension between backward and more advanced countries; and secondly, 
there is the tension between backward and developed parts of the same country. It is 
Stewart’s claim that populism arises as a result of these tensions.26
He argues that populist movements emerge in societies and social groups where there 
exists both the reality mid an awareness of being peripheral to the centres of power 
[Stewart, 1969: 181]. In this context, the “demonstration effect” is significant. This has 
its greatest impact upon indigenous elites, and takes the form both of an exposure to 
the analyses surrounding the modernisation of the West, and an actual experience of
24 See Laclau, E., Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, (Verso, London: 1979), 153-154.
25 See Stewart, A., "The social roots", in Ionescu, G. and Gellner, E., (Eds.), Populism: Its 
Meaning and National Characteristics, (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London: 1969), ISO- 
181; and 190-191.
26 Stewart, A., (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London: 1969), 181.
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the consequences for their countries of relative economic backwardness. Populism is a 
response to the eroded legitimacy which results from the problems of economic 
development; it represents an attempt:
to revitalize integration on the basis of “traditional” values. Initially it is 
those who compose the movement who are to be so integrated....But in 
the long run it is a technique of national integration. This attempt may 
come from those who wish to change the structure of society or from 
those who wish to preserve it and their position in it which they see as 
threatened.27
Thus, for Stewart, populist movements can be considered as responses to a variety of 
crises of development. Two such crises are of especial significance: firstly, where a 
social group, in response to the frustrations caused by the demonstration effect and/or 
the lack of opportunity for advancement, adopts rapid modernisation as a desirable 
goal, then this is frequently sufficient to engender a populist mobilisation (consider, 
for example, the Russian populists) [Stewart, 1969: 185]; and secondly, where 
modernisation is already underway in a society, populist movements can emerge as a 
consequence of the current or anticipated consequences of change (for example, the 
American populist movement) [Stewart, 1969: 186].
As a result of this character as responses to crises of development, populist 
movements, according to Stewart, have a peculiar “Janus quality” [Stewart, 1969: 
186]; that is, they seek to control the modernisation process in terms of the traditional 
values of their respective societies. This is reflected in the synthesis of modernism and 
traditionalism which characterises their ideologies. The beliefs which constitute these 
ideologies have a dual function as “solutions to critical dilemmas” and “mobilizing 
agents”. In this respect, of particular importance “is the task of mobilizing and 
organizing individuals who because of their economic situation and/or novel social 
situation are politically marginal [Stewart, 1969: 193].”
27 Stewart, A., "The social roots", in Ionescu, G. and Gellner, E., (Eds.), Populism: Its Meaning 
and National Characteristics, (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London: 1969), 182.
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It is this functioning which underlies the eclecticism of populist ideologies. Common 
themes include:28 (i) the notion that social reconstruction should be organised around 
the institutions of the “people”, an idea that facilitates integration by its appeal to 
traditional forms; (ii)an emphasis on the “uniqueness” of the society which has 
produced the populist movement and the situation that it faces; (iii) the identification 
of “conspiratorial agents” to explain the stress situations faced by the followers of 
populist movements; and (iv) a rejection of the parliamentary form of politics. 
However, despite the eclecticism that the mobilising function engenders, the content 
and meaning of populist ideology is far from arbitrary. Rather, claims Stewart, “it must 
and will correspond to the critical situations in which the movement’s followers find 
themselves and will do so the more specifically where the mass base of the movement 
is genuinely homogeneous [Stewart, 1969:193].”
It is possible to identify in this analysis two central themes. The first is the notion that 
the modernisation process creates a number of relations of inclusion and exclusion, 
which can be understood in terms of a distinction between “metropolis” and 
“province” (or “core” and “periphery”). In simple terms, the idea being advanced here 
is that modernisation has uneven effects; that it produces, both internationally and 
intra-nationally, differentials in wealth, power, influence and so on. Significantly, 
these differentials have subjective correlates in the awareness which social groups 
have of their relative disadvantage.
The second key theme is the argument that populism emerges in the context of 
differential modernisation, representing a response to real, threatened or imagined 
exclusion and marginality. In this respect, Stewart’s treatment of the functions of 
ideology is particularly insightful, since it suggests an analytic framework which has a 
scope that extends beyond the purely macro-political. Specifically, his utilisation of 
Geertz’s idea that ideology constitutes a “map of problematic social reality” and his 
argument that populist beliefs function as “solutions to critical dilemmas” suggest a 
conception which recognises not only the macro-political significance of the
28 See Stewart, A., "The social roots", in Ionescu, G. and Gellner, E., (Eds.), Populism: Its 
Meaning and National Characteristics, (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London: 1969), 
192-193.
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mobilising function of populist ideology, but also that this function is fundamentally 
dependent on the ability of populist ideology to represent, address and articulate the 
uncertainties and frustrations that individuals experience when confronted by the 
consequences of their exclusion from the centres of power and influence. Thus, there 
is, in Stewart’s account, an implicit recognition that explanations of populism must 
concern themselves with the realm of subjectivity; particularly, with the way that 
social actors experience: firstly, the conditions which lead to the emergence of populist 
movements; and secondly, the discourses and structures of the movements themselves.
However, these sorts of issues are not explored in any detail; and consequently, 
Stewart’s account remains incomplete. This can be illustrated by considering the 
relationship that exists between the “social roots” of populism and the specifically 
“populist” response. It is, as we have seen, Stewart’s claim that certain social 
conditions are basic to the emergence of populism; however, he does not adequately 
specify the mechanisms that underlie this relation. In particular, his neglect of the 
realm of subjectivity and its relationship to populism, leaves him unable to deal with a 
whole series of questions, concerning the efficacy of the populist intervention, which 
are suggested by his analysis. These include, for example:
1. At the level of individual subjectivity, what are the consequences of the 
experience of socio-economic exclusion and marginality?
2. What is the relationship between subjectivity constituted in exclusion/margin- 
ality and the emergence of populist movements and ideologies?
3. What are the bases of the integrative and mobilising properties of populist 
ideology? What is the peculiar efficacy of an appeal to “the people”; a 
condemnation of “conspiratorial agents”; a celebration of traditional insti­
tutions; and so on?
4. How do individuals experience a discursive intervention that is based upon 
these kinds of ideological elements? To what extent do populist discourses 
resonate with the structures of subjectivity?
Without considering these sorts of questions, the relationship between the “social
roots” of populism and the specifically populist response remains purely empirical. In
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other words, whilst Stewart’s analysis has the merit of specifying the kinds of social 
conditions that lead to populism, it is unable to demonstrate adequately - despite a 
treatment of ideology which suggests an appropriate analytic framework - how and 
why populist movements emerge.
Of course, it is not only Stewart’s account that is undermined as a consequence of a 
neglect of the realm of subjectivity. For example, precisely the same problems are to 
be found in di Telia’s analysis of populism. For instance, di Telia argues that in order 
for populist ideology to perform its mobilising and integrative functions, it must have 
widespread emotional appeal. However, he discusses neither the dynamics of this 
appeal, nor the nature of the experience of populism, and consequently, offers no 
satisfactory explanation of the apparent integrative and mobilising properties of the 
populist address.
A similar neglect of the realm of subjectivity characterises the third of the analyses of 
populism that I wish to consider; namely, Ernesto Laclau’s Towards a Theory o f  
Populism. However, in the case of Laclau, this neglect is not accidental; it is, rather, a 
function of the Althusserian problematic which informs his work. From this 
perspective, individuals are the mere bearers o f structures’, their subjectivity is 
constituted in ideology by the mechanism of interpellation (“hailing”), whereby the 
determinate individual is transformed so that he might live his conditions of existence 
as a determinant subject.29
According to Laclau, it is clear that to the extent that the basic function of ideology is 
to interpellate individuals as subjects, the isolated elements of an ideological system 
are unified by the specific interpellation which forms the organising principle of the 
ideology. In this respect, he distinguishes between class interpellations and popular- 
democratic interpellations: the former - which constitute individuals as class subjects - 
are based on the objective contradiction that exists at the level of the mode of 
production between classes; the latter - which constitute individuals as “the people” -
29 See Laclau, E., Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, (Verso, London: 1979), 100-101.
30 See Laclau, E., (Verso, London: 1979), 101-102.
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are based on the contradiction that exists at the level of a determinate social formation
31between “the people” and the power-bloc.
Not surprisingly, it is Laclau’s claim that the class contradiction is pre-eminent. 
Consequently, popular-democratic interpellations, which have no particular class 
content, always present themselves articulated with class discourses. In fact, according 
to Laclau, “...Class struggle at the ideological level consists, to a great extent, in the 
attempt to articulate popular-democratic interpellations in the ideological discourses of 
antagonistic classes. The popular-democratic interpellation not only has no precise  
class content; but is the domain o f  ideological class struggle p a r  excellence [Laclau, 
1979: 108-109].”
In this struggle, it is the task of the dominant class to neutralise the potential 
antagonisms which are contained in “the people”/power-bloc contradiction. In part, 
this is achieved by articulating popular-democratic interpellations to the class project 
of the dominant class; or, more specifically, by:
a transformation of all antagonism into simple difference. The 
articulation of popular-democratic ideologies within the dominant 
discourse consists in an absorption of everything in it which is simple 
differential particularity and a repression of those elements which tend 
to transform particularity into a symbol of antagonism.
For Laclau, populism emerges precisely at the point where the dominant class is no 
longer able to absorb the antagonistic potential of popular-democratic interpellations. 
Thus, “populism consists in the presentation o f  popular-democratic interpellations as 
a synthetic-antagonistic complex with respect to the dominant ideology [Laclau, 1979: 
172-173].” There are two major contexts in which this occurs: (i) where a fraction of
31 "The "people” form an objective determination: the people are one o f the poles o f the 
dominant contradiction in a social formation, that is, a contradiction whose intelligibility 
depends on the ensemble o f political and ideological relations o f domination and not just the 
relations o f production. If class contradiction is the dominant contradiction at the abstract 
level o f the mode o f production, the people/power bloc contradiction is dominant at the level 
o f the social formation [Laclau, 1979: 108]."
32 Laclau, E., Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, (Verso, London: 1979), 173.
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the dominant class, seeking to impose its hegemony but unable to do so within the 
existing arrangement of forces, uses such interpellations in order to secure the support 
of the masses for a restructuring of the power-bloc (as, for example, with the case with 
Nazism);33 and (ii) where a crisis in transformism reduces the ability of the dominant 
bloc to neutralise the antagonism implicit in popular-democratic interpellations, and 
the latter, consequently, become increasingly fused with the class discourses of the 
dominated sectors.34 Thus, for Laclau, movements and ideologies are populist not 
because they share similar social bases; nor because their ideologies display the same 
class interests, “but because popular interpellations appear in all of them, presented in 
the form of antagonism and not just of difference [Laclau, 1979: 174].”
The merit of Laclau’s account is that it represents a sophisticated attempt to construct 
a Marxist theory of populism; one that circumvents many of the difficulties which are 
traditionally associated with this type of approach to politics (most significantly, class 
reductionism).35 However, it is, nevertheless, a deeply flawed analysis, one which 
ultimately betrays the vacuity of the Marxist problematic which forms its foundations. 
In order to justify this claim, I wish to examine briefly Laclau’s analysis of the 
emergence of Nazism - a sui generis form of populism36 - so that I might refer to this 
specific case when considering how Laclau’s theory of populism is compromised by 
the kind of neglect of the realm of subjectivity which is characteristic of the structural- 
Marxist approach.37
According to Laclau, Nazism emerged in the context of a dual crisis: firstly, a crisis of 
the power-bloc; and secondly, a crisis of the working-class. The crisis of the power- 
bloc stemmed from the inability of monopoly capital to gain political hegemony in the 
face of opposition from a politically powerful land-owning sector. In this situation, 
facing the necessity of political and economic restructuring, monopoly capital was
33 See Laclau, E., Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, (Verso, London: 1979), 173.
34 See Laclau, E., (Verso, London: 1979), 174.
35 For a brief summary o f the merits o f Laclau's theory, see Mouzelis, N., "Ideology and class 
politics: a critique o f Emesto Laclau", in New Left Review, 112, (45-61), 49.
36 Laclau, E., (Verso, London: 1979), 153.
37 For different types o f critique, see Mouzelis, N., "Ideology and class politics: a critique o f 
Emesto Laclau", 45-61; and Canovan, M., Populism, (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New 
York and London: 1981), 342-344.
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forced to seek a radical confrontation with the existing political system on the basis of 
a popular mobilisation; with the caveat that this mobilisation could not be allowed to 
develop into a mass socialist movement. The conditions existed in 1930s Germany for 
such a mobilisation as a result of the post-war crisis, which, coupled with the 
impotence of a power-bloc paralysed by contradiction, led to a crisis of transformism 
and the emergence of a jacobinised petty-bourgeoisie; that is, a petty-bourgeoisie 
characterised by “the conviction that the struggle against the dominant-bloc can be 
carried out as an exclusively democratic struggle, apart from classes [Laclau, 1979: 
116]”. According to Laclau, it was the specific achievement of fascism that the 
resultant mobilisation assumed a character which prevented an identification between 
popular-democratic and socialist interpellations [Laclau, 1979: 119]. Therefore, it 
was fascism which “provided the necessary condition for monopoly capital to make 
use of a mass mobilization against the traditional system of power...[Laclau, 1979: 
120].”
Additionally, monopoly capital was aided in this task, claims Laclau, by the crisis of 
the working-class; that is, by the failure of the working-class to contest the arena of 
popular-democratic struggles. This occurred because socialist political discourse had 
been structured to exclude non-class interpellations. Both the reformist and 
revolutionary fractions of the working-class pursued exclusively class policies. 
Consequently, confronted by the crisis of transformism, “they did not even try to link 
the radical jacobinism of the middle classes to socialist discourse: they maintained 
themselves in a pure class perspective which led to their political suicide [Laclau, 
1979: 128].” Thus, argues Laclau, “...Fascism, in this sense, was the result of a crisis of 
the working class”; a crisis rooted in “its incapability of presenting itself to the 
dominated classes as a whole as a hegemonic popular alternative....As a result, the 
popular interpellations of the middle classes were absorbed and neutralised...by fascist 
political discourse, which put them at the service of the new monopoly fraction 
[Laclau, 1979:128].”
38 ,. ,i •This was achieved: firstly, by the predominance o f a racial interpellation, which allowed the 
retention o f the jacobin radicalism necessary for a challenge to the power-bloc, whilst 
obstructing its channelling in a socialist direction [Laclau, E., Politics and Ideology in 
Marxist Theory, (Verso, London: 1979), 120]; and secondly, by corporativism, which 
permitted class interpellations but denied the reality o f "class struggle", and the possibility o f 
an identification between "people" and "class" [120-121].
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It can be seen, therefore, that Nazism is, for Laclau, characteristically a form of 
populism; it emerged from a crisis in the dominant bloc; and constituted a challenge to 
the existing political system by a new class fraction, on the basis of a presentation o f  
popular-democratic interpellations as a synthetic-antagonistic complex with respect to 
the dominant ideology [Laclau, 1979: 172-173]. However, Laclau’s analysis is 
inadequate both as a treatment of the emergence of Nazism, and as a specification of 
the character of a sui generis form of populism.
In broad terms, the problems of Laclau’s account stem from two related sources: (i) the 
Althusserian problematic which informs his work; and (ii) the neglect of the realm of 
subjectivity; or more precisely, the view that subjectivity is constituted in ideology by 
the mechanism of interpellation. In order to examine these problems, I wish to analyse 
critically the three key propositions of Laclau’s account.
Proposition I  Popular-democratic interpellations express the objective contra­
diction that exists, at the level of a social formation, between “the people” and the 
power-bloc.
This proposition contains a whole series of questionable assumptions which would 
warrant further examination, if it were the sole purpose of this analysis to provide a 
definitive critique of Laclau’s account. In particular, both the idea of ideological inter­
pellation and the argument that a social formation is characterised by an “ensemble of 
political and ideological relations of domination [Laclau, 1979: 108]” are highly 
problematic. However, due to the enormity of the task of criticising these notions, I 
propose here to deal only with the problems of specification which surround the idea 
of popular-democratic interpellations.
The most significant point about popular-democratic interpellations is that they rely 
for their specification on the purely logical relationship they enjoy with the 
people/power-bloc contradiction. “To be able to speak of a popular-democratic 
interpellation,” writes Laclau, “the subject addressed as “the people” must be so in 
terms of an antagonistic relationship regarding the dominant-bloc.”39 This is the case
39 Laclau, E., Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, (Verso, London: 1979), 107.
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quite simply because the people, at the level of a social formation, constitute one pole 
of the contradiction between the dominated (“the people” = the oppressed = the 
underdog)40 and the dominant (the power-bloc = the State). Thus, the existence and 
nature of popular-democratic interpellations is arrived at and guaranteed by deductive 
reasoning. However, this has a number of problematic consequences which have a 
bearing on the analysis of populism (as it will become clear when propositions II and 
IH are considered).
To start with, the status of discourses that use “the people” as an interpellative 
structure but which do not express opposition to the power-bloc is not clear. Laclau’s 
analysis suggests two possibilities, neither of which is satisfactory. Firstly, it is 
possible that such discourses exist as a consequence of the neutralisation and 
absorption of popular-democratic interpellations by the dominant-class.41 However, 
this kind of conception leads to problems of falsifiability; specifically, it means that 
references to “the people” are, by definition, ultimately grounded in the people/power- 
bloc contradiction. And secondly, it is possible that such discourses are mere rhetoric, 
lacking a specific material basis.42 However, this is neither to address nor to 
understand the nature of the experience of the social world, and therefore, it fails as an 
explanation of the efficacy of “the people” as an ideological symbol (a point to which I 
will return later on).
A second problem is that Laclau grounds his analysis in the theoretical specification of 
an objective contradiction (people/power-bloc) which contains as a possibility its own 
resolution. He also, as we have seen, adheres to a view which states that individuals 
are the mere bearers of structures. The combined effect of these propositions is to 
guarantee that individuals are worthy of the historico-revolutionary role assigned to 
them by the Marxist problematic. By definition, “the people” are a potentially
40 Laclau uses this type o f terminology to describe "the people" and the power-bloc. See, for 
example, Laclau, E., Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, (Verso, London: 1979), 105- 
108; and 166-167.
41 See Laclau’s discussion o f Macpherson's analysis o f liberal ideology, Laclau, E., (Verso, 
London: 1979), 170.
42 Suggested by Laclau, E., (Verso, London: 1979), 165-167.
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revolutionary force. If popular-democratic interpellations are “reactionary”,43 - as they 
were, for example, in the case of National Socialism - it is merely a consequence of 
the distortions imposed by the class struggle. It does not imply that “the people” are 
unworthy of their destiny. In effect, therefore, Laclau engages in an arbitrary 
celebration of the oppressed, ascribing to them a potentially heroic character, whatever 
the realities of their actual historical struggles.
Proposition n  Populism consists in the articulation of popular-democratic inter­
pellations as a synthetic-antagonistic complex with respect to the dominant 
ideology.
The strategy whereby Laclau arrives at this conception of populism is illuminating. 
Firstly, he notes that references to “the people” occupy a central place in populist 
discourses [Laclau, 1979:165]. Secondly, he argues, as we have already seen, that “the 
people” is related to a specific contradiction, and therefore, is not merely a rhetorical 
concept but an objective determination [Laclau, 1979: 165]. Thirdly, he asks whether 
mere reference to the people - or, in his terms, the presence of popular-democratic 
interpellations - is sufficient to define a discourse as populist. He concludes that it is 
not, since “...Numerous ideological discourses make reference to “the people” which 
we would not think of calling “populist” [Laclau, 1979: 172].” And finally, he 
concludes, therefore, that a populist discourse is one that contains a peculiar form of 
articulation of popular-democratic interpellations; namely, as Proposition II states, in a 
synthetic-antagonistic complex with respect to the dominant ideology [Laclau, 1979: 
172].
The difficulties associated with this strategy and the conception which it produces are 
clear. For example:
43 By "reactionary", I mean an ideology that seeks to ostracise and/or subjugate particular 
groups or individuals.
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1. It is a purely rhetorical point that there exist numerous ideological discourses 
which make reference to the “people” yet which are not populist, since this is 
clearly a matter of definition.
2. Since popular-democratic interpellations are defined in terms of their 
antagonistic relationship with the power-bloc, it is not clear how these can be 
presented in any way other than antagonistically towards the dominant ideology 
(see Proposition I);44
3. Most significantly, there are a number of problems concerning the idea that 
populism is defined by the antagonistic presentation of popular-democratic 
interpellations towards the dominant ideology. Particularly, the theoretical and 
empirical grounds for this conception need to be more clearly specified. In this 
respect, it is necessary to establish whether it is always the case, as Laclau 
implies, that commonly identified populisms in fact present their popular-demo­
cratic interpellations in this manner; and if  it is not always the case, then it is 
necessary to specify the theoretical grounds for excluding from the category 
“populism”, movements and ideologies which make their appeals to “the 
people” in other ways.
Also, if one accepts Laclau’s analysis, the status of movements that begin as protests 
against the power-bloc - thereby, satisfying the criterion for populism - but become the 
power-bloc’s dominant fraction is also not clear. At what point does a political 
movement - for example, National Socialism - cease to be populist? In the terms of 
Laclau’s analysis, it seems only possible to reply, rather arbitrarily, at the point at 
which it secures power and becomes a regime.
44 One possible response might be that popular-democratic interpellations can be present in the 
discourse o f a dominant class in a neutralised form. However, this leads to the problems o f 
falsifiability that I noted when discussing Proposition I; that is, the problem that all references 
to the people are related to the people/power-bloc contradiction as a matter o f definition.
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Proposition m  The “popular traditions” characteristic of populist discourses 
comprise popular-democratic interpellations, and, therefore, express the 
contradiction between “the people” and power-bloc.
The major difficulty associated with this proposition is that many of the “popular 
traditions” which make up populist discourses - particularly, those that might be 
characterised as “reactionary” - do not appear, in any obvious sense, to express the 
contradiction between “the people” and the power-bloc. In this respect, the racism and 
nationalism of the National Socialist movement immediately spring to mind; but one 
might also mention, for example, the authoritarian strands of “Thatcherite” discourses; 
the occasional racism of the American populists; and the anti-Semitism which was 
sometimes present in the Russian narodnichestvo. For Laclau, there appear to be two 
possible responses to this criticism: he can either accept that popular-democratic 
interpellations sometimes take on a reactionary character, but argue that this is a 
function of the distortions imposed by the class struggle;45 or he can maintain that 
popular-democratic interpellations cannot, by definition, be reactionary, and therefore, 
where reactionary popular traditions exist, they are merely rhetorical and incidental to 
the character of populism.
However, both these responses are seriously flawed. Particularly, they demonstrate the 
unfalsifiability of the assertion that popular-democratic interpellations are rooted in 
the struggle of the people against the power-bloc; that is, they demonstrate that this 
assertion is true by definition (see Proposition I). This fact has a number of important 
consequences. Most significantly, it provides Laclau with ready-made explanations for 
the existence of discourses which are both reactionary and popular, namely, that they 
are either the outcome of ideological class-struggle or they are merely rhetorical and 
lacking in the grounds for an emotional appeal. As a result, the necessity for further 
analysis of the foundations of reactionary discourses and the sources of their appeal is 
eliminated. However, the problem, of course, is simply that Laclau’s account is not 
very convincing. The history of “reactionary discourses” is that they are expressly used
45 Laclau makes this kind o f argument about the discourses o f National Socialism. Specifically, 
he argues that the ideological elements which constituted the dominated classes as "the 
People" and expressed their opposition to the power-bloc were present in these discourses, 
but that they were neutralised and distorted by a specifically fascist, racial interpellation [see 
Laclau, E., Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, (Verso, London: 1979), 119-121].
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by political movements and regimes in order to generate particular emotional states, 
for the purposes of mass political mobilisation. But Laclau’s account requires either 
that we dismiss their emotional appeal as merely transitory, to be annulled the moment 
that socialist discourses begin to contest the arena of popular-democratic struggle; or 
that we deny its reality altogether, arguing that it has no material foundation. Clearly, 
both these responses are unsatisfactory, not least because they preclude any serious 
analysis of the kinds relationships between discourse and subjectivity that I have been 
exploring in this thesis.
A number of points should be clear from this analysis of Laclau’s theory of populism. 
Firstly, the theory is largely rationalist in character; that is, it is derived, by means of 
logical deduction, from the concepts used to describe a social formation. Secondly, to 
the extent that it is built upon the logical relationships between concepts, the theory is 
empirically unfalsifiable. However, this is not to say that it is plausible, since, as I have 
demonstrated, it suggests a number of unanswered empirical and theoretical questions. 
And thirdly, the Althusserian problematic which informs Laclau’s work leads to a 
number of difficulties. These can be seen most clearly in the neglect of subjectivity, 
where the strategy which reduces subjectivity to social structure guarantees that 
individuals are worthy of their historico-revolutionary destiny. Laclau’s analysis rules 
out, as a matter of definition, the possibility that popular, reactionary discourses might 
be bom in and derive their efficacy from the structures of subjectivity. Clearly, this is 
of enormous benefit to Marxist theory, but it is bought at the expense of sociological 
rigour. For example, to deny the importance of psychological factors in National 
Socialism, to argue that the efficacy of ritual, symbolism and myth can be explained in 
structural terms, might be beneficial to Marxism, but it misunderstands that Nazism 
was a secularised religion, a “grand spectacle, from beginning to end”.46 In the final 
analysis, Laclau’s theory is flawed in a way similar to di Tella’s and Stewart’s: none of 
these properly consider the nature of the experience of populism; and, therefore, they 
are not able to specify satisfactorily the bases of the integrative and mobilising 
properties of populist ideology.
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Of course, unless it can be shown in a positive way why subjectivity is important for 
understanding populism, it is an empty criticism to argue that previous theories are 
deficient for neglecting this area. Therefore, it is necessary, at this point, to outline the 
beginnings of an alternative treatment of populism; one that draws upon the arguments 
concerning consciousness, subjectivity and intersubjectivity that I have developed 
throughout this work. By analysing populism in these terms, I hope, as I noted at the 
beginning of this chapter, to demonstrate not only that its understanding is enhanced 
by considering these kinds of issues, but also that there is a substantive utility in a 
political sociology which treats these areas of analysis seriously.
46 Eksteins, M., Rites o f Spring: The Great War and the Birth o f the Modem Age, (Black 
Swan, London: 1990), 414. See my discussion o f National Socialism and ritual, Chapter 5, 
149-157.
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PART II: POPULISM RECONSTRUCTED: THE CASE OF “THATCHERISM”
Introduction
The analysis to follow is founded on one major prppdsition; namely, that populist 
discourses - to the extent that they connote an apparently inalienable relative natural 
conception o f the world, and deny complexity and otherness - represent, address and 
articulate the various socio-existential dynamics which lie at the heart of subjectivity.
From this proposition, follow a number of secondary claims. These include: (i) that the 
macro-political efficacy of a populist intervention is ultimately founded upon effects 
that occur at the level of individual subjectivity; (ii) that populist discourses have a 
peculiar effectiveness as mechanisms of social integration and political mobilisation, 
as a consequence of the fact that they dovetail with the various socio-existential 
dynamics associated with subjectivity; as a result, such discourses tend to be employed 
where integration and mobilisation are perceived to be the major political tasks; and 
(iii) that populist discourses, as a consequence of their integrative and mobilising 
properties, tend to be associated with certain kinds of socio-economic circumstances; 
particularly, those where the integrity of a social group or society is threatened by
From these propositions, it is possible to anticipate the kind of analysis that is to be 
constructed. I have argued that there exist a number of socio-existential dynamics of 
subjectivity; specifically, the necessity that individuals experience to reaffirm their 
senses of self; the desire for the symbolic mastery of the “external world”; and the will 
to symbolic negation. The significant point about populist discourses is that they 
represent, address and articulate these various dynamics. Populism is fundamentally 
about belonging, the sovereignty of the in-group and the sanctity o f its associated 
folkways. Populist discourses, by celebrating the in-group and denigrating the out­
group, constitute a mechanism whereby individuals achieve a certain solidity of being. 
It is the ability of such discourses to deliver ontological security to their audiences 
which lends to them their effectiveness as mechanisms of integration and mobilisation. 
For whilst such discourses might be employed for macro-political ends, they have their 
roots in and address the structures of individual subjectivity.
increasing social marginalisation.
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In order to consider this argument and some of its implications in more detail, I wish 
to undertake a brief analysis of “Thatcherism”.47
Thatcherism
The normal strategy for explaining the emergence of Thatcherism is to point first to 
the socio-economic conditions that necessitated a break with the post-war settlement 
(i.e., the Butskellist commitment to full-employment, an expanding, stable economy 
and a strong welfare state), and to note that with the Labour Party beset by a number of 
internal contradictions it was only the Conservative Party which could accomplish the 
kind of break that Thatcherism represented.48 However, whatever the undoubted merit 
of this kind of strategy, it is deficient to the extent that it neglects the symbolic and 
psychological aspects of the Thatcherite intervention; that is, to the extent that it treats 
Thatcherism purely in terms of macro economic, political and social processes. Of 
course, this is not to say that political analysts do not make reference to symbolism and 
to psychological concepts and categories to understand Thatcherism.49 Rather, it is to 
claim that such references are rarely integrated into conceptual schemata which allow 
one to understand Thatcherism simultaneously at the macro and micro-levels.
In order to explore the kinds of insights that are generated by an approach that operates 
at both these levels, and to illustrate the sense in which Thatcherite discourses, as 
populist discourses, articulated the various dynamics associated with subjectivity, I 
will adopt the following strategy for analysing Thatcherism. Firstly, I will briefly 
examine whether the Thatcherite intervention can be considered “populist” in the 
sense specified by the working definition established at the beginning of this chapter. 
And secondly, I will explore the relationship between Thatcherite discourses and two
47 For discussions o f "Thatcherism", see, for example: Hall, S. and Jacques, M., The Politics o f  
Thatcherism, (Lawrence and Wishait, London: 1983); Young, H. and Sloman, A., The 
Thatcher Phenomenon, (BBC, London: 1986); Cole, J., The Thatcher Years, (BBC, London:
1987); Jenkins, P., Mrs Thatcher's Revolution, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Mass.: 1988); and Young, H., One o f Us: Final Edition, (Pan Books, London, Sydney and 
Auckland: 1991).
48 See, for example, Jenkins, P., (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.: 1988).
49 See, for example, Hall, S., “Gramsci and Us”, Marxism Today, June 1987, 19.
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analytically separate audiences; namely, the “committed” and “non-committed” 
audiences.
Thatcherism was indeed a populist intervention:50 its discourses ^ e re  ahOund with 
references to the People, and their corollaries, ordinary men and women (housewives), 
the family and the Nation;51 it employed rhetoric that was oppositional and combative 
in character, targeting, in particular, collectivism and the interventionist state, the 
legacy of socialism and moral turpitude;52 and, in certain senses, it was anti­
intellectual53 and it eschewed the trappings of representative government54 Moreover, 
Thatcherism also exhibited a number of other characteristics which are often 
associated with populist movements. In particular, its discourses: (i) celebrated a
50 To illustrate this point, I will quote from some o f the major speeches that Margaret Thatcher 
gave during her years as the Conservative Party leader. It should be noted that these quotes 
represent well documented aspects o f Thatcherism. In this respect, see Young, H. and 
Sloman, A., The Thatcher Phenomenon, (BBC, London: 1986); Jenkins, P., Mrs Thatcher's 
Revolution, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.: 1988); and Young, H., One o f Us: 
Final Edition, (Pan Books, London, Sydney and Auckland: 1991).
51 Margaret Thatcher has declared: "Our aim is to let the people feel that they count for more 
and more. If we cannot trust the deepest instincts o f our people, we should not be in politics 
at all (1980) [Thatcher, 1989: 116]"; and "...But we had - and we have - the great assurance 
that our beliefs are not lofty abstractions confined to philosophy lectures. They are what 
ordinary men and women agree on instinctively (1988) [Thatcher, 1989: 279].". See also, for 
example, Thatcher, M., The Revival o f Britain, (Edited: Cooke, A. B.), (Aurum Press, 
London: 1989), 159; and 177.
52 Margaret Thatcher has stated: "It is the Labour Government that has brought us record peace­
time taxation. They have the usual Socialist disease: they have run out o f other people's 
money...Never in the field o f human credit has so much been owed (1975) [Thatcher, 1989: 
20]"; "Today the conflict o f interest is not so much between unions and employers as 
between unions and the nation...(1979) [Thatcher, 1989: 102]"; and "...What we have seen in 
this country is the emergence o f an organized revolutionary minority who are prepared to 
exploit industrial disputes but whose real aim is the breakdown o f law and order and the 
destruction o f democratic parliamentary Government (1984) [Thatcher, 1989: 191]".
53 The anti-intellectualism o f Thatcherism is tied up with the centrality o f "the People" in its 
discourses. For example, in 1986, Margaret Thatcher declared that "...Conservatism is not 
some abstract theory. It's a crusade to put power in the hands o f ordinary people [Thatcher, 
1989: 205]". Moreover, anti-intellectualism formed the underpinning o f a number o f more 
specific discourses, including those that concerned law-and-order, education and urban-decay 
[see Thatcher, M., (Aurum Press, London: 1989), 274; 226; and 228].
54 This aspect o f Thatcherism appeared little in its discourses (presumably out o f the need to 
appear committed to the democratic process). However, it was evident in its activities. In this 
respect, Jessop, B., Bonnett, K., Bromley, S. and Ling T., argue that "the state has been 
Thatcherized through civil service reorganization and politically motivated promotion to key 
official posts; through the enhancement o f Treasury control over all areas of 
government.. .through the radical centralization o f government power and the assault on local 
government...[Jessop, B., Bonnett, K., Bromley, S. and Ling T., 1984: 50]." One might also 
consider the so-called "Westland Crisis", (1986), precipitated by the resignation o f Michael 
Heseltine, the then Defence Secretary, who claimed that Margaret Thatcher had no regard for 
the procedures o f Cabinet government.
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mythic national past;55 and (ii) employed themes of nationalism and mild 
xenophobia.56
The sense in which these kinds of discourses might have articulated the socio- 
existential dynamics of subjectivity is clear. Specifically, they can be conceived as 
mechanisms which enable individuals to attain both the symbolic mastery of the 
external-world and the symbolic negation of the other,; to this extent, they function 
also to deliver a certain solidity of being. Thus, for example, to celebrate “the People”, 
the family and the Nation is to reaffirm the sanctity of the in-group and its associated 
folkways', and to employ oppositional and combative rhetoric to denigrate and 
marginalise those groups and philosophies that are perceived to be a threat to the 
integrity of the in-group is to negate symbolically the threat posed by the other. In this 
sense, Thatcherite discourses can be seen to have functioned like any other political 
discourse, disseminating a number of important myths, constructing “a world which is 
without contradictions because it is without depth, a world wide open and wallowing 
in the evident”, establishing “a blissful clarity”, where “things appear to mean
cn
something by themselves”.
However, it is, of course, necessary to go beyond this general statement about 
Thatcherite discourses, to attempt to specify more fully the precise mechanisms that 
lay behind their functioning. The importance of this task is obvious when one 
considers that whilst Thatcherism was populist in character it is by no means clear that 
it achieved popular consent for its project.58 Therefore, in order to explore more fully
5 In this respect, Margaret Thatcher states that "...Britain is a great nation. The Conservative is 
proud o f our national past. We still acclaim the scientific and technological innovations to 
which Britain gave birth and which ushered in the industrial and scientific age....We have 
given to the world the English language, which is now close to being to the modem world 
what Latin was to the ancient. We know that our literature is a general inspiration. We rejoice 
that Britain is still respected in all free countries as the "Mother o f Parliaments" and the 
custodian o f the principle o f the rule o f law [Thatcher, 1989: 84]."
56 These discourses were utilised most significantly to make the case for immigration controls. 
For example, in 1978, Margaret Thatcher claimed that "the British character has done so 
much for democracy, for law, and done so much throughout the world, that if  there is a fear 
that it might be swamped, people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in. 
So if  you want good race relations, you have got to allay people's fears on numbers [cited in
, YoimgHI. and Sloman, A., 1986: 87, (footnote)]."
 ^ 57 BdrthesJ R., Mythologies, (Paladin, London: 1973), 156. See above, Chapter 3, 82-83; and
o Chaptpr5, 139-141.
58 The evidence seems to suggest that people's reaction to Thatcherism was decidedly 
ambivalent. This can be illustrated in a number o f different ways: (i) in the three general
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the sense in which Thatcherite discourses articulated the subjectivities of their 
audiences, I wish to examine, as I stated above, their relationship to the committed and 
non-committed audiences.
The Committed Audience
To anticipate, I wish to argue that it is not possible to understand the successful 
genesis of Thatcherism without understanding the sense in which its discourses both 
represented and addressed the hopes, fears and common-sense of its advocates. To 
illustrate this point, I will focus upon the authoritarian aspects of Thatcherism, and 
consider their relationship to the biography and psychology of Margaret Thatcher. By 
doing so, I hope to demonstrate, amongst other things, that the macro-political efficacy 
of a political intervention is founded, at least in part, on effects which are generated at 
the level of individual subjectivity.
According to Stuart Hall, the authoritarianism of Thatcherism was manifest in its 
advocacy of tougher policies on law and order; a stringent industrial relations policy; 
tighter controls on immigration; and an end to moral lassitude.59 Similarly, Andrew 
Belsey argues that the authoritarian aspect of Thatcherism was characterised by a 
commitment to: (i) strong government; (ii) social authoritarianism; (iii) a disciplined 
society; (iv) hierarchy and subordination; and (v) the nation.60 The similarity between
elections that the Conservative Party fought under the leadership o f Margaret Thatcher, it 
never gained more than half o f the popular vote; (ii) it is clear that many Conservative voters 
were not committed to the Thatcherite project; for example, with respect to the 1987 general 
election, Ivor Crewe points out that had voters supported the party they preferred on the 
issues they claimed that counted, then the Labour Party would have achieved victory [Ivor 
Crewe, The Guardian, 16/06/87]; (iii) the Conservative Party was unable to translate its 
dominance o f national elections (i.e., 1979, 1983 and 1987) into general dominance o f 
elections; for example, the Conservatives performed relatively badly in die shire council 
elections o f 1985 and 1989, in the provincial and metropolitan council elections o f 1986 and 
1990, in the European elections o f 1985 and 1989, and in numerous by-elections; (iv) it is 
possible to identify a number o f areas o f political contestation that proved particularly 
resistant to the Thatcherite message; for example, the Community Charge (a system o f local 
government taxation); the National Health Service; and the issue o f elected metropolitan 
authorities; and (v) in The Guardian newspaper’s average o f polls index, the Conservative 
Party, between the years o f 1979-1990, at no time gained the support o f more than 50% of 
the population [see Birch, H., McDermott, Q. and McNay, M., (Eds.), The Thatcher Legacy, 
The Guardian Collection: No. 3, (The Guardian: 1990): 61].
59 See Hall, S. and Jacques, M., The Politics o f Thatcherism, (Lawrence and Wishart, London: 
1983), passim.
60 Belsey, A., "The New Right, social order and civil liberties", in Levitas, R., (Ed.), Ideology 
o f the New Right, (Polity Press, Cambridge: 1986), 169-197.
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the attitudes that underpinned these themes and those that dominated Thatcher’s 
childhood is striking. In this respect, her biographers stress the austerity and asceticism 
of her early years, emphasising, in particular, the formative influence of her Methodist 
father, Alf Roberts; it was he who taught the young Margaret the values of duty, 
patriotism, hard work, self-help and thrift. “We were Methodists,” she later declared, 
“and Methodist means method...There were certain things you just didn’t do, and that 
was that.. .Duty to the church, duties to your neighbour and conscientiousness were 
continually emphasised.”61
Needless to say, this simple correspondence between the attitudes and philosophies 
which dominated Margaret Thatcher’s childhood and the broad themes that 
underpinned the authoritarian aspect of the Thatcherite intervention is not necessarily 
a causal relationship. However, it should be noted, that for some commentators it is 
precisely this; for example, Sir William Pile, the Permanent Secretary at the 
Department of Education and Science from 1970-1974, claims that “...Everything she 
did, and that included all her public policies and her private discussions of those 
policies, sprang not from her intellect, nor were they inherited from a manifesto of 
somebody else’s intellect, but from her own character. I’ve known no minister whose 
policies were the man to the same extent. Everything she did, all her preferences, all 
her prejudices sprang from innate preferences and prejudices and the character of her 
upbringing and her genetic endowment.”62 Nevertheless, it is probably wise to treat 
these claims, and the more general view that Thatcherism was bom in the character of 
Margaret Thatcher, with caution, not least because the absence of counterfactuals 
means that questions concerning the causal significance of the actions and 
philosophies of particular individuals to the course of history are ultimately 
intractable, therefore, leaving us unable to rule out the possibility that “Thatcherism” 
might have existed without Thatcher. Moreover, there are also empirical reasons for 
doubting the validity of Pile’s claims; for example, it is quite possible to find instances
61 Cited in Young, H., One o f  Us: Final Edition, (Pan Books, London, Sydney and Auckland: 
1991), 6.
62 Cited in Young, H. and Sloman, A., The Thatcher Phenomenon, (BBC, London: 1986), 12-
13.
where Thatcher made decisions on the basis of pragmatic rather than “ideological” 
considerations.63
Instead, I wish to ask a different question about the similarity between the world-view 
of Margaret Thatcher and the authoritarianism of the Thatcherite project. Specifically, 
I wish to examine whether there is a sense in which this similarity is functional for 
Thatcher at the level of subjectivity; that is, I wish to consider the sense in which there 
is a pay-off to subjectivity in a discourse which expresses and represents the attitudes 
and beliefs comprised therein (i.e., within subjectivity).
As a starting point to this analysis, I will make a number of comments about the nature 
and functioning of an authoritarian world-view.64 It will be recalled that, in Chapter 2, 
I described a mode of being which Sartre termed the spirit o f seriousness.65 This refers 
to an individual’s attitude towards the world, where he assigns a transcendent and 
objective reality to the beliefs, values, rights and duties which seemingly govern his 
behaviour. In the serious attitude, the individual seeks, and apparently achieves, the 
assurity and solidity of being that is demanded by the solitary relation; he finds reality 
outside himself, in a social identity which is defined by a network of rights and duties. 
The important point is that the authoritarian world-view is precisely an example of the 
spirit o f seriousness; it employs an absolutist morality; it emphasises the immutability 
of the world; it is intolerant of difference; and, as we have seen, it makes use of 
notions of rights and duties. Moreover, it also functions like the spirit o f seriousness', 
that is, it functions to locate the individual in the world; to define him; and to confer 
upon him a solidity of being.
However, the authoritarian world-view is also brittle; occupying the realm of value- 
orientations it is deprived of the ultimate legitimation that it works; its absolutism 
leaves it unable to assimilate the threat posed by alternative conceptions of the world; 
and it is undermined by the simple existence of those forms of behaviour that it denies.
63 Most famously, perhaps, in 1990, when she stood down from the second ballot o f the 
Conservative Party leadership election, despite her declared intention to fight on.
64 An ascetic, austere world-view, which stresses the importance o f duty, hard-work and thrift; 
and which preaches an absolutist morality, where retribution is the normal punishment for 
transgression. Needless to say, such a world-view occupies the realm o f value-orientations.
65 See Chapter 2, 57-58.
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The significance of these comments becomes clear when one considers the challenges 
that authoritarianism faced in the early to mid-1970s. Most significantly, there was the 
memory of the 1960s, a decade of enormous social upheaval - when many of the 
traditional structures of society had been uprooted and replaced by new ones - in the 
context of which authoritarianism was anachronistic and periphery, apparently seeking 
only to limit the potential for human self-fulfilment. Moreover, a whole series of social 
phenomena - for example, the perceived “explosion” in crime; “sexual promiscuity”; 
racial tension; the decline of Britain as a world power - provided on-going testament to 
both the contingency of the authoritarian world-view, and the otherness of the existent 
social order.66 The consequence of these sorts of challenge is that the taken-for- 
grantedness of the authoritarian world-view is undermined. In turn, this diminishes its 
efficacy as a tool for the symbolic mastery of the world, and threatens the integrity of 
the social identities that individuals gain when they enter the realm of authoritarian 
beliefs and values.
In the light of these arguments, it is easy to see how the authoritarianism of 
Thatcherism functioned in relation to the world-view of Margaret Thatcher. 
Specifically, the authoritarian discourses of Thatcherism: (i) expressed  a necessity to 
reaffirm a world-view that had apparently been left behind by the course of history; to 
this extent, they also articulated the deeper need for the reaffirmation of the self; (ii) 
expressed  a necessity to negate symbolically the other, in order that the threat posed by 
the existence of forms of behaviour denied by authoritarianism might be managed; to 
this extent, they also articulated the w ill to symbolic negation; (iii) functioned  to 
reaffirm the authoritarian world-view : - (a) by the continued reaffirmation and 
repetition of central themes; (b) by the symbolic negation of the other (see (ii), above); 
(c) by operating on the terrain of the breakdown in the authoritarian view, in order to 
reconstruct this in favour of authoritarianism;67 with the consequence that this 
viewpoint regained the ground that it had lost in the 1960s; and (d) by returning 
authoritarianism to the centre political stage, where it became enshrined in various 
policy decisions; - and (iv) to the extent that (iii) had been achieved, functioned  to
66 Note the similarity o f this argument to that made concerning the emergence o f Nazism in 
Germany. See Chapter 5, 149-157.
67 In this respect, note Hall's claim that every moment o f crisis is also a moment o f 
reconstruction. See Hall, S., “Gramsci and us”, Marxism Today, June 1987, passim.
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reaffirm the social identity which is achieved when occupying the realm of 
authoritarian beliefs and values.
Thus, it can be seen from these arguments that the authoritarian discourses of 
Thatcherism had a reaffirmatory function both with respect to the authoritarian world­
view that was so much part of Thatcher’s character, and with respect to her self more 
generally. Of course, the important point is that these sorts of arguments can be 
applied equally to all those others who were committed to the Thatcherite project. In
fact, there are reasons for supposing that they have even more pertinence when applied
68to the supporters of Thatcherism than they do when applied to Thatcher herself.
The Conservative Party, in the months preceding the election of Thatcher to its 
leadership, was experiencing something of a crisis. It had lost three of the four 
previous general elections; in its previous term in office, it had presided over four 
years of economic turmoil and social division; its leader, Edward Heath, was 
unpopular in both the country and the parliamentary party;69 and it was divided on 
matters of policy and style.70 In this sort of context, the ability of a party to bind its 
members to the ideals and philosophies that are central to its identity is diminished; 
and consequently, so is its capacity to generate a sense of belonging amongst its 
supporters; a sense that they are engaged in a collective endeavour - with the frisson 
that this provides - to create a society in their own image. In this respect, the 
discourses of Thatcherism - particularly, those that were authoritarian in character - 
performed a revivifying function. They constituted a mechanism by which the 
collective sentiments of the Conservative Party were renewed and thereby created the 
conditions that allowed the party faithful to experience their membership of the party 
with a greater intensity, with the consequence that their social identities, and the 
beliefs and values associated with these, were solidified.
In fact, Thatcherism, in general, performed a revivifying and integrating function for 
the Conservative Party (the committed audience). Thus, for example, Edward du Cann
68 The supporters o f Thatcherism did not, as a rule, have the frisson o f everyday political life to 
deliver to them ontological security, as did Margaret Thatcher.
69 See Cole, J., The Thatcher Years, (BBC, London: 1987), 8.
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greeted Thatcher’s (1975) leadership election victory with the comment that “...We 
have a new and rather exciting leader. Mrs Thatcher will make the Tory Party 
distinctive”; and he claimed that her election signalled “a new start, recreating, 
refreshing and reinvigorating.”71 Similarly, Barbara Castle, in her diaries, noted that 
“...Margaret’s election has stirred up her own side wonderfully: all her backbenchers 
perform like knights jousting at a tourney for a lady’s favours, showing off their paces 
by making an unholy row at every opportunity over everything the government 
does.”72 The Durkheimian parallels here are clear: Thatcherism, at least in its early 
stages, was, for the committed, a moment of collective ferment.; a moment when the 
Conservative Party was led into a closer relationship with itself, and its members lived 
their politics with an intensity that monopolised their minds to the more or less 
complete exclusion of egoism and the everyday.73 Thus, Thatcherite discourses func­
tioned to transport the committed audience to the heart of collective life and, 
consequently, reaffirmed both the beliefs and values that constituted their world-view, 
and their social identities more generally. The early success of Thatcherism, therefore, 
lay in its ability to unite a disunited party, in a manner that enabled its supporters to 
transcend the isolation and estrangement of the solitary relation.
The Non-Committed Audience
In the preceding analysis, I have used a conceptual framework that refers both to the 
micro-level of social actors and the macro-level of political forms and processes for its 
explanations. Specifically, I have demonstrated that Thatcherite discourses addressed 
and articulated the socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity, as they existed for the 
committed audience; and that there occurred, as a result, certainly in the early period 
of Thatcherism, a revival of the Conservative Party; a revival which fedback into the 
subjectivities of the committed audience, in the sense of an increase in their 
experience of ontological security.
70 Thus, Harold Wilson talked about a parliament "without any identifiably coherent 
Opposition, judged either by measures or men [cited in The Times, 01/02/75]."
71 Cited in The Times, 12/02/75.
72 Cited in Young, H. and Sloman, A., The Thatcher Phenomenon, (BBC, London: 1986), 37.
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In making these claims, I am adding substance to the more general arguments that 
have been developed concerning the mechanisms that enable individuals to escape the 
spectre of existential anxiety. In this respect, I have pointed to the significance of: (i) 
the in-group, and I have claimed that individuals gain social identities in relation to its 
typifications and relevances; and that these identities are enhanced in the conflictual 
relation, because, in conflict, the in-group is more real to individuals, and 
consequently, they are more real to themselves; (ii) the realm of value-orientations, a 
realm of imagined intersubjectivity, upon entry of which individuals are transported to 
the heart of collective life, where they celebrate the identities that they share with 
their fellow-men; and (iii) occasions of ritualistic celebration, which afford, in their 
collective effervescence, the greatest chance that people have to transcend the solitary 
relation.74
Clearly, the Thatcherite intervention seems readily understandable in these kinds of 
terms. For example, one might consider that Thatcherite discourses constructed and 
addressed a mythic in-group that comprised “the People” or “the Nation”, and 
juxtaposed this group to a number of out-groups - for instance, the “loony-left”, the 
“law-breakers” and the “flood of immigrants” - which were portrayed as threatening 
its integrity; or that in its authoritarian aspect, it manifested a rigid and well-defined 
set of moral precepts, which ensured the transparency of the social-world; and which 
could be called upon to effect the symbolic negation of the other. However, whilst this 
kind of analytical framework might be pertinent for understanding the relationship 
between Thatcherism and the committed audience, it is less clear how it is useful for 
understanding the relationship between Thatcherism and the non-committed audience. 
Quite simply, it is not obvious how the Thatcherite intervention might have aided 
those individuals who were not explicitly committed to its agenda to escape the fears 
associated with existential anxiety. For example, it does not appear plausible to 
suggest that non-committed individuals will have gained enhanced social identities
*7% After Durkheim, E., Sociology and Philosophy, (Cohen and West Ltd., London: 1953), 
91-92.
74 See Chapter 5, passim. Note also that these three mechanisms have corollaries in the more 
specific arguments that have been articulated about the reaffirmatory and integrative 
functions of: (i)pohtical conflict [for example, Chapter 3, 115-116]; (ii)pohtical discourse 
[for example, Chapter 3, 82-83]; and (iii) civic ritual [for example, Chapter 5, 149-157].
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simply by entering the realm of Thatcherite value-orientations. However, there are, in
r \ A
fact, a number of possible responses to this objection. - f
Firstly, it is to fail to recognise that discourses address their audiences on a number of
different levels of subjectivity.75 In this respect, the important point is that Thatcherite 7 
discourses addressed the socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity, as they existed at 
their deepest levels, even where individuals held particular attitudes, beliefs and values 
that were contrary to the Thatcherite ethos. Specifically, by employing bi-polar 
oppositions to connote “belonging” and “opposition”, in-group and out-group, 
Thatcherite discourses achieved a resonance at these levels, regardless of the thoughts 
and emotions that existed at higher levels of subjectivity, by their promise to deliver to 
their audiences some degree of ontological security.
Secondly, it will be remembered that I have argued that individuals do not hold one 
consistent set of attitudes, beliefs and values. Rather, these stand against one another 
in relations of relative consistency/inconsistency and superordination/subordination.76 
Consequently, Thatcherite discourses inevitably resonated with certain of the attitudes, 
beliefs and values that individuals held, even where these conflicted with other super­
ordinate attitudes, beliefs and values. As Stuart Hall put it, when addressing a 
conference organised by Marxism Today, “make no mistake, a tiny bit of all of us 
is...somewhere inside the Thatcherite project. Of course, we’re all one hundred per­
cent committed. But every now and then - Saturday mornings, perhaps, just before the 
demonstration - we go to Sainsbury’s and we’re just a tiny bit of a Thatcherite 
subject... [Hall, 1987: 19].”
Finally, there were aspects of the Thatcherite agenda which enjoyed considerable 
public support, even amongst those individuals who rejected the broad sway of 
Thatcherite policies. Specifically, there was substantial support for those discourses - 
founded upon a rhetoric of “Us” and “Them” distinctions - that dealt with “creeping 
collectivism”, left-wing extremism, welfare “scrounging”, law and order, sexual
75
76
See Chapter 4, 95. The important point to recognise here is that the various levels o f  
subjectivity are relatively autonomous. Therefore, each manifests its own analytically distinct 
relationship with the discourses o f  Thatcherism.
See Chapter 5, footnote 62.
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morality, immigration, defence, the relationship of Great Britain to other nations, and 
so on.77 Or, to put this another way, Thatcherism enjoyed considerable public support 
for those of its discourses that denied complexity and otherness, and that connoted an 
apparently inalienable relative natural conception of the world.
The prevalence in the mass public of the kinds of ideas, beliefs and values that these 
discourses represented is a consequence of the functional relationship which they 
enjoy with the socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity. Predicated upon relations of 
“inclusion” and “exclusion”, belonging and opposition, they function, as we have seen, 
to enable individuals to reaffirm their senses of self; to attain the symbolic mastery of 
the external-world; and to achieve the symbolic negation of the other. Therefore, 
Thatcherite discourses - to the extent that they embodied these kinds of ideas, beliefs 
and values - reflected, addressed and articulated this functional relationship.
77 The prevalence and significance, during the years o f Thatcherism, o f the kinds o f ideas, 
beliefs and values espoused in these discourses can be demonstrated both anecdotally and by 
a multitude o f attitude survey data. For example, anecdotally, one might consider: that the 
1979 general election was fought and won on the basis o f a discursive intervention that 
juxtaposed "the People" ("Us") to the power o f the leadership o f the trade unions ("Them") 
[see Hall, S. and Gamble, A., The Politics o f Thatcherism, (Lawrence and Wishart, London: 
1983), 26-34; and Young, H., One o f Us: Final Edition, (Pan Books, London, Sydney and 
Auckland: 1991), 127-131. (The difference in the emphasis between these two accounts is 
interesting. Whilst, for Stuart Hall, the attack on collectivism was, in 1979, the crucial 
ideological intervention, Hugo Young, whilst recognising the importance o f this attack, 
stresses its initially cautious character)]; that the 1979-1983 Conservative government 
enjoyed its highest levels o f support immediately following the war over the Falkland Islands 
(in this respect, Hugo Young states that "...While nobody can be certain what would have 
happened if  the war had never taken place, there is no room for disputing [that] the 
victory...abruptly lifted the Tories on to a plateau o f public support which, six months earlier, 
would have seemed quite unattainable [Young, 1991: 297])"; and that the "toughness" and 
"resoluteness" o f Margaret Thatcher were perceived to be her major attributes; for example, 
in an Observer/Harris poll, based upon a sample o f 1040 interviewees (19-20/04/89), voters, 
when asked to rate what they liked best about Mrs Thatcher, chose "determination" (32%); 
"courage" (16%); "leadership" (14%) and "strength" (14%) as the most significant 
characteristics [see "10 Years at Number 10", The Observer, 30/04/89]. Significantly, 
according to this same poll, "trade union reform" is the "best thing that Mrs Thatcher has 
done" [9]. And, with respect to attitude survey data, one might note, for example, that the 
British Social Attitudes Survey, throughout the 1980s, identified attitudes towards law and 
order, and sexual morality which were broadly in line with the authoritarianism of the 
Thatcherite message. See, for instance, the 1988/1989 survey [Jowell, R., Witherspoon, S. 
and Brook, L., (Eds.), British Social Attitudes: the 5th Report (Gower Publishing Company, 
Aldershot: 1988)), 47; 230; and 253. Similar patterns o f attitudes were identified by other 
surveys - for example, the British Election Study, May 1979, [cited in Sarlvik, B. and Crewe, 
I., Decade o f Dealignment, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1983), 170]. Both the 
British Attitudes Survey and the British Election Study surveys suggest that the public also 
held attitudes which were broadly consistent with the Thatcherite message in areas such as 
immigration control; EEC membership; trade union reform; and defence policy [see Sarlvik, 
B., and Crewe, I., (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1983), 170; 236; and 242; and 
Jowell, R., Witherspoon, S. and Brook, L., (Eds.), (Gower Publishing Company, Aldershot:
1988), 66; and 67].
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It is important to emphasise precisely what is being claimed here; namely, that the 
discourses of Thatcherism, as a result of the relative pervasiveness of authoritarian and 
oppositional ideas, beliefs and values in the mass public - and to the extent that they 
articulated the functional relationship between these kinds of idealities and the socio- 
existential dynamics of subjectivity - functioned to enable many of the individuals who 
had ostensibly rejected the politics of Thatcherism, to overcome, in part at least, the 
fears associated with existential anxiety. For example, such discourses could be used 
as mechanisms for the symbolic mastery of the external-world: (i) by confirming the 
reality of the ideas, beliefs and values that individuals already held; (ii) by managing 
the threat posed by the other, whether it be “law-breakers”, “sexual deviants”, 
“immigrants” or “political extremists”; and (iii) by reaffirming, as a consequence, the 
integrity of the in-group.
In sum, therefore, it is my claim that the Thatcherite intervention, even as it was 
experienced by the non-committed audience, can be understood in terms of an analytic 
framework that foregrounds the strategies and mechanisms that individuals employ to 
attain a certain degree of ontological security. In this respect, I have demonstrated that 
Thatcherite discourses represented, addressed and articulated the socio-existential 
dynamics of subjectivity. In the case of the committed audience, they did so, quite 
simply, by the celebration of the in-group and its associated folkways, which 
functioned to transport the committed audience to the heart of collective life and, 
thereby, to reaffirm their social identities. And, in the case of the non-committed 
audience, they did so: (i) by the utilisation of bi-polar oppositions to connote belonging 
and opposition, which resonated with the dynamics associated with the deepest levels 
of subjectivity; (ii) as a consequence of the contradictory nature of the attitudes, 
beliefs and values that individuals held, which meant that Thatcherite discourses 
inevitably resonated with certain of these, even where they conflicted with others; and 
(iii) as a result of the prevalence in the mass public of the kinds of ideas, beliefs and 
values that Thatcherism embodied in those of its discourses that were predicated upon 
relations of “inclusion” and ’’exclusion”, belonging and opposition.
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Populism - Some Conclusions
I have been arguing that Thatcherite discourses, as a result of their celebration of the 
in-group and condemnation of otherness, were peculiarly effective as mechanisms for 
generating social identity; for attaining a symbolic mastery of the external-world; and 
for achieving the symbolic negation of the other. It is in this sense that they 
represented, addressed and articulated the socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity. 
The important point is that it is precisely this celebration of the in-group and 
condemnation of otherness which marks out the Thatcherite intervention as populist. 
Therefore, the key to understanding populism is to understand that populist discourses, 
to the extent that they connote an apparently inalienable relative natural conception o f  
the world and deny complexity and otherness, dovetail with the socio-existential 
dynamics of subjectivity.
It is possible to use this insight to make a number of final comments about the 
arguments that I considered in Part I of this chapter. It will be remembered that both di 
Telia and Stewart claimed that populism is characteristically associated with situations 
of socio-economic marginality and exclusion. It is now easy to understand why this 
should be the case. At the level of individual subjectivity, the consequences of 
exclusion and marginality are the kinds of anxiety and insecurity that were 
experienced, for example, by sectors of the population of Germany following defeat in
78the 1914-1918 war; and by those people who were committed to an authoritarian 
world-view in the years preceding the advent of the 1979 Conservative administration. 
These feelings emerge as a result of the diminution of the self which occurs with the 
weakening of the typifications and relevances that define the in-group, and with the 
consequent decline in the ability of this group to confer upon its members the solidity 
of being that they seek. Of course, the important point is that in such circumstances the 
emergence of populist discourses, as mechanisms whereby individuals might achieve a 
reaffirmation of the self, is to be expected. In this respect, populism is primarily an 
integrative moment, its efficacy rooted in its ability to connote belonging and to negate 
otherness.
78 See Chapter 5, 149-157.
It is clear, therefore, that explanations of populism must concern themselves with the 
realm of subjectivity. Of course, it is precisely a neglect of this realm which 
undermines the three theories of populism that I considered in the first part of this 
chapter. Thus, with respect to the theories of di Telia and Stewart, it will be 
remembered that I have argued that neither theorist is able to specify adequately the 
dynamics of the emotional appeal of populism and, therefore, that neither is able to 
offer a satisfactory explanation of the mobilising and integrative properties of populist 
discourses. And I have claimed that Laclau’s analysis is similarly flawed, but with the 
added difficulty that in his case the neglect of subjectivity is not accidental, but rather 
a function of the Althusserian problematic which informs his work. With regard to 
Laclau’s theory, perhaps the most significant problem is that by reducing subjectivity 
to social structure, he guarantees that individuals are worthy of their historico- 
revolutionary destiny. As I noted in the first part of this chapter, his analysis rules out, 
as a matter of definition, the possibility that reactionary, popular traditions might be 
bom in and derive their efficacy from the structures of subjectivity.
However, it is clear that this position - quite apart from the difficulties inherent in 
arguing by definitional fiat - is unsustainable. The presence of reactionary themes in 
populist discourses is a manifestation of their effectiveness as mechanisms of political 
mobilisation and integration; an effectiveness which is rooted in the fact that they 
dovetail with the socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity. As we have seen, the 
attraction of populism is that it promises its audiences “ontological security”. 
Significantly, it does so not only by celebrating the in-group, but also by condemning 
otherness. Laclau fails to recognise the centrality of themes of “opposition” and 
“exclusion” in populist discourses. As a result, he is able to articulate the view that it is 
possible for “popular-democratic” interpellations to be harnessed to a future socialist 
project. However, this is clearly a false hope, undermined by the necessity which 
individuals experience to achieve the reaffirmation of the self; the symbolic mastery of 
the external-world; and the symbolic negation of the other.
CONCLUSION
In this conclusion, I will consider the importance and implications of the arguments 
developed in the preceding chapters and also specify some of their limitations. These 
arguments fall into four broad categories: (i) sociological/theoretical; (ii)
political/theoretical (abstract); (iii) socio-existential (or socio-psychological); and (iv) 
political/theoretical (concrete). I will construct this conclusion around an analysis of 
the arguments in each category in turn.
(i) Sociological/theoretical
Perhaps the most theoretical of the arguments which appear in this work is the idea 
that sociological concepts constitute their own reality. For the most part, this argument 
is implied rather than explicitly stated. It is seen most clearly in the claim that abstract 
entities have no objective correlates in the “real” world.1 It is also implicit in the 
frequent use of “ideal-typical” methodology to analyse sociological and political 
phenomena/
The notion that sociological concepts constitute their own reality is a function of the 
radical idealism which forms the meta-theoretical backdrop of this thesis. Obviously, it 
is not possible to explore here the details of this meta-theory. Nevertheless, it might be 
pertinent to specify its major claims. Firstly, it is held that the world beyond 
experience is essentially unknowable. This conclusion is inevitable once one has 
accepted an epistemology that privileges the knowledge claims of human 
consciousness. Secondly, and as a corollary of the first point, it is postulated that the 
objects of knowledge are mental constructs; they have no necessary equivalents in the 
external-world.3 And thirdly, it is held that the sciences - including the social sciences
1 See, for example, Chapter 3, 85; and Chapter 4, 102-104.
2 See, for example, my discussions of: social structure [Chapter 1, 29-32]; the relationship 
between beliefs/values and the typificatory frameworks o f  particular social groups [Chapter 
3, 84-85]; the ritualistic nature o f  party conferences [Chapter 5, 134]; and the definition o f  
populism [Chapter 6, 162-163].
3 This claim, as with the first claim, is the inevitable consequence o f  ascribing epistemological 
privilege to the sphere o f  consciousness. As is well known, those approaches that start with 
the interiority o f  consciousness in order to make judgements about what is "real" and about
- when they seek to understand a world which they conceive to be external to 
themselves, analyse precisely their attempts to understand this world.4
These claims have a number of broadly epistemological implications for the practice 
of the social sciences. Most significantly, the “truth” or “validity” of social scientific 
statements can be assessed only in terms of the conventions of the particular “finite 
provinces of meaning” from which they are derived.5 Moreover, as a consequence of 
the “closed” nature of such provinces o f meaning, there is no possibility of developing 
“formulae of transformation” to enable these provinces to be referred to one another. 
Of course, this begs the question: how is it possible that social scientists who occupy 
very different provinces of meaning are apparently able to engage in meaningful 
dialogue?
Needless to say, a full treatment of this question is beyond the scope of this 
conclusion. Consequently, I will restrict myself to a few remarks only. Perhaps the 
most important factor determining the possibility of communication across provinces 
of meaning is that social scientists enjoy a more or less similar socio-technical 
heritage. As a result, it is likely that certain of the baseline conceptions which they 
hold - for example, a commitment to the principles of deductive logic - will have a 
common derivation, providing the ground for meaningful dialogue, even where social 
scientists occupy veiy different provinces of meaning. Of course, the greater the 
degree of perceived commonality, the greater is the potential for such dialogue. 
However, it is important to recognise that this does not imply that there is any contact 
or overlap between discrete provinces of meaning. Rather, communication proceeds 
along the kinds of lines suggested by the following model:
what "exists" have great difficulty in reconstituting the external-world (e.g., Descartes, 
Husserl and Sartre).
4 The Hegelian parallels here are clear.
5 See my discussion o f Alfred Schutz's notion o f multiple realities [Chapter 3, 66-71]. 
Although I am talking here about "finite provinces o f meaning", I could just as easily be 
talking about: "paradigms" [Kuhn, T., The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, 2Dd Edition, 
(University o f Chicago Press Chicago: 1970)]; "language-games" [Wittgenstein, L., 
Philosophical Investigations, 3r Edition, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford: 1968)]; "problematics" 
[Althusser, L., For Marx, (The Penguin Press, London: 1969)]; "frames o f meaning" 
[Giddens, A., New Rules o f Sociological Method (Hutchinson, London: 1976), 130-154]; 
and so on.
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Social scientist X, in order to subject the theories and concepts of social scientist Y to 
critical analysis, will reconstruct these theories and concepts as typifications, their 
form being determined, in part, by the demands of the prevailing interest at hand6 
These typified theories and concepts will then be analysed and criticised according to 
the procedures that social scientist X  perceives to be appropriate; specifically, 
appropriate either in terms of the criteria specified by his own finite provinces of 
meaning; and/or in terms of the criteria that he perceives, also by means of 
typification, to apply within the provinces of meaning occupied by social scientist Y. 
This communicative process is wholly internal to the provinces of meaning occupied 
by social scientist X. It is these provinces of meaning which define the reality of the 
theories and concepts which he analyses. Consequently, it is entirely impossible for 
him to apprehend these theories and concepts in the same fashion as they are appre­
hended by social scientist Y.1
In addition to these broadly epistemological concerns, the radical idealism 
underpinning this thesis has had a number of more concrete theoretical and 
methodological consequences. In this respect, I have already noted the frequent use of 
“ideal-typical” methodology to analyse sociological and political phenomena. Perhaps 
the most striking, and yet at the same time problematic, usage of this methodology has 
been in the conceptualisation of social structure.8 To recap, I have argued that social 
structure is a constituted reality; it denotes behaviour that has been identified as 
regular and non-random. I have further argued that it is possible to specify social 
structure, as an abstraction, in terms of the typificatory frameworks associated with the 
average courses o f action followed by anonymous social actors.
According to Alfred Schutz, "...It is our interest at hand that motivates all our thinking, 
projecting, acting, and therewith establishes the problems to be solved by our thoughts and 
the goals to be attained by our actions [Schutz, (1970a): 111]."
7 The various critical analyses undertaken in this thesis take the form suggested by this model 
(see, for example, the discussions o f Schutz in Chapter 2; the analysis o f Marxist political 
theory in Chapter 4; the exposition o f Durkheim’s theory o f ritual in Chapter 5; and the 
discussion the various theories o f populism in Chapter 6). For a very different analysis o f the 
relationship between provinces o f meaning, see Giddens, A., New Rules o f Sociological 
Method, (Hutchinson, London: 1976), 142-148 (NB. Giddens uses the term "frames o f 
meaning").
8 See Chapter 1, 29-32.
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Such a conception is striking because it denies any materiality to social structure; 
social structure is specified in terms of the purely formal relationship between social 
action and the typificatory frameworks which govern that actioa Moreover, the 
insistence that social structure is a constituted reality serves to deny to it any role in the 
reproduction of regular, non-random behaviour. Rather, social structure is a purely 
conceptual device which facilitates the description and analysis of behaviour that has 
been identified as such.
Of course, this conception is not without its problems. For example, to the extent that 
social structure is specified in terms of a formal identity between social action and its 
associated typificatory frameworks, there is no clear theoretical space for an analysis 
of the incidental and unintended dimensions of regular, non-random behaviour.9 
Similarly, in this conception of social structure, social action is lifted out of its spatial 
and temporal context; that is, it is denied a “grounding” in the perceived reality of the 
external-world. Finally, and more generally, it might be objected that the specification 
of any particular social structure is based on an essentially arbitrary decision about 
what constitutes significant and distinct regular, non-random behaviour (i.e., an 
arbitrary decision about which patterns of behaviour warrant being specified in terms 
of which social structures).
Significantly, the kinds of problems represented by these examples are characteristic 
of the more general problems associated with ideal-typical methodology. In simple 
terms, these problems are normally conceived to be a function of the perceived 
disjunction between “ideal-types” and the reality that they represent. For example, 
Hindess argues “that in defining the relations between concepts and the real as an 
extra-theoretical relation of similarity or difference the epistemology of models or 
ideal types precludes rigorous conceptual investigation of any real event or situation 
[Hindess, 1977: 37] ”10
9 For a brief summary o f the importance o f the unintended consequences o f action, see 
Giddens, A., The Constitution o f  Society, (Polity Press, Cambridge: 1984), 8-14.
10 See generally, Hindess, B., Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Sciences, (The 
Harvester Press, Sussex: 1977), 34-38.
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However, this kind of criticism cannot easily be levelled against the conception of 
social structure as it has been outlined here. Moreover, neither can it easily be brought 
to bear as a criticism of the more general usage of ideal-typical methodology in this 
work. It cannot be brought so to bear because “ideal-types”, as they have been 
conceived in this thesis - and in contradistinction to the manner in which they are 
employed in Weber’s work - constitute the reality that they specify; that is, there is, as 
a result of the meta-theoretical commitment to radical idealism, no gap between 
concepts and the real. Thus, we have been led back to the original proposition that 
sociological concepts constitute their own reality. /
(ii) Political/theoretical (abstract)
Perhaps the broadest explicit concern of this thesis has been to demonstrate the 
inadequacies of political analyses that do not pay sufficient regard to issues of 
subjectivity; and to establish the substantive utility of a political sociology which does 
take these issues seriously. The theoretical justification for the insistence that political 
analysis must take proper notice of subjectivity was outlined in Chapter 6. To recap, it 
was claimed: firstly, that macro-political phenomena and processes are “solely the 
resultants and modes of organisation of the particular acts of individual persons 
[Weber, 1947: 92]”; secondly, that the structure of consciousness is a significant 
variable in the course of social action; and thirdly, that it is, therefore, necessary that 
political analysis concern itself with subjectivity.11
In this thesis, I have been concerned substantially with the politics of social group 
formation, political mobilisation and social integration. For example, in Chapter 4, I 
considered whether it is possible that a genuinely liberatory consciousness might 
emerge from within the working-class; in Chapter 5, I analysed the role of political 
ritual in the promotion of political mobilisation and social integration; and in Chapter 
6, I undertook a similar kind of analysis of populism. In all these instances, 
subjectivity was found to be central to an understanding of the particular phenomenon 
under consideration. And those analyses that neglected subjectivity in their treatment
11 See Chapter 6, 160.
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of these phenomena were found to be, at best, incomplete12 and, at worst, wholly 
unfounded.13
Notwithstanding the formal requirement - as specified above - that political analysis 
should concern itself with subjectivity, it is perhaps not surprising that subjectivity is 
so important to an understanding of these kinds of phenomena. Both political 
mobilisation and social integration require, on the part of the social actor, some degree 
of affective commitment to an in-group.14 In this respect, one might recall Randall 
Collins’ claim that “...Politics may...be described as a struggle by, with, and over “the 
means of emotional production” [Collins, 1988: 117].”15 Of course, an understanding 
of the relationship between emotions and politics is central to any kind of wider 
appreciation of the relationship between subjectivity and politics.16 Thus, I have 
sought, throughout this thesis, to demonstrate that social actors are more than simply 
rational maximisers of self-interest, especially, where self-interest is defined in purely 
material terms. For example, in Chapter 4 ,1 argued that the simple elimination of the 
material grounds of conflict (i.e., the transcendence o f scarcity) is not sufficient to 
guarantee the emergence of a conflict-free society, since individuals are motivated to 
conflict not solely by the possibility of material benefit, but also by an interest in 
conflict itself; an interest rooted in the ability of conflict to satisfy the necessity that 
individuals experience to reaffirm their senses of self.17
However, whilst I have indeed been concerned to demonstrate that social action is 
motivated, in part, by non-rational factors, it has not been possible to specify the full 
range of these factors. Instead, I have concentrated on motivational factors that might 
be termed socio-existential. As a result, a number of issues and ideas remain largely 
unexplored. Most significantly, I have not attempted to develop a theoretical treatment 
of emotion and, consequently, I have considered neither the relationship between
12 For example, Angus Stewart's analysis of populism [see Chapter 6, 167-171],
13 For example, the Marxist ideas concerning the genesis o f a conflict free society [see Chapter 
4, 112-121].
14 Obviously, a large part o f this thesis has been devoted to examining the nature o f such a 
commitment
15 See Chapter 5, 134.
15 Where emotions can be considered an aspect o f subjectivity.
17 See Chapter 4, 112-121.
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emotions in general and the various socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity, nor the 
relationship between emotions in general and socio-political action. Moreover, it will 
have been noted that I have also made no significant reference to psychodynamic 
theories and concepts.
As I indicated in the Introduction to this thesis, these omissions are not meant to imply 
that the ideas associated with these areas of research cannot usefully be incorporated 
into an analysis of the relationship between subjectivity and politics. Rather, their 
omission has been a function of the fact that the conceptual framework adopted here 
has not straightforwardly suggested their inclusion. Nevertheless, it goes without 
saying that many of the political forms and processes considered in this thesis might 
have been analysed in terms of a theoretical framework that employed a more 
inclusive conceptualisation of subjectivity than the one used in this work.
In addition, and related, to the attempt to establish the substantive utility of a political 
sociology that treats issues of subjectivity seriously, has been a concern to break down 
the absolute distinction between the political and the non-political. Paradoxically, 
there is, of course, a sense in which this is entirely unnecessary, since both the political 
and the non-political exist only as constituted realms; that is, they have no material 
reality in the external-world. Nevertheless, as I noted in the Introduction, the political - 
as a constituted realm - is often defined in terms of its opposition to the non-political. 
It is this constituted opposition, often associated with a macro-institutional approach to 
political analysis, that I have sought, in this thesis, to collapse.18 In this respect, three 
arguments are of particular significance:
1. In a most straightforward sense, it is possible to collapse the distinction 
between the political and the non-political at the level of explanation; that is, it 
is possible to reconstruct, either for the purposes of explanation or in the course 
of analysis, political forms and processes (i.e., forms and processes which are 
considered “political” in the macro-institutional orthodoxy) in non-political 
terms. In this respect, one might consider, for example, the analysis, in Chapter
18 However, as I stated I would in the Introduction, I have, at times, utilised an "exclusive" 
conception o f the political, for the purposes of analytical clarity.
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6, of Thatcherism’s “committed audience”.19 To recap, I used a socio-existential 
model of subjectivity and a Durkheimian notion of ritual, to conceptualise the 
behaviour which constituted the “renewal” of the Conservative Party that 
occurred in the early years of the Thatcher leadership. The significant point is 
that there is nothing to mark out this behaviour, so specified, as political rather 
than non-political.
2. It is possible to widen the definition of “the political” so that all social 
relationships have a political dimension. To this effect, I have argued that “the 
political” is defined by the presence of relations of power and conflict; and that 
the original relationship between Man and his fellow-Man is one based upon 
conflict. Clearly, to the extent that conflict is, therefore, a characteristic of all 
social relationships, the distinction between the political and the non-political is 
collapsed.20
3. I have argued that the significance of this argument, that all social relationships 
are characterised by conflict, lies in the fact that conflict finds expression 
largely in the will to symbolic negation; that is, in the necessity experienced by 
individuals to negate the foreignness of the other, whilst preserving the moment 
of otherness. In terms of the relationship between the political and the non­
political, the important point is that the will to symbolic negation, whilst 
belonging properly to the realms of subjectivity and micro-political 
intersubjectivity, is found also at the level of the macro-political. For example, I 
noted, in Chapter 5, that the ceremonials surrounding the monarchy function to 
negate symbolically the case for republicanism and, more generally, the beliefs 
and values that stand in opposition to the “sacred values” of the monarchy;21 
and in Chapter 6, I argued that the discourses of Thatcherism expressed a 
necessity experienced by the “committed” Thatcherite audience to negate those 
discourses that brought into question the taken-for-grantedness of their world­
views.22 Thus, in simple terms, these patterns of negation, and the more general
19 See Chapter 6, 186-191.
20 See Chapter 3, 86-93.
21 See Chapter 5, 146-148.
22 See Chapter 6, 186-191.
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patterns of negation characteristic of the relationship between in-group and out­
group, can be understood as a macro-transformation of the original conflictual 
relation between Man and his fellow-Man.23
Of course, it is possible to object to these arguments that, for the most part, the whole 
debate concerning the extent of “the political” is one about labels and definitions. And, 
needless to say, to the extent that the political is a constituted realm, there is a sense in 
which this is the case. Nevertheless, the major point stands; namely, that the 
constituted opposition between the political and the non-political is a purely analytical 
convenience; and that there exists an interpenetration between the macro-political, as 
it is constituted in the macro-institutional orthodoxy, and those “micro-political” 
phenomena of subjectivity and intersubjectivity that I have specified in this thesis.
(iii) Socio-existential (or socio-psychological)
I will only briefly summarise the various socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity that 
have been specified in this thesis, since these have been previously summarised in an 
earlier chapter.24
In simple terms, I have argued that as a result of a number of existential facts about 
consciousness, individuals manifest and are subject to various socio-existential 
dynamics of subjectivity. The most important of these are: (a) the necessity 
experienced by individuals to reaffirm their senses of self; (b) the desire for the 
symbolic mastery of the “external-world”; and (c) the will to symbolic negation. I will 
consider each of these in turn.
(a) The reaffirmation of the self
I have claimed that as a result of the experience of isolation, estrangement and lack of 
definiteness - a product of the intentionality of consciousness - the individual is fated
23 See Chapter 4, 118-120.
24 See Chapter 6, 159-161.
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to suffer a perpetual uncertainty and the lack of a solidity of being. As a consequence, 
he is compelled to seek continual reaffirmation of his sense of self.
This reaffirmation is primarily achieved in two ways. Firstly, by simple participation in 
the collective effervescence of social life, which functions to bind individuals to their 
social groups. The clearest example of this kind of reaffirmation of the self is that 
which is attained during occasions of ritualistic celebration.25 And secondly, it can be 
achieved by means of the symbolic mastery of the external-world, crucial to which 
process is the ability of the individual to identify cognitively and affectively with his 
in-groups, both with respect to the roles that he plays within these groups and, more 
generally, with respect to the typifications and relevances which define these groups.26
(b) The symbolic mastery of the “external-world”
The desire to attain the symbolic mastery of the external-world is more than a simple 
function of the necessity which individuals experience to achieve a reaffirmation of 
the self. In fact, rooted in the inexplicable and chaotic character of the relationship 
between Man and the external-world, it represents a distinct socio-existential dynamic 
of subjectivity. In this respect, for example, I noted Berger and Luckmann’s argument 
that “...All social reality is precarious. All societies are constructions in the face of 
chaos [Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 121]”; and that symbolic universes - bodies of  
theoretical tradition which encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality 
[Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 113] - function to assuage the ultimate terror which 
flows from Man’s chaotic and precarious relationship to the world, “by bestowing 
ultimate legitimation upon the protective structures of the institutional order [Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966: 120].”27
In general terms, it has been my claim that individuals routinely achieve the symbolic 
mastery of the external-world by means of the various judgements which comprise the 
normative sphere; or, to put this another way, that they are able to subordinate the
25 See Chapter 4, passim.
26 See Chapter 2, 48-64; Chapter 4, 115; Chapter 5,passim-, and Chapter 6, 183-195.
27 See Chapter 3, 71-73.
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external-world to their wills, to the extent that it is rendered transparent and explicable 
by the beliefs and values of this sphere.28
(c) The will to symbolic negation
According to Hegel, the self-conscious being, in the presence of otherness, is unable to 
achieve self-certainty; similarly, Sartre argues that the For-itself, under the gaze of the 
other, is reduced to an object and, consequently, is enslaved. It is these arguments that 
have led me to claim that the original relationship between Man and his fellow-Man is 
one based upon conflict.29 Of course, as I noted in Chapter 3, this kind of existential 
conflict rarely finds straightforward and overt expression in the social world. Thus, I 
have avoided, for example, the temptation to reduce “material” conflict to existential 
conflict. Nevertheless, as I have already noted in this conclusion, it is my claim that 
existential conflict finds expression in the will to symbolic negation.
It will be recalled that the will to symbolic negation refers to the necessity experienced 
by individuals to negate the threat posed by the foreignness of the other, whilst 
preserving the moment of otherness. I have argued that symbolic negation is normally 
achieved from within the realm of the normative sphere. Specifically, it is ordinarily 
achieved by the employment of normative judgements which function to assimilate the 
other to a world-view defined by the in-groups of the individual employing the 
judgements. Of course, the important point about such judgements is that they are 
mechanisms of familiarity and explication and, consequently, function to annul the 
threat posed by the foreignness of the other. Significantly, to this extent, they are also 
mechanisms to be employed for the symbolic masteiy of the external-world. Indeed, 
the whole process of symbolic negation is central to the struggle for symbolic mastery, 
in that its aim is to ensure that the external reality upon which the individual depends 
is fully expressive of him. This process, therefore, is central also to the attempts of the 
individual to reaffirm his sense of self.
28 See Chapter 3, 71-84; and passim.
29 See Chapter 3, 86-93.
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Obviously, it has been my aim to examine the significance of these socio-existential 
dynamics for political analysis. In this respect, it is possible to employ a threefold 
typology to summarise the purely analytical significance of these dynamics, as this has 
been conceived, both explicitly and implicitly, in this thesis. Firstly, the socio- 
existential dynamics of subjectivity have a causal significance with respect to political 
phenomena and processes; specifically, they enter as motivational factors in the 
emergence and development of political action, movements and discourses.30 
Secondly, these dynamics impart a functional significance to collective political action 
and political discourse, in that both of these constitute resources to be appropriated by 
individuals for the purposes of reaffirming the se lf and achieving both the symbolic 
mastery of the external-world and the symbolic negation of the other. And finally, 
these dynamics have a strategic political significance, in that they can be addressed 
and articulated by political actors and groups, primarily through the mechanisms of 
collective political action and political discourse.31
(iv) Political/theoretical (concrete)
Needless to say, 1 have been concerned to examine not only the formal analytical 
significance of the socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity, but also their importance 
for the understanding of a number of definite political phenomena and processes. In 
this respect, a number of the analyses that I have undertaken have particular 
importance; most significantly: (i) the critical analysis, in Chapter 4, of the Marxist 
idea that a genuinely liberatory consciousness might emerge from within the working- 
class; (ii) the analysis, in Chapter 5, of political ritual, and its role in the promotion of 
political mobilisation and social integration; and (iii) in Chapter 6, the critical analysis 
and reworking of the concept of populism.
However, I am not going to conclude by simply restating the arguments that were 
developed in each of these analyses, since this has already been done at the conclusion 
o f individual chapters and at various other points in this work. Instead, in order to 
summarise the political/theoretical (concrete) aspect of this thesis, I will briefly
30 See, for example, my discussion o f  Thatcherism, Chapter 6, 183-195.
31 See Chapter 6, 183-195; and Chapter 5, passim.
consider how some of the less abstract arguments that have been developed fit into the 
threefold typology of the analytical significance of the dynamics of subjectivity.
(i) Causal significance
I have alluded to the causal significance of the dynamics of subjectivity in all of the 
less abstract analyses of political phenomena and processes that I have undertaken. 
Specifically, for example, in Chapter 4 , 1 suggested that individuals are motivated to 
conflict by the promise of a reaffirmation of their senses of self; something which can 
be achieved in the conflictual relation, where people experience themselves and their 
in-groups with greater levels of intensity. In Chapter 6, I argued that populist 
movements emerge in circumstances of exclusion and marginality because they offer 
to their followers, through their discourses and political action, new social identities; 
where these identities had previously been undermined by the uncertainty and lack of 
definiteness which is the consequence of exclusion and marginality. And in a very 
similar fashion, I suggested, in Chapter 5, that National Socialism was, in part, a 
response to the perceived destruction of the traditional order; expressly, I claimed that 
this destruction had severely undermined the social identities of many German people, 
and that the attraction of National Socialism was that it offered to these people, 
particularly through its ritual and celebration, reconstructed social identities that were 
rooted in a new national myth.32
It is important to be absolutely clear about what is being claimed in all these instances; 
namely, that the socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity - specifically, in these 
examples, the necessity that individuals experience to reaffirm their senses of self - are 
significant motivational factors in the kinds of political action and beliefs that 
individuals manifest. However, it would not be correct to say that these actions and 
beliefs are caused by the socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity. To make such a 
claim would be to engage in the kind of oversimplifying reductionism that I have 
rejected at various points throughout this work.33 In this respect, it is important to
32 ,Of course, the suggestion in both this example, and in the previous example, is that 
individuals are motivated to commit themselves to specific political beliefs and actions 
because o f the promise o f new social identities.
33 See, for example, pages, 9; 24; 121; and 180.
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remember that all of the more concrete analyses in this thesis are ideal-typical in form. 
Specifically, these analyses have been constructed to exemplify the importance of 
issues of subjectivity for political analysis; to this extent, they do not claim to offer full 
explanations of the phenomena and processes they analyse.
(ii) Functional relationships
The idea that the socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity have a causal significance 
with respect to the emergence and development of political phenomena and processes 
is inextricably bound to the notion that collective political action and political 
discourse are resources to be appropriated by individuals for the purposes of 
reaffirming the self and achieving the symbolic negation of the other. In this respect, it 
has been my claim, as above, that individuals are motivated to participate in a specific 
political collective action and/or to adopt particular political attitudes by the 
anticipation that in doing so they will satisfy some of the demands associated with the 
socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity. To the extent that these demands are 
satisfied, the particular political collective action and/or political attitudes can be said 
to be functional for individuals at the level of subjectivity.
I have been concerned, in this thesis, to explore the nature of this functional 
relationship between collective political action and political discourse, on the one 
hand, and the socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity, on the other. Thus, for 
example, I argued, in Chapter 3, that political discourses, in their status as symbolic 
universes, function to render the external-world meaningful. Specifically, I claimed 
that their “ideas, beliefs and values...forming part of the realm of value-orientations, 
constitute an important resource for the individual who seeks the imaginative mastery 
o f the world; that is, that political discourse can be utilised in a strategy o f mastery”.34 
In Chapter 5, I argued that ritual in general, and. political ritual specifically, is 
functional at the level of subjectivity, in that it binds individuals to their in-groups and, 
therefore, functions to reaffirm their senses of self. It achieves such reaffirmation 
through two related processes: firstly, by the simple participation of individuals in 
intersubjectivity; and secondly, by celebrating and reaffirming a symbolic order which
34 See Chapter 3, 75.
represents and expresses the collective-life of the in-group.35 And in Chapter 6 ,1 noted 
that certain kinds of political discourses have a peculiar effectiveness as mechanisms 
of political integration and mobilisation; namely, those discourses that celebrate the 
in-group and its traditions, and denigrate the out-group. I went on to argue that this 
effectiveness is rooted in the fact that such discourses, by employing a rhetoric of 
belonging and opposition, function to achieve for their audiences both the
36reaffirmation of their senses of self and the symbolic negation of the other.
(iii) Strategic significance
Of course, the functional relationship between collective political action/political 
discourse and the socio-existential dynamics of subjectivity has a strategic political 
significance. Specifically, it is possible for political actors and movements to use this 
relationship for their own political ends. Thus, for example, I showed, in Chapter 5, 
how political ritual can be utilised as a mechanism for the “mobilisation of bias”. To 
illustrate this point, I examined the ritualistic and celebratory politics of the Third 
Reich, and concluded that ritual performed a number of crucial functions for the 
National Socialist regime. Perhaps most importantly, by the mechanism of ritualistic 
celebration, the National Socialist Weltanschauung was presented as legitimate, 
natural and inviolable.37 Similarly, in Chapter 6, I demonstrated that populist 
discourses can be utilised to the same general effect. More precisely, I showed that 
such discourses are likely to be invoked in socio-political conditions of exclusion and 
marginality because their ability to articulate the socio-existential dynamics of 
subjectivity lends to them a peculiar efficacy as mechanisms of social integration and 
mobilisation, where both integration and mobilisation are central to the success of a 
political regime or movement. In this respect, as a concrete example, I demonstrated 
that the discourses of Thatcherism - a populist intervention - constituted the mecha­
nism by which the collective sentiments of the Conservative Party were renewed; and I 
argued that the early success of Thatcherism lay in its ability to unite a disunited and
35 See Chapter 5, passim.
36 See Chapter 6, 183-195; and passim.
37 See Chapter 5, 149-157.
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demoralised party in a manner that enabled its supporters to transcend the isolation
38and estrangement of the solitary relation.
It is important to emphasise exactly what is being claimed here; namely, that political 
actors and movements will utilise collective political action and/or political discourse - 
especially those discourses that employ a rhetoric of belonging and opposition - in 
order to achieve politically expedient, social integration and political mobilisation. 
However, this does not imply a necessary awareness, on the part of political actors, of 
the precise mechanisms underlying the emergence of social integration and political 
mobilisation (these mechanisms involving the functional relationship between 
collective political action/political discourse and the socio-existential dynamics of 
subjectivity). Quite simply, political actors do not need to know how integration and 
mobilisation are generated, in order to know, and to utilise, the kinds of collective 
political action and political discourse which do generate this integration and mobilisa­
tion.
To sum up, then, the most general aim of this thesis has been to explore the 
relationship between subjectivity and various political processes and phenomena, with 
a view both to demonstrate the inadequacies of political analyses that do not pay 
sufficient regard to the issues surrounding the notion of subjectivity\ and to show the 
substantive utility of a political sociology which does take^these^issues seriously. To 
this end, I have developed an argument about the nature of consciousness, subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity, which I have employed: (i) to criticise various existing political 
analyses; and (ii) to develop new theories of the mechanisms and politics o f social 
group formation, social integration and political mobilisation. Above all else, I hope 
that I have demonstrated that political sociology must extend its reach beyond the 
boundaries set by the macro-institutional orthodoxy, to concern itself variously with: 
social actors and their beliefs, values, hopes and fears; the political dimensions of 
intersubjective relationships, where politics is defined by the presence of power and 
conflict; the nature of social actors’ experience of the social world and the way in 
which this both affects and is affected by their cognitions and emotions; and the
38 See Chapter 6, 186-191; and passim.
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relationship between this experience, the cognitions and emotions of social actors, and 
political phenomena and processes (where the political is defined in terms of its 
opposition to the non-political).
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